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The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation:
Perceptions and Realities of the New
Burden-of-Proof Rules
Steve R. Johnson*
There is a growing political science and legal literature on the use of
symbolism in the political and legislative process.' Tax law is a natural
arena for such inquiry as tax law touches virtually every type of human in-
teraction, is heavily value-driven, and is a perennial political battleground.'
This article examines a recent tax law change-the enactment of new bur-
den-of-proof rules in the summer of 1998--concluding that it is a perni-
cious exercise in symbolic legislation.
Burden-of-proof rules determine how much evidence a party must in-
troduce at trial in order to prevail. In theory, a dispute-resolution system
could operate without established burden-of-proof rules, but such a system
would impose greater demands of perspicacity on its triers of fact and likely
would be less predictable as to its outcomes? Thus, discussion and debate
about what burden-of-proof rules should prevail have been part of our legal
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. BA, St. Fran-
cis College; J.D., New York University. I thank Alfred Aman, Monica Miller, Lawrence Lok-
ken, Mary Alice McKeen, William Popkin, Lauren Robel, Susan Stabile, and Lawrence Zelenak
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank Christopher Atkins
and Sandra Owen for research assistance.
1. See, e.g., MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964); CHARLES D.
ELDER & ROGER W. COBB, THE POLITICAL USES OF SYMBOLS (1983); John P. Dwyer, The Pa-
thology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990).
2. Some scholarship exists regarding symbolism in tax legislation. See, e.g., William
Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX
L. REV. 287 (1996); Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the Taxation of
High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 182-85 (1993) (stating that the Code is an important
means of communicating cultural values between the nation and its citizens). The potential
for further work along these lines is great.
3. A purely inquisitorial system (in which the court gathers the evidence) has less need
for burden-of-proof rules. They are central, however, to our adversarial system which relies on
the litigants to gather and present the evidence. See, e.g., JOHN H. WIGMORE, 9 WVIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE 276 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burden of Proof in
Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26J. LEGALSTUD. 413, 413-15 & n.5 (1997).
Solomon's threat to bisect the baby was a way to resolve a dispute between litigants who other-
wise appeared to have presented equal proof. See I Kings 4:16-28. Because judges in our
system may not have such an option available to them, they presumably would resolve a com-
parable dispute adversely to the party deemed to bear the burden of proof.
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system for centuries.4
For generations, the allocation of the burden of proof in tax litigation
was settled. With well understood exceptions, the taxpayer bore the burden
of proof in civil tax litigation. In summer 1998, however, Congress unset-
tled the area. As part of major legislation restructuring the Internal Reve-
nue Service,' Congress created new Internal Revenue Code § 7491. This
section provides that, if certain conditions are met and certain exceptions
are avoided, the civil tax burden of proof is now on the Government.
However, those conditions and exceptions are so broad that they es-
sentially swallow the rule. As a result, § 7491 will meaningfully alter alloca-
tion of the tax burden of proof in only rare cases. Section 7491 is a largely
self-canceling section, but, despite that, not a harmless section. The uncer-
tainties and frustrations bred by § 7491-indeed, by any section which
"takes away with the left hand what it bestows with the right hand"-will
decrease the efficiency of our system of dispute resolution and will reduce
public support for our tax administration system.
This article examines these concerns in six parts. Part I is founda-
tional. It describes the burden allocation that existed before enactment of §
7491, stressing its four key qualities: its longevity, flexibility, consistency
with burden-of-proof theory generally, and widespread approval. Thereaf-
ter, Part I describes § 7491.
Part II details the conditions and exceptions in the new section. It
demonstrates that major classes of tax litigants and tax issues are categori-
cally ineligible for burden shifting. It further shows that, even when burden
shifting is theoretically available, the limiting conditions imposed render
such a shift, as a practical matter, largely worthless to taxpayers. Thus, §
7491 is without substance.
Two related questions are raised by the foregoing. If, as argued in Part
I, the former rule was long established, well reasoned, and widely sup-
ported, why did Congress choose to write a new statute?6 Further, if Con-
gress thought change really was needed, why did it write the new statute in
4. Thayer remarked that the subject of burden of proof "belongs to universal jurispru-
dence," and he saw its roots extending back as far as Roman law. James B. Thayer, The Burden
of Proof, 4 HARv. L. REV. 45,47 (1890).
5. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, Pub. L No. 105-206, 112
Stat. 685 [hereinafter the "Restructuring Act"].
6. As late as 1996, there existed a "bipartisan consensus in the tax world that [reversing
the burden of proof] would prove disastrous." Shifting the Burden of Proof to The IRS: Consider-
ing the Possibilities, 72 TAX NOTES 1328, 1328 (1996); see, e.g., Jerry A. Kasner, Why Burden-of-
Proof Rules Will Affect Valuation Issues, 81 TAx NOTES 239, 239 (1998) (calling § 7491 "an
amazing change in the law"). Yet Congress enacted § 7491, which purportedly changes the
burden, in 1998. In the space of two years, how did we get from the former bipartisan consen-
sus to § 7491?
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a way that defeats the possibility of substantial change in allocation of the
burden?
These questions are addressed in Part III. It shows that Congress was
responding to two conflicting forces: the desire to garner political advan-
tage by chastising or curbing the IRS, and the reality that a true, general
shift of the burden of proof would have enormous, adverse effects. Steering
between these, Congress chose the path of symbolism. It enacted something
that looks like a reassignment of the burden of proof (garnering political
points) but which, practically, will have little or no effect on the outcomes of
actual tax cases (avoiding the worst of the adverse effects).
The symbol, however, does not come free of cost. To say that § 7491 is
ineffectual is not to say that it is innocuous. Parts IV and V explain the
harms that Congress permitted in order to achieve its symbol. Part IV con-
centrates on harms to the tax controversy system, including reduced pro-
duction of information on audit and increased expense and inconvenience
at trial. Part V focuses on a more subtle but ultimately even more serious
type of harm: reduced public confidence in, and support for, the nation's
tax system.
Finally, Part VI offers a proposal. Before § 7491 was enacted, taxpay-
ers usually bore the burden of proof in civil tax litigation although numer-
ous specific, rifle-shot exceptions existed that placed part or all of the bur-
den on the IRS when warranted by the nature of the issue or procedural
circumstances. That was the responsible choice. Part VI proposes that Con-
gress go "back to the future," reinstating a general rule placing the burden
on taxpayers, ameliorated appropriately by specific, situational exceptions.
It describes two alternative ways to accomplish that result.
I. SECTION 7491 AND ITS ANTECEDENT
Golden ages are mythic,' and invocations of them usually are exercises
in selective recall. The pre-§ 7491 regime was not perfect. As far as the im-
perfection of human affairs allows, however, it was pretty good. As shown in
subparts I.A. through I.C., it was long standing, highly flexible, consistent
with factors traditionally governing allocation of the burden of proof, and
widely supported. Subpart I.D. describes § 7491.
A. LONG TENURE OF THE PRE-§ 7491 RULE
For over a century," it has been customary to distinguish between two
7. The pioneering work distinguishing between these two aspects of the burden of proof
was done by James Bradley Thayer in the 1890s. See JAMES.BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
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aspects of the burden of proof: the duty of bringing forward evidence (the
burden of production), and the risk of nonpersuasion (the burden of per-
suasion).8 Although courts and commentators are often less than precise in
their use of terms in the area, the unelaborated term "burden of proof' is
typically intended to mean only the burden of persuasion.9 That is my in-
tended meaning when I use that term in this article.
In criminal tax litigation, both the burden and standard of proof are
the same as in other varieties of criminal law. The Government prevails
only if it proves the defendant-taxpayer guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.1 °
In civil tax litigation, however, it was settled, before enactment of §
7491, that the burden of proof typically was on the taxpayer, usually dis-
chargeable through a preponderance of the evidence." That rule enjoyed
long tenure. The burden was placed on the taxpayer virtually from the be-
ginning of the modern income tax, and that allocation had antecedents in
federal tax law in the 1800s.
The most frequently cited case in this country's tax jurisprudence is
the Supreme Court's 1933 decision in Welch v. Helvering.'2 Although that
case is important in defining when business expenses are "ordinary and
necessary" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162, most citations to Welch relate
to its statement of the allocation of the civil tax burden of proof: "[The
Commissioner's] ruling has the support of a presumption of correctness
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE ATTHE COMMON LAw 353 (1898); Thayer, supra note 4, at 8.
8. See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Dept. of Labor v.
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272-75 (1994) (discussing the definition of burden of
proof); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-58 (1981) (discussing
the purpose behind the two aspects of the burden of proof); FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 337-43 (4th ed. 1992) (examining in treatise fashion the two burdens); 21
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
5122 (1977) (examining in treatise fashion the two burdens); John T. McNaughton, Burden of
Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1382, 1382-83
(1955).
9. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1015 (1975) (identifying the burden of persuasion as the burden of proof); WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 8, at 555 (explaining the various uses of the term "burden of proof");
Theodore Ness, The Role of Statutory Presumptions in Determining Federal Tax Liability, 12 TAX L
REV. 321, 330 (1957).
10. E.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 126 (1954).
11. E.g., United States v.Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976) (stating that the burden of proof
is on the taxpayer); Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515 (1935) (stating that "unquestiona-
bly the burden of proof is on the taxpayer"); Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887
(3d Cir. 1986) (stating that the burden of production and burden of persuasion are on the
taxpayer); Estate of Todisco v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1, 6 (Ist Cir. 1985) (stating that the
burden of proof rests on the taxpayer).
12. 290 U.S. 111 (1933). A computer search on June 4, 1998, revealed 5733 citations to
Welch.
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and the [taxpayer] has the burden of proving it to be wrong.""
Despite its vintage, however, Welch was far from the first occasion on
which this burden had been cast on taxpayers. The burden of proof fell on
taxpayers under the United States' first income tax in 1862" and under
other revenue measures in the 1800's.5 Thus, the former burden rules had
"been in place for well over a century and [were] closely woven into the
fabric of our [tax] system."1 6
The rules for burden of proof governing tax cases applied without re-
gard for the type of tax issue involved. Most federal tax cases are either
prepayment suits in the Tax Court or bankruptcy court, or refund actions
in the Court of Federal Claims, district court, or bankruptcy court. 7 Al-
though some differences existed among the various fora, the taxpayer typi-
cally bore the burden of proof regardless of where the case was tried. For
example, from its inception, the Board of Tax Appeals (the forerunner of
the Tax Court) imposed the burden on taxpayers in most instances.' 8 In
ensuing revisions of its rules, the Tax Court repeatedly reaffirmed the gen-
eral thrust of the Board's rule.'9
In a refund action, while the taxpayer's burden is, in theory, higher
than it is in a Tax Court case, the burden remained with the taxpayer. In
Tax Court, the taxpayer discharges his burden of proof by showing that the
IRS's determination was arbitrary and excessive, whereupon the burden to
show the correct amount of tax liability shifts to the IRS.2 In a refund ac-
tion, however, the taxpayer must do more than show the IRS's determina-
13. Id. at 115.
14. Former IRS Chiefs Say IRS Should Not Bear Burden of Proof in Court, 95 TAX NOTES
TODAY 75-20 (Apr. 18, 1995) (reproducing letter from 10 former IRS Commissioners to the
Chairs of the House Ways & Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee).
15. See, e.g., Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877) (involving a refund action of fed-
eral import duties).
16. Exploring the Development of Taxpayer Bill of Rights II Legislation: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways & Means 104th Cong. 40, 45 (1995)
[hereinafter "TBOR II hearing"] (statement of Margaret Milner Richardson).
17. For a fuller discussion of the various tax trial tribunals, see Steve R. Johnson, The
Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court Decisions
Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REv. 235, 238-42 (1998). Traditional descriptions of the tax trial
system omit the bankruptcy court. However, the growing number, dollar magnitude, and
sophistication of tax issues tried in that court require the bankruptcy court to be taken seri-
ously as a tax trial forum. See id. at 240-42 (discussing the growing significance of the bank-
ruptcy court as a tax trial forum).
18. See B.T.A. Rule 20 (July 1, 1924 ed.); see also Avery v. Commissioner, 22 F.2d 6, 8 (5th
Cir. 1927) (stating that the burden of proof on taxpayers is a well-settled rule).
19. See generally TAX CT. R. 32; TAX CT. R. 142. For exceptions under these rules, see
infra text accompanying notes 319 to 331.
20. See, e.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515 (1934) (explaining this burden-
shifting procedure).
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tion was incorrect; she also must establish the amount of the refund to
which she is entitled.'
A second difference also exists. Refund actions often involve counter-
claim or set-off issues raised by the Government. The burdens as to such
issues are complex and can shift between the parties.2 2 The matter is sim-
pler in Tax Court prepayment cases. There, the IRS typically will raise all
adjustments in the statutory notice of deficiency. If the IRS realizes there
was an adjustment it missed, it will raise the adjustment in its pleadings and
will bear the burden of proof as to that adjustment.23
By contrast, although all bankruptcy courts impose at least some bur-
den on the debtor-taxpayer, there is a split as to how great that burden is.
In a bankruptcy proceeding, creditors may file proofs of claim reflecting
what they believe the debtor owes them. A properly filed proof of claim
constitutes prinza facie evidence of both the validity and the amount of the
debt or liability.24 However, the debtor or bankruptcy trustee may object to
the claim. If he does, and if he presents evidence to rebut the prima fade
correctness of the claim, the creditor bears the ultimate burden of proof as
to the claim. 5
Before the enactment of § 7491, when a tax issue was tried in bank-
ruptcy court via objection to an IRS proof of claim, some courts concluded
that the above scheme overrode the usual burden-of-proof allocation.
21. Id. at 514-15; see also Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932); Forbes v. Hassett,
124 F.2d 925, 928 (1st Cir. 1942); Comment, Burden of Proof in Tax Litigation: Offset and Equi-
table Recoupment, 15 BUFF. L. REv. 616, 617-19 (1966).
This theoretical difference likely matters little. Evidence that the taxpayer presents to
persuade the Tax Court that the IRS's determination was arbitrary and excessive typically also
suffices (along with the other evidence introduced at trial) to permit reasonable determination
of true tax liability. See IRA L. SHAFIROFF, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE DESKBOOK 160 (2d ed. 1989).
22. In a case of some vintage, the Court of Claims (an ancestor of the current Court of
Federal Claims) set out perhaps the most intricate allocation. It divided setoffs into four cate-
gories: (1) an item in the same tax period involving the same tax as the taxpayer's refund
claim, (2) an item in the same period involving a different tax but which is related to and
ultimately affects the amount of the tax liability at issue, (3) an item in the same period in-
volving a different tax unrelated to the tax in the refund claim, and (4) an item in a different
tax period involving any type of tax whether related or unrelated to the tax in the refund
claim. The court held that the Government bears the burden as to setoffs of the third and
fourth types and that, as to setoffs of the first and second types, the Government must present
some substantial evidence in support of the setoff whereupon the burden settles on the tax-
payer. Missouri Pacific R.Rv. United States, 338 F.2d 668, 670-71 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
For other discussions of the burden of proof as to counterclaims and setoffs in refund
actions, see, for example, MARVIN GARBIS ET. AL., FEDERALTAX LITIGATION 17-29 (1985).
23. TAx CT. R. 142(a) (1998).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (Vest 1999); B.R 3001(f).
25. E.g., In re Holm, 931 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1991).
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These courts held that, upon objection to the IRS's claim and presentation
of evidence in support of the objection, the burden of persuasion was on
the IRS." Other courts, however, concluded that the character of the issue
controlled over the forum in which it was being litigated, and therefore
held that the usual burden-of-proof allocation applied even when a tax
issue was being litigated in the bankruptcy court.
Thus, the former rule placing the burden generally on taxpayers had
deep roots and was followed, with differences in detail, in all of the tax trial
tribunals. As detailed in Appendix A, Congress and the courts did carve out
exceptions, altering allocation of the burden in targeted, atypical situations.
However, the very pattern of those localized exceptions emphasized the
settled nature of the former general rule. An observation by congressional
staff as to the presumption of correctness attaching to IRS determinations
8
has equal force with respect to the burden of proof:
Although this presumption is judicially based, rather than legisla-
tively based, there is considerable evidence that the presumption
has been repeatedly considered and approved by Congress. This
is the case because the Internal Revenue Code contains a number
of civil provisions that explicitly place the burden of proof on the
[IRS] in specifically designated circumstances. The Congress
would have enacted these provisions only if it recognized and ap-
proved of the general rule of presumptive correctness of the
[IRS's] determination."
B. PRE-§ 7491 REGIME'S FLEXIBILITYAND CONSISTENCY WITH BURDE_-OF-
PROOF THEORY
Although the pre-§ 7491 regime generally placed the burden of proof
on the taxpayer, there were exceptions. There were dozens of situations in
26. E.g., In re MacFarlane, 83 F.3d 1041, 1044-46 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 U.S.
1243 (1997); In re Placid Oil Co., 988 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1993), nonacq., 1995-1 C.B. 1.
27. E.g., In re Landmark Equity Corp., 973 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1992); Resyn Corp. v.
United States, 851 F.2d 660, 663 (3d Cir. 1988).
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Tax Advisory Committee voted 9 to 1
in favor of the view that the normal burden allocation as to tax issues should apply in bank-
ruptcy proceedings as well. FINAL REPORT OF TAX ADVISORY COMMITrEE OF NATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, Item 211 (1997). The full Commission agreed and in-
cluded this among its recommendations to Congress. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS, Recommendation 3.2.5 (1997).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 150-59.
29. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF SENATE FINANCE
COMMITEE CHAIRMAN'S MARK RELATING TO REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE 36 (JCX-17-98) (Mar. 26, 1998).
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which, by statute, court rule, or judicial decision, part or all of the burden
was placed on the IRS. These exceptions were in recognition of the unusual
nature of particular issues or procedural postures and were an established
part of the former regime. This system show cases that regime's flexibility.
Moreover, the total package-the burden generally on taxpayers but with
situationally appropriate exceptions-comported well with the principles
and factors that govern allocation of the burden of proof in our legal sys-
tem generally. Thus, the pre-§ 7491 regime was not some special "brealk"
or advantage for the IRS-it was consistent with burden-of-proof theory
generally.
In developing these points, an organizational challenge looms. The
two conclusions above-the flexibility of the former regime and its consis-
tency with general burden theory-are important to the arguments in this
Article. However, the road to those conclusions runs through many par-
ticulars. To develop them is a painstaking endeavor and is likely to excite
only tax procedure specialists.
Thus, I have resorted to the device of developing the requisite par-
ticulars as to the prior rule's flexibility in Appendix A, and those as to the
rule's consistency with general burden theory in Appendix B. Once the
reader has waded through enough of them to be convinced of the accuracy
of the two conclusions, I urge her to proceed to subpart I.C. for discussion
of a further aspect of the previous regime.
C. WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR PRE-§ 7491 RuLE
Over the long tenure of the pre-§ 7491 rule, occasional proposals were
made to shift the burden of proof to the IRS as to all or most tax issues."0
For instance, the original version of the first Taxpayer Bill of Rights con-
tained a provision to shift the burden, but it was removed from the legisla-
tion before enactment."1 The most persistent advocate of reversal, Repre-
sentative James A. Traficant, Jr., of Ohio, introduced a series of bills to this
effect. 2
30. E.g., H.R. 2389, 97th Cong. (1981).
31. The original version was in S. 604, 100th Cong. § 16(a) (1987), and H.R. 634, 100th
Cong. § 11 (1987). The enacted version was Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act,
§§ 6226-6235, 102 Stat. 3730-3737 (1988).
32. These included H.R. 5286, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 250, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.
390, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2450, 104th Cong. (1995); and H.R. 367, 105th Cong. (1997).
Among other legislation introduced by Representative Traficant was H.R. 5005, 102d Cong.
(1992), which would have provided: "Any person operating a trade or business in the State of
Ohio shall be exempt from all Federal laws and regulations applying with regard to such a
trade or business."
For completeness, Representative Traficant's personal difficulties with the IRS should
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What is striking about such proposals, however, is how relatively few
there were, how handily they were defeated, and how general the opposi-
tion to them was. When a burden-shift proposal emerged-whether § 7491
or some prior proposal-a familiar coalition rallied against it.
First, tax administrators consistently opposed a general burden shift.33
For example, ten former IRS Commissioners voiced their opposition to
such a shift to the Chairs of the House Ways & Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee. They stated: "It is clearly beyond the realm of
possibility that our income tax system could continue in anything like its
present form if this proposal were to become law."34
Judges experienced with tax litigation also repeatedly explained the
necessity of maintaining a system in which the burden of proof lay with the
taxpayer. An original member of the Board of Tax Appeals made this point
when testifying to Congress in 1925,'5 and subsequent judges have con-
firmed it in decisions,36 legislative statements, 37 and commentary.3 8
be noted. The IRS determined that he was liable for deficiencies and civil fraud penalties for
failing to report and pay tax on bribes he received. The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit
upheld those determinations although Representative Traficant was acquitted of related
criminal tax evasion charges. See Sheryl Stratton, Shifting the Burden of Proof to the IRS: Consid-
ering the Possibilities, 72 TAX NOTES 1328, 1329 (1996) (quoting former IRS Commissioner
Donald C. Alexander: "Traficant has been pushing [reversing the burden of proof) ever since
he found out, to his surprise, that bribes were income.").
Ironically, Representative Traficant still would have lost his Tax Court case even if his
proposals bad been the law. The IRS has long borne the burden of proof in fraud cases, even
under the old regime. See infra text accompanying note 315.
33. See, e.g., TBOR II hearing, supra note 16, at 17 (1995) (statement of Cynthia G. Beer-
bower, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy); id. at 40 (1995) (statement
of Margaret Milner Richardson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
34. Former IRS Chiefs Say IRS Should Not Bear Burden of Proof in Court, 95 TAX NOTES
TODAY 75-20 (Apr. 18, 1995) (reproducing letter from Shirley D. Petersen, Randolph W.
Thrower, Donald C. Alexander, Mortimer M. Caplin, Sheldon S. Cohen, Roscoe L Egger Jr.,
Fred T. GoldbergJr., Lawrence B. Gibbs, Jerome Kurtz &Johnnie M. Walters).
Other statements of opposition from these former Commissioners include TBOR II
hearing, supra note 16, at 136 (statement of Donald C. Alexander); id. at 130 (statement of
Lawrence B. Gibbs); id. at 141 (statement of Sheldon S. Cohen); id. at 119 (statement of Fred
T. Goldberg, Jr.); IRS Restructuring and Oversight Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm.,
105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 282 (1998) [hereinafter "IRS Restructuring'] (statement of Fred Gold-
berg, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy); id. at 264 (statement of Sheldon
S. Cohen).
35. Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 69th
Cong. 908-09 (1925) (statement ofJames S. Ivins).
36. E.g., Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
37. E.g., Burden-of-Proof Provision Could Spur Disputes, Tax Court ChiefJudge Says, 98 TAX
NOTES TODAY 12-58 (Jan. 20, 1998) (reproducing letter from Chief'Judge Mary Ann Cohen to
Senate Finance Committee).
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In addition, tax academics argued against burden shifting. An impor-
tant article written when Congress was considering the first Taxpayer Bill of
Rights concluded that "the apparently attractive notion of making the tax
collector's job more difficult [by reversing the burden of proof] is short-
sighted and simplistic.""9 There was a notable outpouring of academic op-
position to § 7491 at various phases in the legislative process" and criticism
of it after its enactment.4' Other commentators also weighed in against a
general shift of the tax burden of proof. The strong balance of such com-
mentary supported the previous burden allocation in tax cases and op-
posed burden-shifting proposals.42
Perhaps most interestingly, leading taxpayers' representatives also re-
peatedly spoke against a general shift of the tax burden of proof. At first
blush, one might think that tax lawyers and other representatives would
lead the chorus for the shift, but they have not. Recognizing that a shift
would disadvantage honest taxpayers relative to dishonest ones,43 could
lead to more-not less-intrusive audits,4 4 and would severely compromise
38. E.g., CCH TAXDAY, Oct. 22, 1997 (quoting Samuel Sterrett, former ChiefJudge of the
Tax Court); cf. Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture: The United States Tax
Court: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 15 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 12-15 (1998) (detailing the diffi-
culties that will be caused by § 7491).
39. Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax
Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239,282 (1988).
40. See, e.g., Burden of Proof-Response to the Tax Profs, 78 TAX NOTES 1066 (1998) (letter
from Prof. Richard B. Malamud); Reject Burden-of-Proof Shift, Urges Tax Prof 78 TAX NOTES
753 (1998) (reprinting letter from Prof. Bernard Wolfman to Senators William V. Roth, Jr.,
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan); Tax Profs Urge Rejection of Burden-of-Proof Shift, 78 TAX NOTES
755 (1998) (reprinting letter from ninety-seven tax professors to Senate Finance Committee
members); IRS Restructuring: Burden of Persuasion vs. Burden of Production, 77 TAX NOTES 624
(1997) (reprinting letter from Prof. Calvin H. Johnson to Senator William V. Roth, Jr.); Burden
of Proof Shift Worries Tax Professors From Coast to Coast, 77 TAX NOTES 623 (1997) (reprinting
letter from Profs. Glenn Coven, Jerome Borison, John K. McNulty and Richard Westin to
Senators William V. Roth, Jr., and Daniel Patrick Moynihan). Professor Daniel Q. Posin com-
municated his opposition electronically to Senator John Breaux of the Finance Committee in
December 1997.
41. See Leandra Lederman, Unforeseen Consequences of the Burden of Proof Shift, 80 TAX
NOTES 379 (1998) (arguing that the consequences of the burden of proof shift ultimately will
be unfavorable to taxpayers). Another recent article concluded that § 7491 will usually have a
negligible effect on the outcome of litigated tax cases but could give taxpayers a strategic
advantage in some instances. Nathan E. Clukey, Examining the Limited Benefits of the Burden of
Proof Shift, 82 TAX NOTES 683 (1999).
42. E.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Shi ling the Burden orJust Shyiling the Blame?, 77 TAX NOTES 484
(1997); Note, The Presumption of Correctness: Should the Commissioner Be Required To Carry the
InitialBurden of Production, 55 FORDHAM L REv. 1087, 1108 (1987).
43. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text.
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the effectiveness of our tax system,45 responsible taxpayers' representatives
acknowledged that their interests and those of their clients are better
served by leaving the burden on the taxpayer in most instances. In recent
years, this view has been expressed by, among others, representatives of the
American Bar Association Section of Taxation,46 the New York State Bar
Association Tax Section,47 the Tax Executives Institute,48 the Community
Tax Law Project,49 the National Association of Enrolled Agents, 0 individual
taxpayers' representatives, and others.5 '
Of course, unanimity in these affairs is not to be expected, and so, in-
evitably, occasional voices advocated burden shifting. 52 What is notable,
however, is the rarity of such voices and the overwhelming consensus that
the burden of proof generally should rest on the taxpayer, not the IRS.
D. SECTION 7491
The Restructuring Act had its roots in the work of the National Com-
mission on the Restructuring of the Internal Revenue Service, popularly
known as the Kerry-Portman Commission.53 The Commission presented its
45. See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
46. E.g., IRS Restructuring, supra note 34, at 417 (statement of Stefan F. Tucker); Recom-
mendations of the National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue Service and Taxpayer
Protections and Rights, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways &
Means, available in 1997 WL 14151435, at *49 (1997) (statement of Pamela F. Olson); TBOR II
hearing, supra note 16, at 158 (statement of N. Jerold Cohen).
47. E.g., NYSBA Urges Slowdown of Burden-Shif Express, 77 TAX NOTES 619 (1997) (re-
printing letter from Richard 0. Loengard Jr. to Representatives Bill Archer and Charles
Rangel); New York State Bar Ass'n, Memorandum to the Members of the House Ways & Means
Subcommittee on Oversight, Re: H.R. 390-Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, Tax Rep. no. 832 (Mar.
23, 1995) (on file with author).
48. Tax Executives Institute Comments on IRS Reform Bill, 79 TAX NOTES 1411 (1998); Paul
Cherecwich, Jr., Lau, 101: Burden of Proof Differs in Civil and Criminal Cases, 77 TAX NOTES 489
(1997) (reprinting letter to Representative Bill Archer). The Tax Executives Institute repre-
sents about 5000 in-house tax professionals employed by 2800 of the leading companies in the
United States and Canada.
49. IRS Restructuring, supra note 34, at 329 (statement of Nina E. Olson).
50. TBOR IIhearing, supra note 16, at 146 (statement ofJoseph F. Lane).
51. E.g., IRS Restructuring, supra note 34, at 367 (1998) (statement of Michael I. Saltz-
man); Carolyn Joy Lee, Tax Professionals Lick Chops in Anticipation of Burden of Proof Shq2, 77
TAX NOTES 622 (1997) (reprinting letter to Representative Bill Archer).
52. In 1925, a representative of the American Institute of Accountants unsuccessfully
urged burden reversal. Hearing on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways &
Means, 69th Cong. 877 (1925). More recent advocates include Douglas C. Burnette in IRS
Restructuring, supra note 34, at 233, 238 and Bernard J. Long, Jr., Burden of Proof Shi/2: Tom
Jefferson Would Be Proud, 77 TAX NOTES 625 (1997).
53. Congress created the Commission in 1995. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriations Act, Pub. L No. 104-52, 109 Stat. 468 (1996) (appropriating
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report in June 1997. The Commission considered the burden of proof
matter, but it made no recommendation in its report.
Legislation was introduced to enact some of the Kerry-Portman rec-
ommendations.' Like the Commission's report, the bill, as originally in-
troduced, contained no burden-of-proof provision. In mark-up in the
House Ways and Means Committee, however, Chairman William Archer
inserted a burden provision into the bill.55 The committee recommended
the bill to the full House, and the House overwhelmingly approved it. The
following year, the Senate Finance Committee recommended its version of
a Restructuring Act-including a burden-of-proof provision-and the full
Senate approved it after floor amendment.
The House and Senate versions of the burden-of-proof provision dif-
fered. The Conference Committee adopted the Senate versions with minor
changes. Both houses approved the Restructuring Act, including the bur-
den-of-proof provision, by lopsided majorities.56
The general burden rule under the new legislation, codified in
§ 7491(a), is as follows:
(1) General rule. If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer intro-
duces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant
to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by
subtitle A or B [of the Code], the [IRS] shall have the burden of
funds to government agencies). It was co-chaired by Senator Robert Kerry and Representative
Rob Portman.
54. See, e.g., H.R. 2292, 105th Cong. (1997).
55. H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 301 (1997). Under § 301 of the House bill, § 7491 would
have read as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE. The [IRS) shall have the burden of proof in any court
proceeding with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the in-
come tax liability of a taxpayer.
(b) LIMITATIONS. Subsection (a) shall only apply with respect to an issue
if-
(1) the taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to such issue,
(2) the taxpayer has fully cooperated with the [IRS] with respect to such
issue, including providing, within a reasonable period of time, access to
and inspection of all witnesses, information, and documents within the
control of the taxpayer, as reasonably requested by the [IRS], and
(3) in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, the taxpayer is de-
scribed in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).
(c) SUBSTANTIATION. Nothing in this section shall be construed to over-
ride any requirement of this title to substantiate any item.
Id.
56. The vote in the House was 402 to 8; the vote in the Senate was 96 to 2. The President
signed the Restructuring Act on July 22, 1998.
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proof with respect to such issue.
(2) Limitations. Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to an issue
only if-
(A) the taxpayer has complied with the requirements
under [the Code] to substantiate any item,
(B) the taxpayer has maintained all records required
under this title and has cooperated with reasonable re-
quests by the [IRS] for witnesses, information, docu-
ments, meetings, and interviews, and
(C) in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust,
the taxpayer is described in [Code] section
7430(c)(4)(ii).
(3) Coordination. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any issue if any
other provision of [the Code] provides for a specific burden of
proof with respect to such issue.
In addition, the legislation enacted two specific burden-of-proof rules.
First, § 7491(b) provides, with respect to individual taxpayers, that the IRS
has "the burden of proof in any court proceeding with respect to any itcm
of income which was reconstructed by the [IRS] solely through the use of
statistical information on unrelated taxpayers."
Second, § 7491(c) deals with penalties. It provides, again with respect
to individual taxpayers, that the IRS has "the burden of production in any
court proceeding with respect to the liability ... for any penalty [or similar
addition to tax]."
All portions of new § 7491 are effective with respect to court proceed-
ings relating to IRS examinations beginning after July 22, 1998, the date of
enactment of the Restructuring Act.57 The provision that created new §
7491 was the first of the over seventy items included in the "Taxpayer Pro-
tection and Rights" title of the Restructuring Act. Presumably, this was not
accidental, but instead reflected the importance, whether real or symbolic,
Congress attached to § 7491.
57. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3100(c)(1), 112 Stat. 726 (1998). If no examination occurs, § 7491 is effective for court pro-
ceedings relating to tax periods beginning after, or events occurring after, July 22, 1998.
§ 3100(c)(2).
For these purposes, "[a~n audit is not the only event that would be considered an
examination." Specifically, the matching of an information return against the tax return and
the review of refund claims are "examinations" for effective date purposes. H.R. REP. NO. 105-
599, at 242 (1998) (Conf. Comm.).
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On the whole, § 7491(a) as enacted is more narrow than the version
passed by the House;58 that is, § 749 1(a) as enacted is less likely to result in
burden shifting. The House version was more limited in two respects: it
applied only to income taxes, not transfer taxes, and required the taxpayer
to "fully" cooperate with the IRS. It is unclear, however, if the courts will
interpret the "cooperation" condition as enacted as falling far short of full
cooperation.
Moreover, the enacted version is more limited than the House version
in ways that are likely to prove significant. First, § 7491(a)(1) requires that
the taxpayer present "credible evidence," which is likely a higher standard
than the requirement set forth in the House bill, that the taxpayer is as-
serting "a reasonable dispute." 9 Second, § 7491(a)(2)(A) requires that the
taxpayer comply with all substantiation rules "under" the Code, as opposed
to substantiation rules "of' the Code under the House bill.' The "under"
language more clearly includes substantiation requirements in the Treasury
Regulations promulgated under the Code. The "of' language might have
limited compliance to substantiation requirements in the statute. Third, §
7491(a)(2)(B) requires the taxpayer to maintain required records as a con-
dition of a burden shift.6 ' There was no comparable requirement in the
House version. Thus, the House bill would have encouraged taxpayers not
to make and keep original documentation of transactions. Fourth, §
7491(a)(3) provides that the general rule of § 7491(a) yields to specific bur-
den-of-proof rules elsewhere in the Code.62 Again, the House bill had no
such requirement.
Thus, to those-like me-dubious of the enterprise of shifting the
burden of proof in tax cases generally, the rule now on the books is less
objectionable than the rule originally passed by the House. The Senate
legislative history does not discuss whether that body intended to weaken
the House version of the legislation or why the Senate considered the above
changes necessary. The absence of such discussion is perhaps further sup-
port for the argument of this Article that § 7491 was not intended as a seri-
ous substantive measure.
58. For the text of the House's version of the rule, see supra note 55.
59. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 138, 146-47 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text. However, there is a constructional
principle that subsequently enacted general statutes do not oust more specific, prior statutes
absent clearly expressed intent to this effect. E.g., Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 125
(1904); Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190, 199 (9th Cir. 1966). If courts applied this
principle, they would have reached the same result even under the House version of§ 7491.
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II. SYMBOL WITHOUT SUBSTANCE
The general burden rule in the Restructuring Act is contained in
§ 7491(a). Subsections § 7491(b) and (c) harbor specific rules dealing with
statistical information and penalties, respectively.63 To the extent they have
practical significance, subsections (b) and (c) could have been enacted sepa-
rately, without the general rule of subsection (a).' The question, then, is
whether § 7491(a) provides anything of meaning.
This article contends that it does not. Congress hedged § 7491 (a) with
many conditions and exceptions and, as a result, rendered the section
empty. There are eleven limitations, of varying degrees of significance, on
the burden shift under § 7491(a). For completeness, I mention all eleven
below, in the order in which they appear in the statute. 65 However, as de-
veloped hereafter, they are not of equal significance. The limitations in-
clude:
(1) The shift applies, if at all, only to "court proceedings," not to ad-
ministrative proceedings.66
(2) Any shift is predicated upon the taxpayer's introduction of "credi-
ble evidence" as to the issue in controversy. 67
(3) The shift applies only to "factual issue[s]."'
(4) The shift applies only to issues "relevant to ascertaining the liability
of the taxpayer" for tax.6 9 Thus, cases involving issues other than liability
and cases involving the liability of persons other than the taxpayer are out-
side the ambit of § 7491.
(5) The shift applies only to controversies involving taxes "imposed by
subtitle A or B [of the Internal Revenue Code]," i.e., only to the income,
estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes.70
(6) Only "the burden of proof' can shift, 71 thus leaving intact the pre-
sumption of correctness in favor of the IRS. 2
(7) The taxpayer's compliance with all applicable statutory and regu-
63. See infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
64. This would have been in keeping with the many situational, localized burden shifts
under the prior regime. See infra Appendix A pp. 70-77.
65. For the full text of I.RC. § 7491(a), see supra pp. 12-13.
66. I.RC. § 7491(a)(1).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Self-employment taxes are treated as income taxes for this purpose. H.R. REP.
No. 599, supra note 57, at 242 n. 15.
71. I.P.. § 7491(a)(1).
72. See infra notes 150-59 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of correct-
ness).
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latory substantiation requirements is prerequisite to any burden shift.73
(8) To qualify for the burden shift, the taxpayer must have maintained
"all records" required by the Code and Regulations.74
(9) The burden will shift only if the taxpayer "has cooperated with rea-
sonable requests by the [IRS] for witnesses, information, documents, meet-
ings, and interviews."75
(10) Large partnerships, corporations, and trusts are not eligible for
the burden shift.76
(11) Other Code sections providing for specific burden rules supersede
§ 7491(a).77
The taxpayer bears the burden of proving that she satisfies the condi-
tions for burden shifting. 78 In other words, the taxpayer bears the burden of
proof as to who bears the burden of proof in a specific factual scenario.
Cumulatively and, in some instances, individually, these limitations
eviscerate a general burden shift. In terms of their effects, the limitations
fall into two groups: those that prevent the burden from shifting at all, and
those that permit the shift but denude it of practical significance.
A. LIMITATIONS PREVENTING BURDEN SHIFT
Many of the above conditions and exceptions prevent shifting of the
burden of proof. The first is likely to be fairly unimportant, and therefore
can be disposed of quickly. Section 7491(a) applies only in a "court pro-
ceeding."7 Most tax controversies, of course, never get to court and, in-
stead, are resolved in administrative proceedings, such as audits, supervi-
sory conferences, and conferences with the Appeals Office. On occasion,
Revenue Agents or Appeals Officers have taken a mulish view of the burden
of proof, saying to the taxpayer "you'll have to prove that to me," then la-
beling as "insufficient" reasonable attempts by the taxpayer to do just that.
In theory, this still could happen under § 7491(a). However, such conduct
73. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(A).
74. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(B).
75. Id.
76. See I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(C) (noting that in order to qualify under this statute when the
taxpayer is a "partnership, corporation, or trust," the taxpayer must meet the requirements
outlined in § 7430(4)(A)(ii)).
77. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(3).
78. H.R. REP. No. 599, supra note 57, at 240. The legislative history of the House version
of § 7491 was to the same effect. H.R. REP. No. 105-364, at 57 (1997) ("Taxpayers who fail to
substantiate any item ... will... be unable to avail themselves of this provision regarding the
burden of proof.").
79. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1).
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has always been contrary to IRS policy8" and, fortunately, rarely occurs.
Thus, excepting administrative proceedings from § 7491(a) likely will have
little significance.8
However, as discussed below, other categorical limitations should
prove to be more significant. The importance of each will depend on court
interpretation. The predictions below are based on the statutory language,
history, and the case law background on which they are superimposed. Bear
in mind that technical correction legislation is always possible to cure un-
intended consequences of legislative inadvertence or sloppy drafting.82
1. "Liability of the Taxpayer" for Designated Types of Taxes
Section 7491(a) applies only to the taxes imposed by subtitles A and B
of the Code,83 which apply only to cases that involve federal income, estate,
gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes. Thus, the section does not
apply to cases involving the employment taxes imposed by subtitle C or the
excise taxes imposed by subtitles D and E. These omitted taxes raise signifi-
cant revenue amounting to approximately a third of the federal tax take."
Although they are involved in fewer controversies than the income tax,
employment and excise taxes have generated thousands of litigated cases.
As to the taxes to which it does apply, a generous construction of the
statute's "liability of the taxpayer" language seems appropriate to effectuate
the section's purpose, and this will obviate some potential problems. For
80. See, e.g., I.R.M. 4244.
81. For a view that such a limitation does matter, see IRS Restructuring, supra note 34, at
238 (statement of Douglas C. Burnette, National Society of Accountants) (arguing that the bill
would make the IRS insist on "intensive examination" during audits in order to show full
cooperation on the part of the taxpayer).
One could argue that § 7491(a) would further discourage such untoward behavior,
that it would be especially short-sighted for the IRS to "demand strict proof' at audit or Ap-
peals if the IRS would bear the burden of proof at trial. The problem with such an argument,
though, is that, because of the other conditions and exceptions discussed in Part II, there
rarely will be a meaningful burden shift to the IRS at trial, even under § 7491 (a).
82. Assuming, of course, that the future Congress feels the same way about § 7491 as the
enacting Congress did, that Congress perceives the problem and, given competing demands
for attention, cares enough to effect correction, that a political "critical mass" forms behind a
given solution, and that no accident of the legislative process shelves or defeats the effort. All
these are significant "if's." Technical correction of § 7491(a) is possible but uncertain, espe-
cially if Congress truly cared more about the section as symbol than as substance.
83. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1).
84. For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, employment taxes represented 33.1%
of federal taxes collected and excise taxes represented 2.8%. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
DATA BOOK: OCTOBER 1, 1995 TO SEPTEMBER30, 1996, at 3 tbl. 1 (1997).
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instance, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear unified partnership cases,8 5
and jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions relating to retire-
ment-plan qualification, tax-exempt status of state and local governmental
obligations, and qualification or classification of exempt organizations and
foundations.' Often, the entity litigating the case will not have its own tax
liability on the line. Instead, the impact ultimately will be on the tax liability
of others associated with the entity, such as the partners in the partnership,
the holder of the state or local bond, or the contributors to the charity who
wish to deduct their contributions. The "liability of the taxpayer" language
should not be interpreted so narrowly as to exclude such cases from the
ambit of § 7491. The disposition of these cases will directly affect how much
tax is owed by persons who are taxpayers, and that should suffice.
However, even under a generous reading of the language in question,
§ 7491(a) does not include all cases involving federal income, estate, gift,
and generation-skipping transfer taxes. At least three classes of cases ap-
pear to be outside the statutory language.
First, many tax cases-particularly in district court and bankruptcy
court 7 are collection cases.88 In these cases, there usually is no dispute
about liability. It is acknowledged that the taxpayer owes tax; the issue typi-
cally is whether the IRS has properly used one or another of the collection
tools at its disposal.8 9 Since "liability" is not at issue, § 7491(a) would not
seem to apply and, thus, the burden of proof would not shift in such collec-
tion cases.
Second, when the IRS makes a jeopardy or termination assessment of
tax (shortcutting the normal deficiency procedures), taxpayers are entitled
to administrative and judicial review of the assessment in district court and
85. See TAX Gr. R. 240-251 (discussing the Tax Court Rules that apply in partnership
actions).
86. See TAX Gr. R. 210-218 (discussing the Tax Court Rules that apply in declaratory
judgment actions).
87. Certain collection matters also may be at issue in collateral proceedings in the Tax
Court. See infra notes 339-43 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances under
which the Tax Court can enjoin the collection of tax).
88. For descriptions of the tax collection process, see MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 14 (1991);James K. Wilkens &Thomas A. Matthews, A Survey of
Federal Tax Collection Procedure: Rights and Remedies of Taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service,
3 ALASKA L. REV. 269 (1986).
89. Some Supreme Court cases are illustrative. In United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677
(1983), the IRS imposed tax liens on, and sought judicial sale of, homestead property. The
Court held that this practice is valid, subject to certain equitable principles. Id. at 680. In
United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 719-33 (1985), the Court upheld an
IRS levy on joint bank accounts to satisfy tax debts of one of the depositors. In both cases, the
existence and amounts of the tax liabilities were uncontroversial. The disputes related to the
amenability of the assets at issue to enforced collection by the IRS.
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sometimes the Tax Court. Such review involves two issues: whether the
making of the assessment was reasonable and whether the amount assessed
was reasonable.9" It is well established that a § 7429 case is a preliminary
proceeding and that the determinations reached in it will have "no effect
upon the determination of the correct tax liability in a subsequent pro-
ceeding. [The § 7429 case] is unrelated, substantively and procedurally, to
any subsequent [Tax Court or refund] proceeding to determine the correct
tax liability."9' Accordingly, § 7429 cases also seem to be outside the reach
of § 7491.92
Third, a significant trend in tax procedure in the last decade has been
the increase, via the various Taxpayer Bills of Rights, in the Tax Court's
jurisdiction over various special or ancillary proceedings. These proceed-
ings divide into three classes for § 7491(a) purposes: those to which the
section does apply;93 those to which § 7491(a) does not apply, but which are
covered by other burden rules;' and those to which neither § 7491 (a) nor
any other specific burden rule applies (for example, a proceeding to com-
pel the IRS to make refunds of determined overpayments). 95 These pro-
ceedings do not relate to the liability of the taxpayer. Thus, § 7491(a) would
not authorize imposition of the burden of proof on the IRS in such pro-
ceedings.96
2. Eligible Taxpayer
Congress's professed concern with respect to the burden of proof was
protection of individual taxpayers and small business taxpayers.97 Consis-
90. I.R.C. § 7429(b)(3)(A) (1994).
91. S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. 1, at 365 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN 3439, 3795.
92. I.R.C. § 7429(g)(1) contains special burden-of-proof rules for jeopardy and termina-
tion 'assessment review cases. See infra text accompanying notes 311-13.
93. See, e.g., TAX Cr. R. 261 (giving the Tax Court authority, under certain conditions, to
redetermine interest on a deficiency); TAX Cr. R. 280-84 (giving the Tax Court authority to
review IRS failures to abate interest). The Code provides that interest "shall be assessed, col-
lected, and paid in the same manner as taxes." I.R.C. § 6601(e)(1). That should put interest-
liability cases within the scope of § 7491 (a).
94. See, e.g., TAX CT. R. 230-233 & 270-274 (giving the Tax Court authority to hear ac-
tions for litigation and administrative costs); Tax Ct. R. 220-229A (granting the Tax Court
authority to hear disclosure actions). These do not determine a taxpayer's liability for tax, so
would be outside § 7491(a). However, they are governed by their own pre-existing burden-
allocation rules. TAX Gr. R. 229, 232(f) & 270(d).
95. See TAx Cr. R. 260 (describing proceedings to enforce overpayment determinations).
96. A case could be made that, because the IRS is in a better position to know whether a
refund was made and, if not, why not, the burden of proof in such proceedings should be
imposed on the IRS by judicial decision. However, the matter is not settled.
97. "The committee is concerned that individual and small business taxpayers frequently
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tently with that end, Congress excepted large entities from the "benefit" of
§ 7491. Through cross-reference to § 7430,9 Congress provided that
§ 7491(a) will not shift the burden in cases in which the taxpayer is a corpo-
ration, trust, or partnership with a net worth in excess of $7,000,000.
This exception will be of only limited importance as to trusts. Certain
kinds of trusts can be taxpayers," 0 and a few important cases have featured
trusts as the taxpayers.' Still, the number of litigated cases which involve
trusts as taxpayers is small. 10
2
The exception also will be of only limited importance with regard to
partnerships. Indeed, an argument could be made that a partnership can-
not be a "taxpayer" as that term is used in § 7491(a), thus rendering this
exception meaningless as to partnerships. Partnerships do not pay estate,
gift, generation-skipping transfer taxes, or income taxes.'03 Partnerships are
litigants in TEFRA unified partnership proceedings, 1"4 but their role there
are at a disadvantage when forced to litigate with the Internal Revenue Service. The commit-
tee believes that the present burden of proof rules contribute to that disadvantage." H.R. REP.
No. 105-364, supra note 79, at 56.
98. Section 7430 provides that, if certain conditions are met, a victorious taxpayer may
recover from the IRS some or all of the taxpayer's administrative and litigation costs incurred
to contest IRS adjustments. I.R.C. § 7430. Concluding that large taxpayers can protect them-
selves, however, Congress excepted them from eligibility for such cost shifting.
99. Section 7491(a) "shall apply with respect to an issue only if . . . in the case of a
partnership, corporation, or trust, the taxpayer is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii)."
I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(C). The referenced provision in § 7430 itself references another statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (as in effect on October 22, 1986). The substance of the rule is that
entities with net worth over $7,000,000 as of the date the action commences are excluded from
eligibility. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-5(0(2); H.R REP. No. 599, supra note 57, at 240.
100. See I.RIC. §§ 641-668 (defining, among other things, what kinds of trusts can be tax-
payers).
101. E.g., Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982); Haft Trust v.
Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975); Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th
Cir. 1996); Quick's Trust v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1336 (1970), affd per curiam, 444 F.2d 90
(8th Cir. 1971).
102. There are numerous cases in which the IRS has sought to disregard family trusts or
business trusts under assignment-of-income principles, the sham-transaction doctrine, or other
theories. E.g., Vnuk v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1980) (a case in which the IRS
sought to disregard a family trust under assignment-of-income principles). However, in such
cases the deficiency notices are issued to the creators or beneficiaries of the "trust" and the
creators or beneficiaries are the petitioners seeking relief in court. Id. at 1319. Since such
cases do not involve a trust as the "taxpayer" within the meaning of § 7491(a), the net-worth
exception would not apply to them. (Other exceptions likely would, however. For instance,
those creating sham trusts are unlikely to cooperate with the IRS on audit.)
103. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 701 (exempting partnerships from income tax).
104. See I.R.C. §§ 6221-6233 (describing the tax treatment of partnership items). These
sections were added to the Code by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
("TEFRA'), Pub. L No. 97-248, §§ 402-406, 96 Stat. 324_(1982). Since 1997, there also has
been a unified audit system for electing partnerships with over 100 members. See I.R.C. §§
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is as representative rather than as real-party-in-interest.0 5 They are peti-
tioners, but they are not "taxpayer[s]," which is the operative word for §
7491(a) purposes. Yet, the courts usually are loathe to interpret a statute so
as to render any part of it meaningless.0 6 If that approach is applied in this
context, the likely construction would be that § 7491 cannot apply when the
partnership in a TEFRA case has a net worth over $7,000,000 dollars. Such
cases, however, are not numerous.
The exclusion from § 7491(a) of corporations with net worth over
$7,000,000 dollars is a significant exception. Such taxpayers represent the
great bulk of the revenue involved in audit adjustments proposed by the
IRS. Coordinated Examination Program (CEP) taxpayers are only a subset
of corporations exceeding the § 7491(a) net worth threshold, yet about two-
thirds of the total dollar amount of adjustments proposed by IRS auditors
are proposed with respect to CEP taxpayers.10
7
3. Factual Issues
"For purposes of standard of review, decisions by judges0 8 are tradi-
tionally divided into three categories: denominated questions of law (re-
viewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for clear error), and matters
of discretion (reviewable for 'abuse of discretion')."'0 9 "Matters of discre-
tion" typically are procedural in nature, and the substantive issues in tax
cases involve the other two categories.
By its terms, § 7491(a) applies only to "factual issue[s],""' not to legal
6240-6255 (describing large partnership treatment).
105. In cases subject to the TEFRA rules, the tax treatment of an item is determined at the
partnership level. I.R.C. § 6221. If a dispute exists as to an item, the tax matters partner (or, in
some cases, another partner) may file a petition on behalf of the partnership contesting the
IRS's determination. I.R.C. § 6226(a) & (b); see TAX CT. R. 240(d) & 241 (describing com-
mencement of partnership action). However, the partners themselves also are considered as
parties to the action, I.R.C. § 6226(c), and partners not originally named may intervene in the
action, TAx CT. R. 245. If the IRS prevails in the case, it will be the partners themselves (not
the partnership) against whom the IRS will make assessments and from whom the IRS will
collect additional amounts due. I.R.C. §§ 6225 & 6230; Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(6)-l(a).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that
statutory interpretation cannot be done by excision); Trotz v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 927,
930 (10th Cir. 1966) (refusing to infer a value test that would render the statutory wording
obsolete).
107. See Saltzman, supra note 88, at S8-14 (1997 cum. supp. no. 2). CEP was started in the
late 1960's and covers about 1700 of the nation's largest corporate taxpayers.
108. Most tax cases are tried in the Tax Court, which does not offer jury trials. Even in the
other tribunals, the overwhelming majority of tax trials involves ajudge as the finder of fact.
109. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
110. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1) (1998).
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issues. At first blush, this would seem to matter little. Our legal system de-
pends on the parties to develop the facts, but judges do not shrink from
discovering (or creating) the law themselves. Armed with statutory text,
precedents, legislative history, canons of construction, and the like, judges
need not rely on a burden of proof as to legal issues.
But an important class of issues-variously called mixed questions of
fact and law, ultimate facts, or applications of law to fact"'-combines ele-
ments of fact and law, and therefore does not fit neatly into the "fact versus
law" dichotomy. Many litigated tax cases involve such issues." 2 Thus, if such
issues are not considered "factual issues" for § 7491(a) purposes, the scope
of that section will be narrow.
What, then, is a "factual issue" for § 7491(a) purposes? The statutory
phrase is not self-defining, and the legislative history does not clarify the
matter. Conceptually, at least three readings of the phrase are possible.
One possibility is that a "factual issue" exists as long as the issue has any
factual component. Such a reading would keep all mixed issues within
§ 7491 (a). Another option is that a "factual issue" exists if the issue involves
only factual components. This reading would exclude all mixed issues from
§ 7491(a). Finally, it is possible that a "factual issue" exists if the mixed is-
sue is "more factual than legal," but not if it is "more legal than factual."
My suspicion is that most courts will gravitate towards the third read-
ing. Perhaps as a lingering effect of the common-law tradition, American
courts are sometimes hesitant about adopting bright-line, polar rules. Also,
111. See, e.g., Robert L. Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Com-
parative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REv. 70, 93-120 (1944) (describing instances where law and fact
combine).
112. Examples include the following, among other possibilities: (1) whether an asset is a
capital asset, United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969); (2) whether an
asset qualifies for a particular depreciation regime, ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 142 F.3d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998); (3) whether an economic activity rises to the
level of a trade or business, Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 181 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980); (4) whether a particular arrangement should be classified as a
sale, Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976); (5) whether
a payment constitutes a loan or a capital contribution, In re Larson, 862 F.2d 112, 116-117
(7th Cir. 1988) (noting conflicting cases); (6) whether a loan is business or non-business in
nature, Price v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50, 432, at 84, 185 (7th Cir. 1998)
(designated not for publication); (7) whether the "all events" test was satisfied so as to permit a
deduction to an accrual method taxpayer, Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d
1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1981); (8) the proper characterization of a transaction for tax purposes,
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 435
U.S. 561 (1978); (9) whether a given instrument constitutes debt or equity, Scriptomatic, Inc.
v. United States, 555 F.2d 364, 372 n.13 (3d Cir. 1977); and (10) whether a condition consti-
tutes "reasonable cause" to prevent imposition of a tax penalty, Marrin v. Commissioner, 147
F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Craddock, No. 95-1437, 1998 WL 423450, at *4 (10th Cir.
July 28,1998).
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as discussed later, the third approach will maximize maneuver-room in
particular cases, a result typically cherished by judges."3
Moreover, judges are perennially fond of analogies to the familiar,
and adoption of the third reading would put them in accustomed territory.
Specifically, courts are accustomed to encountering the "mixed question"
or "ultimate question" category in the context of appellate review. In that
context, having classified the issue for review as a mixed issue, appellate
courts usually then apply deferential review if factual elements predominate
in the issue, or they apply de novo review if legal elements predominate." 4
If courts do interpret "factual issue" for § 7491(a) purposes by refer-
ence to the "predominant character" analysis familiar from appellate re-
view, a significant constraint will be imposed on possible burden shifting.
For instance, to take just a smattering of recent appellate tax cases, whether
an exchange qualified for the like-kind non-recognition rules, "'-whether a
sale was a disqualified related-party transaction,"' whether securities were
capital assets,1 7 and whether assets qualified for special cost recovery,"' all
were held to be legal issues, not factual issues, in the contexts presented."'
4. Supervening Burden-of-Proof Rules
Section 7491 contains a coordination rule. The general burden-shift
rule of § 7491(a) "shall not apply to any issue if any other provision of [the
Code] provides for a specific burden of proof with respect to such issue."'121
Since the Code already lays down particular burden rules, this coordination
rule directly exempts from the general shift rule areas such as accumulated
113. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified Viu, of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural
-Discretion, 64 N.C. L REV. 993, 994 (1986) (stating thatjudges have room for making decisions
when deciding ultimate facts).
114. For further discussion, see infra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
115. Christenstein v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CGH) 50, 352, at 83, 923 (9th
Cir. 1998) (designated not for publication).
116. Meek v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50, 179, at 83, 259 (9th Cir.
1998) (designated not for publication).
117. Marrinv. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1998).
118. ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 142 F.3d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.
1998).
119. Numerous similar results appear in the older cases. An example is a line of cases
holding that whether property was held for sale to customers (and therefore within an excep-
tion to capital asset status) is primarily a legal issue. E.g., Biedenham Realty Co., Inc. v.
United States, 526 F.2d 409, 416 n.25 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d
905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Temple, 355 F.2d 67, 68 (5th Cir. 1966)(Wisdom,
C.J., dissenting); Thomas v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1958).
120. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(3) (1998).
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earnings tax cases,' 2 ' jeopardy and termination assessment and levy review
cases,' 22 and transferee and fiduciary liability cases, 123 among others.' 24
Moreover, this exception might be pushed considerably further. A
number of important Code sections use language expressly adverting to the
judgment of the Tr.easury Secretary and thus the IRS.' 25 The legislative
history of § 7491 classes such "in the Secretary's judgment" sections as sub-
stantiation rules, the satisfaction of which is prerequisite to a burden shift
under § 7491(a).' 26
Examples of such sections include:
1) If a taxpayer does not have a regular accounting method, or if her
regular accounting method does not clearly reflect income, the taxpayer's
taxable income shall be computed "under such method as, in the opinion
121. See I.LC. §§ 533-534 (stating what constitutes evidence of the purpose to avoid in-
come tax and explaining when the burden of proof of whether a business has accumulated
beyond the reasonable needs of business shall be on the taxpayer). These sections contain both
burden-of-production and burden-of-persuasion rules. Section 7491(a) refers to the "burden
of proof," which typically means the burden of persuasion. See supra note 9 and accompanying
text. As a practical matter, however, the courts likely will read the section broadly enough to
encompass the whole accumulated earnings tax burden-allocation scheme.
122. See I.R.C. § 7429(g) (stating that the burden of proof on whether the making of a
jeopardy assessment is reasonable is on the Secretary, but that the burden of proof as to rea-
sonableness of the amount of the assessment is on the taxpayer).
123. See I.R.C. § 6902(a) (providing that the burden of proof is on the transferee as to
whether the transferor owed additional tax but is on the IRS as to whether the transferee is
secondarily liable therefor).
124. See I.R.C. §§ 341(c)(1) (stating certain situations which are evidence of a collapsible
corporation); 357(b)(2) (stating the burden-of-proof rule as to exception to non-recognition
rule for incorporation and reorganization exchanges); 2040(a) (stating that the whole ofjointly
owned property is included in the gross estate unless the taxpayer proves the extent of contri-
butions of owner(s) other than decedent); 2501(a)(4) (establishing a split burden of proof as to
gift tax cases involving loss of U.S. citizenship).
Other examples come from the Restructuring Act. Section 3202(a) of the Restructur-
ing Act creates new I.R.C. § 6511 (h), which suspends the statute of limitations on refunds for
"financially disabled" taxpayers. The statute specifies that no such disability will be recognized
unless "proof of the existence thereof is furnished in such form and manner as the Secretary
may require." I.R.C. § 651 l(h)(2)(A) (1998). Also, § 3201 of the Act creates new Code § 6015,
which replaces the former "innocent spouse relief' provisions of § 6013(e). The new rules are
complex. The burden of proof is on the IRS as to some matters (for example, that the spouse
claiming innocence had actual knowledge of the incorrect return item or that the spouses
jointly participated in a fraudulent scheme of asset transfers) and on the spouse claiming
innocence as to other matters (for example, allocation of tax items between the spouses and
disqualified status of assets transferred within one year of the payment due date or notice of
deficiency date). See H.R. REP. No. 599, supra note 57, at 253-54 (explaining the new rules
governing spouses when there is a deficiency).
125. When used in the Code, "Secretary" means "the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate," I.R.C. § 770 1(a)(1 1), in other words, via delegation, the IRS.
126. See H.R. REP. No. 599,supra note 57, at 241 &n.13.
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of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income."'' 27
2) The IRS is empowered to recast transactions between related tax-
payers "if [the Secretary] determines that such [action] is necessary in order
to prevent evasion of taxes or dearly to reflect the income of [the related
taxpayers]. " 128
3) Direct and indirect foreign tax credits are allowable "only if the tax-
payer establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary" all information neces-
sary for verification and computation of the credit. 29
4) Americans working abroad can exclude from taxable income some
or all of their foreign income if certain conditions, sometimes including
that the taxpayer was a "bona fide resident of a foreign country," are met.
The taxpayer must establish such bona fide foreign residence "to the satis-
faction of the Secretary. '
But the potential may exist for the Government to go even further.
The courts have held that the appearance of "in the Secretary's judgment"
type language in a statute alters the standard of proof. Under it, the tax-
payer, in order to prevail, must be supported by more than the usual pre-
ponderance of the evidence-she must meet the higher burden of showing
that the IRS's determination constituted an abuse of discretion.13 1
Based on that line of cases, the Government could plausibly argue that
sections involving the above language engage two of the limits under
§ 7491. Each of them may be a substantiation rule and also "another provi-
sion of [the Code which] provides for a specific burden of proof with re-
spect to such issue."'' 32 Judicial acceptance of such an argument would mean
that, categorically, § 7491 cannot shift the burden in tax accounting cases
involving § 446(b), in § 482 cases, in foreign tax credit cases, on the "bona
fide foreign residence" issue of § 911 cases, or in cases involving any other
Code section harboring similar "Secretary's judgment" language.
The consequent erosion of § 7491(a) would be great. Measured by tax
127. I.LRC. § 446(b) (1998).
128. I.1C. § 482.
129. 1.RLC. § 905(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.905-2 (as amended in 1998) (listing the require-
ments the taxpayer must meet in order to claim a foreign credit).
130. I.R.C. §911(d)(1)(A).
131. See, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532 (1979) (noting
that §§ 446 and 471 give the IRS wide discretion); Oakcross Vineyards, Ltd. v. Commissioner,
98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,336, at 83,834 (9th Cir. 1998) (designated not for publication)
(holding that the taxpayer "faces an extremely high burden" and a "high hurdle" in chal-
lenging the Commissioner's decision because § 446(b) grants the IRS "broad discretion").
132. The legislative history, while (as seen above) affirming the first characterization, does
not deny the second. The principle of exclusion need not apply here. Nothing in the statutory
text or the legislative history indicates that substantiation rules and Code-provisions-
providing-a-specific-burden are exclusive categories.
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dollars at issue, § 482 controversies are by far the most important class of
tax litigation," and foreign tax credit cases are among the most
important.'34 Tax accounting cases are numerous and entail substantial
revenue.' 3 There have been several hundred § 911 cases although none
have entailed large amounts of tax dollars. Thus, in important classes of
cases, other Code sections will displace § 7491(a). 3"
B. LIMITATIONS ERODING SIGNIFICANCE OF BURDEN SHIFT
The remaining conditions in § 7491(a) have more subtle, but perhaps
no less significant, effects. Although they do not prevent shifting the bur-
den to the IRS, they do render the shift largely meaningless when it does
occur. Below, I discuss the remaining conditions individually, then I ana-
lyze their cumulative impact. The thrust of the argument is this: As a result
of the conditions in § 7491, taxpayers in the future will have to do every-
thing they had to do in the past, both before and at trial. Moreover, trial
outcomes will be affected only when the evidence is in perfect equipoise, in
other words (since perfect equipoise is chimerical), virtually never. Thus,
very few taxpayers will experience "relief' under § 7491(a), even in catego-
133. See, e.g., Elizabeth Magin, ABA Court Procedure Committee Discusses Arbitration in Litiga-
tion, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 18, 1992 (reporting that one percent of cases docketed with the
Tax Court represent 78% of the dollar value).
134. This is hardly surprising because "[tihe calculation of the foreign tax credit involves
some of the more intricate and complex provisions of the Code," JOHN F. COOPER & I.
RICHARD GERSHON, INTERNATIONAL TAX GUIDE: U.S. INCOME TAXATION § 21:02 (1991), and
"[t]he foreign tax credit, quite simply, stands at the intersection of the world's tax statutes, and
directing traffic at that intersection is a frightfully difficult endeavor," RICHARD L KAPLAN,
FEDERALTAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES, PLANNING AND POLICY 81
(1988).
Another limit is reinforcing. The taxpayers in § 482 and foreign tax credit cases typi-
cally are large corporations, and are therefore ineligible for § 7491 burden shifting, see supra
note 107 and accompanying text. Such cases may be doubly outside § 7491.
135. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. GRAETz & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 686 (3d ed. 1995) ("Determining when income is taxed and when
deductions are permitted is often as important, in terms of a taxpayer's tax liability, as deter-
mining what is income and what is deductible."). One of the most contentious and important
sets of current income tax issues involves expensing versus capitalization of costs. See, e.g.,
INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (denying deduction to corporation for in-
vestment banking fees and expenses incurred when transforming into a wholly owned subsidi-
ary). The capitalization doctrine traditionally is rooted in Code §§ 263 and 446(b), of which §
446(b) may be the stronger root. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAX LAw 276 (3d. ed. 1998).
136. Other examples of sections containing "to the satisfaction of the Secretary" language
include I.R.C. §§ 305(b)(5), 306(b)(4), 453(e)(7), 706(b)(1)(C), 1362(b)(5)(B), 1362(0(2), and
1378(b)(2) (West 1999).
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ries of cases which theoretically qualify for a burden shift.
1. Maintenance of Records and Substantiation
Section 7491(a) can apply only if the taxpayer "has maintained all rec-
ords required under [the Code]"'137 and "has complied with the require-
ments under [the Code] to substantiate any item." 'ss The legislative history
amplifies the "substantiation" requirement. The rule includes "substantia-
tion requirements, whether generally imposed, or imposed with respect to
specific items, ' as well as "any requirement of the Code or regulations
that the taxpayer establish an item to the satisfaction of the Secretary."' 0
Furthermore,
Taxpayers who fail to substantiate any item in accordance with
the legal requirement of substantiation will not have satisfied the
legal conditions that are prerequisite to claiming the item on the
taxpayer's tax return and will accordingly be unable to avail
themselves of this provision regarding the burden of proof. Thus,
if a taxpayer required to substantiate an item fails to do so in the
manner required (or destroys the substantiation), this burden of
proof provision is inapplicable.'
In short, § 7491 notwithstanding, the taxpayer still must maintain rec-
ords and still must present them to support her tax return positions. If she
does not, she still will bear the burden of proof and still will lose for failure
to meet it. The "records" and "substantiation" conditions can have far-
reaching effects, as three points make clear:
(1) A number of important Code sections feature specific substantia-
tion rules. This includes sections governing widely claimed (and frequently
litigated) deductions for travel and entertainment expenses4 2 and for
charitable contributions.
143
137. I.LC. § 7491(a)(2)(B).
138. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(A).
139. H.R. REP. No. 599, supra note 57, at 241 (footnotes omitted).
140. Id.
141. Id. However, the report adds that if "the taxpayer can demonstrate that he had
maintained the required substantiation but that it was destroyed or lost through no fault of the
taxpayer, such as by fire or flood, existing tax rules regarding reconstruction of those records
would continue to apply." Id. at 241 n.14.
142. See I.LC. § 274(d) (West 1999); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.274(d)-I (as amended in 1998) &
1.274-5T(4) (as amended in 1997) (describing substantiation requirements for travel and
entertainment deductions).
143. See I.R.G. §§ 170(a)(1) & (f)(8) (West 1999); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13 (as amended in
1996) (outlining the record keeping requirements for charitable deductions).
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(2) A number of other important Code sections contain "satisfaction of
the Secretary" language, such as §§ 446(b), 482, 905, and 911, which, as
seen above,'44 are considered substantiation requirements by the § 7491
legislative history.141
(3) In addition to rules already in existence, the IRS and Treasury
have authority to create further record-keeping rules. The most general
source of such authority is § 6001, which provides in relevant part:
Every person liable for any tax ... shall keep such records, ren-
der such statements, make such returns, and comply with such
rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time pre-
scribe. Whenever in the judgement of the Secretary it is necessary,
he may require any person.., to make such returns, render such
statements, or keep such records, as the Secretary deems suffi-
cient to show whether or not such persons is liable for tax.'46
Aggressive use of this authority could render this limitation on
§ 7491(a) as broad as needed. If (as I suspect is unlikely, given the other
conditions and exceptions to burden shifting) the IRS finds itself frequently
saddled with the burden of proof as to a particular type of issue, the IRS
and the Treasury surely would consider using their § 6001 authority to
promulgate additional record-keeping and substantiation rules as to the tax
item involved. 1
47
2. Cooperation with the IRS
A further condition for burden shifting under § 7491(a) is that the
taxpayer "has cooperated with reasonable requests by the [IRS] for wit-
nesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews."'48 This condi-
tion is discussed in detail in Part IV of this article. For present purposes, it
is enough to note that the taxpayer's obligation involves both providing
144. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
145. These sections are discussed in relation to the "other specific burden rules" excep-
tion. Supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1. For examples of the many cases applying § 6001, see Mene-
quozzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-32 (1965); Lattin v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2734, 2739 (1995).
Additional, more localized authority to prescribe substantiation requirements is con-
tained in various Code sections. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 302(c)(2)(iii) (1998) (requiring a distributee
of stock to file agreement to substantiate these acquisitions); 6038 & 6038A (requiring report-
ing for certain foreign corporations).
147. Some caution would have to be exercised. Blatant abuse of the IRS's § 6001 authority
would risk congressional reprisal. Still, this means of circumvention would be available within
bounds of prudence.
148. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(B).
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information within her control and providing reasonable assistance to the
IRS in obtaining information not within her control, including information
located in foreign countries.
4 9
3. Burden of Proof Versus Presumption of Correctness
Before § 7491, the burden of proof was not the only rule that favored
the IRS in tax litigation. A presumption also existed that the determination
of tax liability by the IRS was correct.50 The courts should, and likely will,
hold that this presumption survives the enactment of § 7491 because it is
clear that the presumption of correctness and the burden of proof are sepa-
rate rules of law. As one court explained:
[There is a ] rebuttable presumption that the [IRS's] determina-
tion . . . is correct. This presumption in favor of the [IRS] is a
procedural device that requires the [taxpayer] to go forward with
prima facie evidence to support a finding contrary to the [IRS's]
determination. Once this procedural burden is satisfied, "the tax-
payer must still carry the ultimate burden of proof or persuasion
on the merits." Thus, the [taxpayer] not only has the burden of
proof of establishing that the [IRS's] determination was incorrect,
but also of establishing the merit of its claims by a preponderance
of the evidence.1
5 1
Section 7491(a) speaks of reversal of "the burden of proof' only,'52
suggesting that the measure does not overthrow the presumption of cor-
rectness. This is confirmed by the legislative history. The relevant reports
all mention the presumption of correctness. They call that presumption "a
fundamental element of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code,"'' 5
and they do not indicate that § 7491 disturbs that "fundamental element"
in any fashion. Indeed, the Senate report and the Conference Committee
report imply that the presumption of correctness continues to have
149. H.R. REP. No. 599, supra note 57, at 240.
150. See, e.g., Welch v. Commissioner, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (stating that the IRS's
determination of tax liability is presumed to be correct). At least one court has described this
as a "strong presumption." Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 138, 141 (1996).
151. Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 584, 593-94 (1989) (citations
omitted), affd, 899 F.2d 3 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Cebollero v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 986,
991 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the taxpayer has both the burden of showing the IRS's errors
and proving her own case).
152. See I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1) (1991) (referring to the burden of proof and not the burden of
correctness).
153. H.R. REP. No. 599, supra note 57, at 238; H.R. REP. No. 364, supra note 78, at 55.
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vitality.'54
Under the pre-§ 7491 regime, the presumption of correctness
"add[ed] little if anything to the taxpayer's burden of proof,"' 55 since evi-
dence sufficient to counter the presumption usually also satisfied the bur-
den of proof and vice versa. However, § 7491 uncouples the two, potentially
shifting the burden of proof, but leaving the presumption of correctness
intact.
The survival of the presumption of correctness significantly undercuts
the practical importance of § 7491(a). Although the presumption is not
itself evidence,' 6 the presumption remains until the taxpayer introduces
competent and relevant evidence in support of her position.B7 The tax-
payer must present more than just some evidence; it must be believable and
substantial to some undefined degree.' 8 This fact creates tactical problems
for taxpayers. Unsure of how much evidence will be enough, the taxpayer's
prudent course is to fully develop and present her case. 59 Thus, even if the
burden of proof potentially is shifted, the survival of the presumption of
correctness will compel the taxpayer to put on as complete a case as before
the introduction of § 7491 into the Code.
4. Credible Evidence
Another road leads to the same destination as the survival of the pre-
sumption of correctness. A precondition of any burden shift is that the tax-
154. These reports state that the status of such evidence is determined "without regard to
the judicial presumption of IRS correctness." H.R. REP. No. 599, supra note 57, at 241. That
observation would have been unnecessary had the presumption of correction been abolished
by § 7491.
155. See Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Tax Court Trials: An Updated View from the Bench, 47
TAx LW. 587, 595 (1994).
156. Although this is the "black letter" rule, courts occasionally have operated as if the
presumption is substantive evidence. See Leo H. Hoffman, Overcoming the Prima-Fade Pre-
sumption of Correctness of the Commissioner's Determination, 4 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 240, 241
(1946).
157. E.g., A& ATool & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 300, 304 (10th Cir. 1950).
Once the taxpayer does so, the presumption vanishes and the burden of going forward shifts
to the IRS. E.g., Byrum v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 731, 735 (1972) (holding that the burden
had shifted to the IRS).
158. See, e.g., National Weeklies, Inc. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 39, 42 (8th Cir. 1943)
(stating that weak and improbable evidence need not be credited); Hoffman, supra note 156, at
240-41.
159. This has been the advice given to taxpayers' counsel for decades. See, e.g., Hoffman,
supra note 156, at 241 ("as a practical matter, you should marshal all the admissible evidence
available because you cannot say beforehand how much evidentiary weight will be given the
prima facie presumption of correctness in your case").
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payer have "introduce[d] credible evidence" with respect to the issue in
controversy."6 The legislative history adds:
The burden will shift to the [IRS] under [§ 7491(a)] only if the
taxpayer first introduces credible evidence with respect to a fac-
tual issue relevant to ascertaining the taxpayer's income tax li-
ability. Credible evidence is the quality of evidence which, after
critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to
base a decision on the issue if no contrary evidence were submit-
ted (without regard to the judicial presumption of IRS correct-
ness). A taxpayer has not produced credible evidence for these
purposes if the taxpayer merely makes implausible factual asser-
tions, frivolous claims, or tax protestor-type arguments. The in-
troduction of evidence will not meet this standard if the court is
not convinced that it is worthy of belief. 6
Two points emerge from this requirement. First, the taxpayer's obli-
gation here is prior to the possibility of a burden shift. If the taxpayer fails
in this obligation, the burden will remain on the taxpayer-indeed, the
taxpayer will lose 62-- even if the IRS puts on no evidence of its own. Sec-
ond, "credible evidence" is not an easy standard. The court is instructed to
subject the taxpayer's showing to "critical analysis" and to reject it, even
absent contrary evidence, if the court deems it "not worthy of belief."'63 The
same conclusion suggested by survival of the presumption of correctness is
suggested here as well. Since the "credible evidence" condition is substan-
tial, taxpayers do not prudently have the option of holding anything back.
For the maximum chance of fulfilling this condition, a taxpayer must fully
develop and present her case from the start. In other words, what was re-
quired of the taxpayer before the enactment of § 7491 (a) remains required.
C. MERE SYMBOL
Consider the cumulative effect of the conditions and exceptions dis-
cussed above. Major areas of tax controversy are categorically outside the
possibility of burden shift, and groups of tax litigants are categorically in-
eligible for it. Moreover, even when a burden shift is theoretically possible,
160. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(1) (1998).
161. H.R. REP. No. 599,supra note 57, at 240-41.
162. "Credible evidence" is sufficient to support a decision for the taxpayer absent con-
trary IRS evidence. So, if the taxpayer fails to introduce such evidence the burden of proof
will remain on her. She will not have met her burden and she will lose.
163. This conforms to present practice. Courts are accustomed to rejecting uncontro-
verted but non-credible evidence. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
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the taxpayer has to jump through tight hoops in order to qualify for it. The
taxpayer must maintain adequate proof, must present it to the IRS, and
must introduce it at trial. In short, taxpayers have to do no less under
§ 7491(a) than they had to do before its existence.
Beyond that, once the taxpayer reaches the end of this long quest, just
how holy is the grails she wins? That is, how much is the taxpayer's chance
of winning the case (which is her ultimate goal after all) increased if she
succeeds in shifting the burden of persuasion to the IRS? As I argue below,
not by much.
Appellate courts and legal theorists are fond of talking about the bur-
den of proof, but how much practical significance in tax cases does alloca-
tion of the burden actually have? If a case is fully developed factually at
trial, it matters little or not at all which party bears the burden. In a fully
developed case, the taxpayer introduces its evidence; the IRS introduces its
evidence; between the two, no material fact is ignored, and the judge de-
cides which party's evidence is more persuasive.
The usual standard of proof in civil tax cases-preponderance of the
evidence'S -renders location of the burden of persuasion insignificant in a
fully developed case. A standard metaphor for the preponderance standard
is an absolutely straight line; if that line is tilted at all, even by a hair's
breadth, a preponderance of the evidence exists in favor of the party in
whose direction the line tilts.105
The burden of persuasion is outcome determinative only when com-
plete equality or equipoise exists. This can happen in an underdeveloped
case. If no evidence is adduced by either party on a critical element of a
claim, equipoise is not disturbed, and the party bearing the burden loses.
When full evidence is adduced, however, equipoise is little more than a
theoretical possibility. Experienced trial lawyers know that the human mind
abhors uncertainty, and therefore tends to take sides." Moreover, even if
both parties have offered evidence, credibility is always an issue. Based on
her accumulated life experience, her sense of probabilities, and her world
view, the judge nearly always finds some of the evidence more or less credi-
ble than the conflicting evidence. This disturbs the equilibrium, and even
the slightest disturbance will allow disposition of the case without depend-
ence on location of the burden of proof. Thus, location of the burden of
164, See e.g., Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 584, 594 (1989), affd, 899
F.2d 3 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
165. See, e.g., JAMES W. MCELHANEY, McELHANEY's TRIAL NOTEBOOK 493-95 (2d. ed.
1987).
166, See, e.g., HERBERTJ. STERN, TRYING CASES TO WIN 119 (1991). As a consequence,
"[w]heather you have the burden of proof or you do not is of no moment. Do not rest on the
adversary's failure of proof. Use all that advances your theme." Id. at 82.
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proof is of little or no importance in cases in which the relevant facts have
been fully developed by the evidence introduced at trial, as commentators
have recognized regarding both tax 6' and non-tax 168 controversies.
The Chief Judge of the Tax Court made this point clearly:
Our experience under current law leads us to believe that cases in
which taxpayers have taken a reasonable position, have met the
substantiation requirements, and have fully cooperated generally
do not turn on who has the burden of proof. When a court has all
of the relevant evidence before it, it generally can determine the
controlling facts rather than decide the case on a failure of proof.
Based on this perception of how the current burden of proof rules
operate, the probable number of different results that would be
produced if section 7491 were enacted would not be great.' 9
Allocation of the burden does matter in underdeveloped cases, but
§ 7491(a) will rarely, if ever, help taxpayers in such cases. The taxpayer
almost always possesses the facts, so inadequate development can be laid at
the taxpayer's door. Typically, the § 7491(a) conditions discussed above,
such as maintaining records, cooperating with the IRS, and presenting
credible evidence, will prevent the burden from shifting to the IRS in un-
derdeveloped cases.
In short, even in those areas in which, categorically, burden shifting is
possible, a shift rarely, if ever, will occur in underdeveloped cases and
rarely, if ever, will be of any practical benefit to taxpayers in developed
cases. A defanged watchdog won't bite the neighbors, but it won't bite a
burglar either. In rendering § 7491(a) toothless, Congress has "protected"
167. See, e.g., JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
1017 (10th ed. 1998) (noting that imposition of the burden of proof on the IRS may be "cold
comfort" to the taxpayer when information to support the IRS's position is developed); Tom
Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., July
15, 1998, at Al (quoting N. Jerold Cohen: "It's a rare case that turns on the burden of
proof."); IRS Restructuring, supra note 34, at 282, 285 (statement of Fred T. Goldberg, Jr.) ("As
a practical matter, the chance that changing the burden of proof in litigated cases will make a
difference is about like the odds of flipping a coin and having it land on its edge."). As an
example, see Friedman v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2383, 2386 (1998) (concluding
that IRS would prevail even were the burden of proof shifted to it in the case).
168. See, e.g., McELHANEY, supra note 165, at 493 ("[F]or the most part the burden of
proof does not make much difference in the outcome of the case."); Edmund M. Morgan, Some
Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 911 (1931) ("The location of the
burden of persuasion is important . . . only in a situation which seldom occurs--namely,
when at the close of evidence the mind of the trier of fact is in equilibrium upon the issue.").
169. Burden-of-Proof Provision Could Spur Disputes, Tax Court ChiefJudge Says, 98 TAX NOTES
TODAY 12-58 (Jan. 20, 1998) (reproducing letter from ChiefJudge Mary Ann Cohen to Sena-
tors William V. Roth, Jr. and Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
445
84 IOWA LAW REVIEW
taxpayers by giving them something which can only bark. Contrary to the
"hype," taxpayers are not helped by § 7491(a). If the section has any
meaning, it is symbolic only.
III. NECESSITY OF MERE SYMBOLISM
After reading Part II, the reader may wonder: "Why did Congress
write § 7491 (a) that way?" If it really wanted to reverse the tax burden of
proof, it should have left out all or most of the exceptions and conditions.
On the other hand, if the exceptions and conditions are so important,
Congress should have skipped the whole enterprise of writing § 7491(a).
"What's the use of a rule that's swallowed by its limitations?"
The question is perfectly sensible, and, in fact, Congress should have
left § 7491 (a) out of the Restructuring Act. However, the choice to enact a
measure that is devoid of practical meaning, is the product of two powerful
but antagonistic forces: the perceived political benefit of being viewed as
doing something versus the real and disastrous consequences of actually
doing something. These forces are described below.
A. POLITICAL NEED TO APPEAR To ACT
Tax collectors are never popular, of course.' In recent decades, how-
ever, a number of trends have created growing dissatisfaction with the IRS
and the Code it administers.' For instance, the IRS is among the most
visible emblems of the federal government, not an enviable position in an
era of growing anti-government feeling. Also, Congress's insatiable appetite
for compounding the complexity of the tax laws has left the IRS responsible
for applying a Code which, year by year, moves closer to being unadminis-
trable.
The IRS, however, has added generously to its own troubles. The in-
ability of the IRS to design and implement an effective computer system
despite expending three to four billion dollars was, perhaps more than
anything else, the impetus for establishment of the Kerry-Portman Com-
mission.' Further, the fortress mentality and self-protective, unresponsive
managerial milieu of the IRS created thousands of instances of abuse-
some publicized, many not.
170. See, e.g., Matthew 9:9-13 (Jesus criticized for eating with tax collectors and other sin-
ners).
171. For reflections on the declining public support for the income tax, see MICHAELJ.
GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OFTHE INCOME TAX (1997).
172. It has been suggested-properly, in my view-that the IRS's problems stem more
from its antiquated computer system than from mean-spiritedness. Paul Glastris et al., At Your
Service, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 18, 1998, at 22, 24.
446 [1999]
B URDEN-OF-PROOF
In this atmosphere, perhaps the most significant event for IRS re-
structuring, and therefore derivatively for burden shifting, was the over-
sight hearings of the Senate Finance Committee in September 1997.17' A
parade of witnesses-taxpayers, taxpayers' representatives, and IRS
agents-testified (sometimes anonymously and behind screens) to a litany
of IRS wrongdoing. 74 The hearings were a staple in evening newscasts and
daily newspapers and created an outpouring of anger among citizens.
As an impetus to enactment of useful Kerry-Portman recommenda-
tions and other reforms, the hearings served a salutary function. The
problem, though, is that the momentum also was used to push ideas that,
far from being useful reforms, were dangerous or beside the point.
The burden-shifting idea provides one good example. The abuses
spotlighted in the oversight hearings involved matters other than allocation
of the burden of proof. Congress is not always sensitive to nuance, however,
and the oversight hearings and the reactions to them created an "IRS bad;
must punish bad IRS" mindset. This led legislators to go beyond measures
adapted to the problems revealed, to search for any semi-plausible, anti-
IRS measure to add to the Restructuring Act, including a burden shifting
provision. 75
Within a fortnight of the end of the oversight hearings, the Chair of
the House Ways and Means Committee announced that he would add a
burden-shift provision to the Restructuring Act.176 The Administration
originally opposed the burden-shift idea, as well as a number of other
measures in the Restructuring Act.177 However, the political impact of the
oversight hearings continued to snowball. 78 Thus, in its familiar volte face
173. Practices and Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service, Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 105"' Cong. (1997). A second set of hearings in early 1998 before the same com-
mittee fizzled, without creating anything like comparable impact.
174. It is not dear that all of the specific allegations were well founded. See, e.g., Susan
Meador Tobias, IRS Abuse Debate Should Be a Two-Way Street, 79 TAX NOTES 1071 (1998); Ste-
phen Barr, Report Labels IRS Testimony "Unfounded," WASH. POST, April 26, 1998, at A2. But
that is not crucial in the larger scheme. It is undoubtedly true that the IRS has, over the years,
committed numerous acts inconsistent with good administration or even basic fairness. If the
hearings left that impression in the minds of the public, it left a true impression.
175. The same could be said of some other provisions of the Restructuring Act, but those
are articles for another day.
176. SeeJCT May Recommend Nen, IRS Burden of Proof in Tax Litigation, 77 TAX NOTES 265,
265 (1997).
177. See White House Says Shifting Burden of Proof Is Political, 77 TAX NOTES 264 (1997).
178. See, e.g., Overhauling the IRS, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 14, 1998, at 12 (the
hearings made IRS reform "a political shoo-in"); Congress Poised to Rein in IRS, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, New Jersey), July 9, 1998, at 5 (the hearings gave IRS reform "unstoppable political
momentum").
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style, the Administration quickly reversed course and embraced much of
what became the Restructuring Act. 79 The Administration did not specifi-
cally endorse § 7491, but its opposition was unorchestrated, indeed
muted. 8' The Administration having left the field, members of Congress
who might have opposed burden shifting had no rallying point and fell in
line with the momentum.
In short, general trends were catalyzed by a sensational event to vault
IRS reform to the top of the political agenda. The stampede for political
advantage gave premium to nearly any "shot" at the IRS, even the notion of
burden shifting which Congress itself had repeatedly rejected.
B. PRAGMATIC NEED TO AVOID GENUINEACTION
Fortunately, however, the political process did not disconnect com-
pletely from reality. It still recognized that a genuine reversal of the tax
burden of proof would be a prescription for disaster, and such reversal was
rejected for that reason. So understood, the limitations written into §
7491(a) are not the result of inadvertence, sloppy drafting, or unwonted
timidity. They are the unavoidable product of the fact that a genuine, un-
bridled reversal of the tax burden of proof would have grave consequences.
The starting point is the realization that the taxpayer typically is the
party with superior access to the facts. Putting the burden on the IRS would
discourage voluntary disclosure of the facts by taxpayers. This would create
either of two negative results. On the one hand, the IRS could try to replace
information no longer voluntarily produced by gathering information more
aggressively through compulsory process. This, however, would make tax
audits more intrusive and disruptive for taxpayers and third parties, the very
opposite of the Act's intended effect. On the other hand, if the IRS is un-
able or unwilling to use compulsory process widely, the flow of information
necessary to correct determination of tax liability would be obstructed. The
result would be to slash federal revenues and to compromise fairness in the
distribution of tax burdens.
179. See NY. TIMES, May 8, 1998, atA1.
180. See Some IRS Reform Bill Provisions Trouble Treasury Official, 79 TAX NOTES 286 (1998)
(noting that Treasury Department was keeping an "intentionally low profile" and at least two
officials had made conflicting comments). There was a compounding factor that took the IRS
out of play as a potential opponent of § 7491. The current IRS Commissioner, Charles Ros-
sotti, was selected precisely because he had managerial experience but was not a tax attorney
or accountant. True to this profile, Commissioner Rossotti articulated no clear position when
asked by legislators for his view of burden shifting. At one point, at odds with all prior IRS
policy, he appeared hesitatingly to accept burden shifting. See IRS Restructuring, supra note
34, at 34 (statement of Charles Rossotti).
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1. Taxpayer's Superior Access to Information
Assume that Terry Taxpayer, on his income tax return for a given
year, claims a $1200 deduction for interest paid. The odds are that the
claimed deduction is proper, but, should the item become controversial,
many questions would need to be answered. Did Terry actually pay out
$1200? If so, did he do so in the year covered by the return? If so, was the
payment in the nature of interest, or was it something else? If it was in the
nature of interest, did any of the specific § 163 rules disqualifying deduc-
tion of interest payments apply?' 8' If not, did any provision outside of § 163
prohibit the deduction or limit its usefulness to Terry for the year in ques-
tion? 82
Similarly, assume that Terry's return for the year reports total gross
income of $60,000. The odds are that his gross income did not exceed that
amount, but again a number of questions would arise should controversy
exist. If the issue is whether Terry had an additional $1500 of income he
failed to report, a number of relevant questions would emerge. These
would include: Did Terry actually or constructively receive the $1500? If so,
did he do so in the year covered by the return? If so, was the item "income"
as that term is used in § 61 ?183 If so, did the receipt item fall within one of
the Code sections authorizing exclusion of the item from gross income? 1 '
If not, did some statute outside the Code authorize exclusion?8 5
In both situations, Terry has better access than the IRS to the infor-
mation that would answer such questions, and this is typical of the great
bulk of tax issues. The taxpayer's informational advantage over the IRS has
four roots. First, the taxpayer himself is, almost always, a party to the trans-
actions at issue in the case. Having first-hand knowledge, the taxpayer is
competent to testify at trial as to what happened. For instance, Terry is in a
position to testify whether he paid the $1200 (and, if so, to whom, when,
and for what) and whether he received the $1500 (and, if so, from whom,
when, and for what). Second, most tax transactions involve documents of
some kind: for example, checks, contracts, deeds, invoices, and the like.
The taxpayer often will have kept copies of such documents. Nearly always,
181. See I.R.C. §§ 163(d)-(h) (1998).
182. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 55-56 (alternative minimum tax); 68 (phase-out of itemized deduc-
tions); 265(a) (deductibility of interest expenses related to production of tax-exempt income);
465 (at-risk rules); 469 (passive activity loss rules).
183. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C. B. 14; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-23-046 (Mar. 10, 1992)
(both holding that certain types of compensatory payments did not constitute income for § 61
purposes).
184. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 101-136.
185. See, e.g., Hostage Relief Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-449, § 201, 94 Stat. 1967 (1980)
(excluding from income compensation of Government employees while held hostage abroad).
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the taxpayer at least had the opportunity make and keep copies of relevant
documents. Third, both for tax and for tax-independent reasons, the tax-
payer may have kept summaries or indirect evidence of the transactions.
Terry's books and records (if he is in business) or his check register might
help resolve the above controversies. Fourth, the taxpayer knows which
other persons or entities were also parties to the transactions. Thus, she
knows to whom to turn for additional information to supplement, com-
plete, or confirm the information already at her disposal.
For these reasons, in the overwhelming majority of cases the taxpayer
possesses a marked informational advantage over the IRS.'86 Moreover, in
those rare situations in which this is not the case, the law has long made
accommodations to ease the taxpayer's plight.'87
2. Incentive To Produce Information
Because the taxpayer typically has superior access to the relevant in-
formation, the burden of proof should be allocated so as to provide her an
incentive to preserve and produce that information. Placing the burden on
the IRS would be perverse in that regard. It would discourage the making
and keeping of records and the giving of testimony, in order to deny the
IRS evidence through which to sustain its burden. In contrast, placing the
burden on the taxpayer encourages making, keeping, and presenting rec-
ords and testimony; for without them the taxpayer will not prevail."' 8
Jt might be objected that putting the burden on the taxpayer creates
only an incentive for him to bring forth information favorable to his posi-
tion, that he still has little reason to bring forth unfavorable information as
well. Such an objection, however, ignores the dynamics of a tax trial. The
tactic of selective and incomplete production often will fail for a number of
186. See, e.g., United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1039 (1973); Martinez, supra note 39, at 272; Michael Quigley, A Commentary on Hou' the Pro-•
posed Regulations Affect the General Principles of Section 482 as Described in the Existing Regulations
and in Case Law, FED. BAR ASW'N SEC. TAx'N REP. 7, 10 (Spring 1992); TBOR II hearing, supra
note 16, at 131 (statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs).
187. Sometimes, this took the form of shifting part or all of the proof burden to the IRS.
See Appendix A infra. Other times, (1) the IRS was directed to obtain information for the
taxpayer, e.g., I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1998) (basis information), (2) the taxpayer was given special
access to information and documents possessed by third parties, e.g., I.R.C. § 6902(b); TAX Gr.
R. 73 (transferee liability); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT, A-14 (1984) (property transfers
between spouses or incident to divorce), (3) resort was made to reasonable approximation, e.g.,
Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930), or (4) the taxpayer was given the
opportunity to reconstruct lost records, e.g., Shores v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2368,
2371 (1998).
188. See, e.g., Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1977); Martinez, supra
note 39, at 271-72.
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reasons.
In most instances, it is not extremely difficult to detect the witness or
party who is trying to withhold at least part of the story. Effective cross-
examination before an experienced judge usually suffices to detect omis-
sions, exaggerations, or prevarications. Upon such detection, the case is
likely to be resolved against the unforthcoming party." 9 In addition, any
foray into production, however partial, opens the door to further disclo-
sures. For instance, if the taxpayer presents a document, it may contain the
names of other parties to the transaction, who can then be contacted or
called as witnesses, or recite other verifiable information. If the taxpayer
testifies, broad opportunities are presented for cross-examination. Fur-
thermore, a taxpayer's failure to present all relevant evidence can give rise
to an adverse inference. It is well established that, when a litigant can be
expected to possess evidence relevant to issues in controversy and fails to
offer it at trial, the court is entitled to conclude that that evidence, had it
been presented, would have been adverse to that litigant's position.9 0
Thus, allocating the burden of proof to the taxpayer largely compels
the taxpayer, on pain of losing on failure-of-proof grounds, to produce at
least some of the information available to him. Attempts to adduce only
carefully selected and partial evidence usually fail. So, when at least some
information is produced by the taxpayer, decisional accuracy is promoted.
3. Choice of Evils
As shown, the flow of information in tax controversies would slow un-
der a "pure" reversal of the burden of proof. How would the tax system
respond to this? There are two main possibilities, neither good. On the one
hand, the IRS could use various investigatory tools it already possesses to
attempt to develop the evidence it would need to shoulder its burden of
proof. This, however, would increase cost, inconvenience, and intrusiveness
for all concerned. On the other hand, political decisions or resource limita-
tions might make it infeasible for the IRS to use those tools much more
189. The courts have held on numerous occasions that the court need not accept testi-
mony, even if uncontroverted, if it is improbable, illogical, or otherwise unconvincing. E.g.,
Wood v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1964); Rand v. Helvering, 77 F.2d 450,
451 (8th Cir. 1935); Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 202, 212 (1992).
190. In Tax Court practice, this is known as the Wichita Terminal presumption. See Wichita
Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946), affd, 162 F.2d 513 (10th
Cir. 1947). A computer search on July 7, 1998, revealed 552 citations to Wichita Terminal.
Other courts also apply this presumption in tax cases. E.g., United States v. Philatelic Leasing,
Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1554, 1565-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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aggressively. This, however, would essentially convert the tax system into an
"honor" system. The result would be a drop, likely a substantial drop, in
revenue raised, and thus in resources available to fund governmental pro-
grams. Also, an honor system would create concerns about fairness of the
distribution of the burden of funding the government. Honest taxpayers
would bear more than their fair share; unscrupulous taxpayers would bear
less than their fair share.
a. Intrusion, Expense, and Inconvenience
In the great bulk of audits, the IRS does not invoke compulsory proc-
ess. It seeks information informally, asking the taxpayer what happened
and asking for copies of the relevant documents. Usually, this approach
yields sufficient information to allow the IRS to make a determination. The
IRS directs its agents to proceed in this fashion if possible and to use formal
investigatory tools only after informal means have proved unsuccessful.' 9'
But the IRS's preference for proceeding cooperatively should not obscure
the fact that the IRS does have a formidable array of compulsory informa-
tion-gathering weapons in its arsenal.
The Code gives the IRS "a broad mandate to investigate and audit
'persons who may be liable' for taxes. ' This broad mandate is backed up
by possible criminal sanctions, 193 enforcement by judicial process," and a
variety of information-gathering devices. Of such devices, the most impor-
tant are the general administrative summons for either documents or tes-
timony,195 several special summonses,'96 and options for enforced produc-
tion of documents located abroad or testimony of persons located
abroad.' 97 These tools are in addition to normal discovery options that are
191. See I.R.M. 4022.3, MT400OB234 (July 28, 1987).
192. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975); see I.R.C. § 7601(a) (giving the
IRS power to canvass districts for taxable persons and objects).
193. See I.R.C. § 7212(a) (making it a criminal offense to corruptly or forcibly interfere
with "the due administration of [the Code]").
194. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7402(a) (giving the district courts jurisdiction "to render such judg-
ments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal
revenue laws").
195. See I.RC. § 7602(a) (giving IRS authority to summons persons or books for examina-
tion).
196. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 65030) (designated summons whose issuance tolls the running of the
statute of limitations on assessment); 7609(f) ("John Doe" summons when identity of taxpayer
unknown).
197. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 982 (formal document requests); 7456(b) (order by Tax Court); 28
U.S.C. § 1783 (order by district court). These powers are supplemented by exchange of in-
formation under tax treaties, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 6103(k)(4); United States Model Income Tax
Convention of September 20, 1996, Art. 26; I.LM. 42(10)(10), and letters rogatory, see, e.g.,
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available under court rules once a matter reaches litigation.'
Given this, the courts are right in characterizing as "broad" the ability
of the IRS to compel taxpayers and third parties to produce information.'99
As one court remarked:
[-lhe power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to investi-
gate the records and affairs of taxpayers is greater than that of a
party in civil litigation. His power has been characterized by this
court as an inquisitorial power, analogous to that of the grand
jury and one which should be liberally construed."'
Thus, if a true burden reversal decreased voluntary production of in-
formation, the IRS might attempt to use its compulsory powers more ag-
gressively in an attempt to compensate for the information deficit. Taxpay-
ers and third parties might seek judicial protection, but their prospects for
success would not be great. IRS summonses need meet only loose require-
ments to be judicially enforceable. - '
Moreover, a burden shift might cause the courts to apply these loose
requirements even more sympathetically to the IRS. The looseness of the
limits on the Service's information-gathering tools reflects appreciation of
the inherent informational disparities between taxpayers and the IRS.20 2 A
pure burden reversal would make the situation worse by discouraging vol-
untary production. To compensate, the courts might well relax their stan-
Tiedemann v. The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820-22 (E.D. La. 1941).
198. For a case discussing the relation between the administrative summons and judicial
discovery rules, seeAsh v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 459 (1991).
199. E.g., United States v. Barter Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Joyce, 498 F.2d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325,
1327 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the IRS has "wide latitude" to summons). Commentators
agree. See, e.g., ROBERT MCKENZIE ET AL, REPRESENTING THE AUDITED TAXPAYER BEFORE
THE IRS, 7-1.10 (1994) ("The IRS has incredibly broad powers to demand information from
taxpayers."); Saltzman, supra note 88, at 13-6 ("the [IRS's] power to compel production of
records or testimony is extremely broad").
200. United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176 (5th. Cir. 1967) (citing Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953)).
201. To secure judicial enforcement of the summons, the IRS's showing "need only be
minimal." Liberty Fin. Servs. v. United States, 778 F.2d 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1985). For ex-
ample, there is no probable cause requirement, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 53-
54 (1964), and relevance and materiality are applied more loosely than in the context of trial
evidence, e.g., Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 862 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 833 (1956). I.R.C. § 7609 imposes special rules regarding summonses to certain types of
third-party recordkeepers. However, these rules are procedural, not substantive, and the IRS
typically has little difficulty satisfying them.
202. "mhese inquisitorial powers are justified 'because all the facts are in the taxpayer's
hands."' United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Bolich v. Rubel,
67 F.2d 894, 895 (2d Cir. 1933)).
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dards when they review challenges to IRS summonses and the like. For like
reason, courts might be inclined to allow the IRS greater latitude in discov-
ery.
203
But our society would not be improved by substituting compelled pro-
duction for voluntary production. Issuing summonses and seeking or op-
posing their enforcement are expensive, inconvenient, and time-consum-
ing activities for the target, the IRS, and the courts.-3 4 In addition, the pro-
cess can cause bitterness, distrust, and hardening of positions, all of which
further erode the relationship between the IRS and the taxpayer, sowing
the seeds for yet more controversy between them in the future.
The situation would be particularly vexing for third-party targets of
IRS compulsory process. For instance, if a taxpayer (relying on the fact that
the IRS bears the burden under a "real" burden shift) refuses to provide
information as to his claimed deductions, the IRS might need to seek in-
formation from, among others, his credit card companies, his bank, his
utilities providers, his mortgage lender, any charities to which he allegedly
contributed, his employer, or, if a proprietor, his suppliers, customers, and
employees. °5 It is more natural to fix compliance burdens on the taxpayer
whose return is under examination than on third parties who may have
dealt with the taxpayer.
However the compliance burdens ultimately are distributed, though,
they would be greater in the aggregate under a system depending on for-
mal process than one depending on cooperation. Burden shifting marches
under the flag of helping citizens and taxpayers. However if it causes the
IRS to rely more heavily on formal information-gathering techniques, it
would have the opposite effect.2°6
b. Revenue Erosion
In all practicality, however, it is unlikely that the IRS would be able to
greatly increase use of formal process after a pure burden shift, even if it
wanted to do so. The very forces that led to enactment of § 7491 would
create political barriers to such use. Perhaps more importantly, congres-
203. The courts sometimes criticize the IRS for relying on discovery instead of adequately
developing the facts during the audit. E.g., Durkin v. Commissioner, 87 T. C. 1329, 1402-03
(1986). This attitude might soften if, because of burden reversal, developing the facts during
the audit becomes more difficult for the IRS.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1975) (stating that IRS sum-
monses "unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy" but are necessary to the system).
205. See TBOR II hearing, supra note 16, at 21 (statement of Cynthia G. Beerbower).
206. Senator Moynihan articulated this concern during the course of consideration of
§ 7491 and was seconded by IRS Commissioner Rosotti. See Hearings Before the Senate Finance
Comm., 1998 WL 212890, at *19-20 (May 1, 1998).
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sional parsimony in IRS appropriations2 7 would create significant resource
constraints.
Of course, the practical inability of the IRS to fully use compulsory in-
formation-gathering devices would create its own set of problems under a
true, general shift of the burden of proof to the IRS. Chief among these is
peril to the public fisc. A genuine shift of the burden would encourage
many taxpayers to pursue a "hide the ball" strategy. They would see benefit
in taking overly aggressive return positions. Then, in the event of audit,
instead of producing information, they would challenge the IRS to disprove
the correctness of those positions. If the IRS could not or would not use its
compulsory tools, it would be unable to meet this challenge.
Certainly, there are many honest taxpayers who would eschew this
strategy. But it defies human experience to assume all taxpayers are in this
category. Given the numbers of taxpayers, even a small percentage de-
crease in compliance would render serious create consequences. 20 8 Con-
gress estimated that § 7491-which is far from a true burden shift-would
cost the Treasury $2.7 billion over a ten-year period.2 9 A genuine shift
would cost much more.210
The matter was put graphically generations ago. Explaining why the
Board of Tax Appeals had, in its rules, placed the burden of proof on the
taxpayer, James S. Ivins, one of the original appointees to the Board,
207. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton, Treasury Appropriations Bill Getting Bumpy Ride in Both Houses,
80 TLx NOTES 290 (1998).
208. "[One] survey suggests that five percent of our taxpayers cheat on their taxes, and
twelve percent would do so if they thought they would not be caught. Similar studies suggest
that, apart from cheating, many taxpayers are more inclined to take aggressive positions on
their tax returns if they believe that they are less likely to ultimately have to pay any additional
tax." TBOR II hearing, supra note 16, at 131 (statement of Lawrence B. Gibbs).
Similarly, a general burden shift would have "enormous and far-reaching adverse effects
on our tax system. . . . [I]t will result in a significant reduction in the willingness of tax-
payers to comply voluntarily with their tax obligations and would greatly encourage tax pro-
testors." Id. at 26 (statement of Cynthia G. Beerbower, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy).
209. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 2676, THE
"INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998," AS PASSED BY THE
SENATE ON MAY 7, 1998 (JCX-42-98) (1998). In the main, this estimate is based on the as-
sumption that the IRS will settle future cases on terms more favorable to taxpayers than it did
under pre-§ 7491 law. See WALL ST. J.,July 15, 1998, at Al.
Revenue scoring is notoriously inaccurate. See, e.g., WALL ST. J., June 23, 1998, at A20
(discussing inaccuracy of scoring of 1997 capital gains changes, and concluding that the reve-
nue estimators should "shape up and start firing people, or go out of business"). The scoring
of § 7491 was, I suspect, particularly conjectural.
210. See Cherecwich, supra note 48, at 490 ("[Ihf shifting the burden were to reduce volun-
tary compliance by as little as one percent, there would be a $10 billion annual decrease in the
revenues.").
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stated: "If you place the burden of proof on the Commissioner, you might
as well repeal the income tax and pass the hat because you will practically
be saying to the taxpayer, 'How much do you want to contribute toward the
support of the government?"'21'
Two final points as to revenue loss. First, the problem would not be
limited to federal coffers-it would spill over to states and localities as well.
Nearly all states and many localities have income taxes. Most of these "pig-
gyback" onto the federal income tax, in that jurisdictions ask their taxpay-
ers to state their income as computed on their federal tax returns, make a
few modifications, then impose state tax rates on these tax bases. 212 Thus, if
a genuine burden shift would lead taxpayers to understate their income for
federal purposes, it derivatively would lead to understatement for state and
local income tax purposes as well. -'
Second, in light of international developments, it is particularly ironic
that the drive for burden reversal has gathered speed now. Russia has been
experiencing a severe fiscal crisis, the effects of which have resonated in
global financial markets. A major factor in that crisis has been Russia's fail-
ure to collect taxes effectively,214 which has driven the Russian government
to desperate measures. 215 With this lesson before us, it is curious that some
would court the revenue erosion that a genuine burden shift would
threaten.
c. Unfairness
There is a further dimension of the foregoing concern. Taxpayers who
win the "hide the ball" game will pay less tax than similar taxpayers who
choose not to play. This would traduce an important goal of our tax system:
the principle of horizontal equity, the notion that similarly situated taxpay-
211. Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 69th
Cong. 907 (1925). This concern remains valid today. A former chief judge of the Tax Court
recently pronounced himself "firmly opposed to a shift of the burden of proof because more
taxpayers might engage in stalling tactics during the examination process, tax avoidance and
tax evasion." CCH TAXDAY, Oct. 22, 1997 (quoting Samuel Sterrett).
212. E.g., JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
868 (6th ed. 1997).
213. See TBOR II Hearing, supra note 16, at 45 (statement of Margaret Milner Richardson)
(discussing the relative impact of shifting the burden of proof to the IRS).
214. Last year, Russia succeeded in collecting only 52% of the taxes owed it. N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1998, at A3.
215. For instance, Russia is trying to enlist men's fear of sexual impotence to improve tax
compliance. One Russian television ad shows a man sitting up, partly nude, in bed. He
mournfully clicks the bedside lamp on and off while an attractive woman next to him turns
away angrily. This visual is accompanied by the voice-over: "Lost your desire? That's nerves.
Pay your taxes and live peacefully." Id.
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ers should be taxed similarly.216
Certainly, there are many departures from this principle-for in-
stance, homeowners are treated better than renters, and married couples
sometimes are treated better, and sometimes treated worse, than cohabi-
tating, unmarried couples. 7 But such departures reflect deliberate policy
choices by Congress based on social or economic incentive purposes. Viola-
tions of horizontal equity resulting from differential ability and willingness
to "game" the system should not be similarly countenanced. A pure burden
shift would compromise the fairness with which the costs of supporting the
Government are distributed among our citizens.
The Supreme Court has made this point in a related context:
We recognize that the authority vested in tax collectors may be
abused, as all power is subject to abuse. However, the solution is
not to restrict that authority so as to undermine the efficacy of the
federal tax system, which seeks to assure that taxpayers pay what
Congress has mandated and to prevent dishonest persons from
escaping taxation thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpay-
ers.
2 19
C. RECONCILIATION THROUGH SYMBOLISM
The clashing forces described above explain the route taken by Con-
gress with their adoption of § 7491(a). Because of the political dynamic, a
purported burden shift was too tempting to forgo. Yet, because a true bur-
den shift would have been calamitous, a straight-forward reversal of the
burden was a pragmatic impossibility.
The reconciliation of the clashing forces was a purely symbolic action.
Thus, we have a § 7491(a) that allows Congress to claim to have tamed the
IRS monster but that will have virtually no effect on who bears the burden
in the practical order.220 Such an exercise is cynical, of course. Worse, as
Parts IV and V will show, there will be costs to be paid for creating this
216. See, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979); Commis-
sioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932).
217. See, e.g., Steve 1_ Johnson, Targets Missed and Targets Hit: Critical Tax Studies and Effec-
tive Tax Reform, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1774-80 (1998) (explaining different tax treatments
given to individuals on the basis of marital and living status).
218. See generally Cherecwich, supra note 48, at 489-90 ("[U]nder the burden-shifting pro-
posal, a dishonest taxpayer would have an incentive to stonewall the IRS and escape paying his
fair share").
219. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1975).
220. See JCT May Recommend New IRS Burden of Proof in Tax Litigation, 77 TAX NOTES 265,
267 (1997).
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empty symbol.
IV. DIsPuTE RESOLUTION HARMS
Part II established that, under § 7491(a), taxpayers will rarely benefit
from reallocation of the tax burden of proof. But that is not the same as
saying that the new section will have no effect. Section 7491(a) will mean-
ingfully affect the lives of participants in our tax system-unfortunately, in
negative ways.
Two of the limitations of § 7491(a) discussed in Part II are ambiguous
and will create significant new uncertainties in tax litigation. These are the
"factual issue" and "cooperation with the IRS" limitations. I will describe
the uncertainties created by these two rules, then show the practical diffi-
culties that will ensue.
A. UNCERTAINTIES
1. Uncertainties from the "factual issue" limitation
Section 7491(a)(1) confines any burden shift to factual issues.22" ' The
stress point here is mixed questions of fact and law. Courts may handle
such questions for § 7491(a) purposes as they have for standard-of-review
purposes: classifying them as either factual issues or legal issues based on
which component predominates.22
But "the devil is in the details," and it is the application of this ap-
proach that will be problematic. For standard-of-review purposes, the di-
chotomization of mixed questions into factual issues and legal issues has
proved far from consistent or predictable.223 Similar uncertainty would be
wrought by importing this approach into § 7491 law.
The problem has three aspects. First, appellate courts often choose to
review mixed tax issues without stating which standard applies to the issues:
the deferential standard for factual issues or the de novo standard for legal
issues. Many times, the appellate opinion simply omits discussion of the
applicable standard. 224 Other times, the opinion notes the disagreement of
221. See supra notes 110-19 and accompany text.
222. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Ralph S. Rice, Law, Fact, and Taxes: Review, of Tax Court Decisions Under Section
1141 of the Internal Revenue Code, 51 COLUM. L REV. 439 (1951) (discussing the difficulty in
characterizing mixed questions as questions of fact or law).
224. For example, a series of appellate tax decisions, dealing with whether release of con-
tract rights produced capital gains or ordinary income, reversed and remanded without ever
discussing whether the mixed issue was predominantly a factual issue or a legal issue. Bisbee-
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the parties as to the proper standard, then says the decision would be the
same under either standard.225
Second, when different appellate courts review the same mixed tax
question, they sometimes disagree as to whether the question is reviewable,
based on its predominant characteristics, as a factual issue or as a legal is-
sue.226 Of course, there is nothing unique to tax cases about this. The "fact
versus law" distinction can be bedeviling, and may generate disagreement,
regardless of the substantive branch of law from which the case
originates.227
Third, appellate courts sometimes play a strategic game. Choice of the
standard of review can go far towards justifying a substantive result the ap-
pellate court may want to reach.228 It also defines the scope of appellate
inquiry, thus affecting the distribution of decisional power between the ap-
pellate courts and the trial courts. The classification choice made by a court
of review may sometimes reflect such considerations.229
Applying this to § 7491, courts may interpret "factual issue" for
§ 7491(a) purposes by reference to factual-issue versus legal-issue as under-
stood for standard-of-review purposes. If the judge thinks burden shifting is
a good idea, the incentive would be generally to classify mixed tax ques-
tions as factual issues, thus maximizing the possibility of a shift. If, though,
the judge shares the view expressed in this Article that the prior rule was
superior to § 7491(a), the tendency would be to classify mixed tax issues as
legal issues, for then § 749 1(a) would not apply.
Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d
125 (2d Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
225. E.g., In re Larson, 862 F.2d 112, 117-18 (7th Cir. 1988); Price v. Commissioner, 98-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,432, at 84,185 (7th Cir. 1998) (designated not for publication);
Berry Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 150,398, at 84,092 (9th Cir.
1998) (designated not for publication).
226. Compare Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1986),
with Saviano v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1985) (disagreeing as to whether
the characterization of a payment as a loan or as a contribution to capital should be reviewed
as a question of law or a question of fact).
227. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (addressing "fact versus law"
conflict between circuit courts as to "substantially justified" element with respect to award of
attorney fees); Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 777-81 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (noting inconsistent holdings as to "fact versus law" nature of
"unobviousness" issue in patent cases).
228. Labeling a mixed question a factual issue triggers deferential review, which is helpful
if the appellate court likes the substantive result reached below. If the appellate court dislikes
that result, labeling that question a legal issue triggers non-deferential, do novo review, mak-
ing it easier to justify reversal.
229. See, e.g., Louis, supra note 113, at 997, 1017-38 (discussing appellate courts' exercise
of control over trial courts' "discretionary power").
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In short, the "factual issue" condition of § 7491(a) can produce signifi-
cant uncertainties, especially if interpreted by analogy to standard-of-review
law. Many tax cases turn on mixed questions of law and fact, and it often
will be difficult to predict whether the courts will consider these to be "fac-
tual issues," eligible for burden shifting.
2. Uncertainties from "Cooperation with IRS" Limitation
An important determinant of whether the burden of proof will shift
under § 7491 (a) is whether the taxpayer "has cooperated with reasonable
requests by the [IRS] for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and
interviews. '23° When will the taxpayer have complied with this requirement?
The legislative history indicates that several elements are essential for com-
pliance. The taxpayer must provide "within a reasonable period of time,
access to and inspection of witnesses, information, and documents" within
the taxpayer's control (but only "as reasonably requested by the [IRS]"). 2 31
In addition, the taxpayer also must provide "reasonable assistance to the
[IRS] in obtaining access to and inspection of witnesses, information, or
documents not within the control of the taxpayer," including such material
located abroad.232 Another "necessary element" of cooperation is the tax-
payer's exhausting her administrative remedies, including administrative
appeal rights.233
However, at least two actions are not required as elements of coopera-
tion. First, the taxpayer need not, on pain of a finding of non-cooperation,
accede to an IRS request to extend the statute of limitations on
assessment.234 Second, the taxpayer may, without risking an adverse find-
ing, assert the applicability of one or another privilege 23 5 as grounds for
refusing to provide information requested by the IRS. -36
230. I.R.C. § 7491(a)(2)(B) (1998).
231. H.R. REP. No. 105-599,supra note 57, at 240.
232. Id. at 240. This includes providing English translations of foreign documents as
reasonably requested by the IRS. Id. at 240 & n.9.
233. Id. at 240.
234. Id. In general, the IRS must assess tax liabilities within three years after the filing of
the taxpayer's return (or, if later, the due date for such filing), I.R.C. § 6501(a), but that period
may be extended by agreement between the IRS and the taxpayer, I.R.C. § 650 1(c)(4).
235. In addition to previously recognized privileges, the Restructuring Act adds a new
privilege for communications with non-attorney tax advisors. Restructuring Act, supra note 5,
§ 3411 (codified at I.R.C. § 7525). For a critical view of the new privilege, see Steve R. John-
son, Tax Advisor-Client Privilege: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Come, 78 TAX NoTES 1041
(1998).
236. "Cooperating also means that the taxpayer must establish the applicability of any
privilege." H.R. REP. No. 105-599, supra note 57, at 240. This implies that at least good-faith
assertions of privilege will not constitute failure of cooperation. As to bad-faith assertions, see
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While helpful, the legislative history does not answer all, or even most,
of the potential questions. Indeed, the cooperation inquiry will always be a
case-by-case matter, rarely susceptible to categorical resolution. That being
true, the purpose of the following discussion is more to suggest the range of
questions that may arise under the "cooperation" condition than to predict
how the courts will answer those questions.
A taxpayer seeking to satisfy or deflect the "cooperation" condition
could argue at any of four levels: (1) the IRS did not make a request for
information; (2) if it did, that request was not reasonable; (3) the taxpayer
complied with the request; and (4) if she did not, there was good cause
therefor. A potential for ambiguity, dispute, and unpredictability exists at
each of these levels.
(1) Did the IRS ask for the information during the examination? Cur-
rently, many information requests by the IRS are oral. People remember
conversations differently, and, thus, the potential for "Yes, I did / No, you
didn't" clashes will be ever-present under § 7491. Even written requests are
not wholly immune from differences in interpretation that lead to dispute,
as anyone who has been involved in discovery imbroglios can attest.2 7
Loosely worded information requests can be interpreted "strategically,"
leading to either cramped production or "box car" production. Moreover,
one can only marvel at the ability of skilled counsel to find "ambiguity" in
even the most carefully drafted requests for production.
(2) If the court concludes that the IRS did, in fact, request the infor-
mation in question, it still must determine whether the IRS was reasonable
in seeking it. Neither the statute nor the legislative history defines this con-
cept. The most obvious analogy is to IRS summonses. Generally, IRS sum-
monses are enforceable if (i) the investigation is conducted pursuant to
legitimate purposes; (ii) the matters inquired into are relevant to that pur-
pose; (iii) the information sought is not already in the IRS's possession; and
(iv) any required administrative steps have been taken.23' Additional re-
quirements are prescribed for summonses in special situations.3 9 Typically,
elements of enforceability are applied loosely and sympathetically to the
IRS, so as not to stifle information gathering.24
infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. MORSE, OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES 9-1 (1990) (stating
that the most common objection to the form of interrogatories is "vague and ambiguous").
238. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
239. See I.RC. §§ 7609(a)-(e) & (g)-(i) (discussing third-party recordkeeper summonses),
7609(f) (describing 'John Doe" summonses); see also § 7611 (explaining investigations of
churches); 7612 (discussing summonses for tax-related computer software source codes).
240. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing the IRS's information gath-
ering advantages).
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Courts applying § 7491(a) will have to grapple with two questions in
this context: Should the requirements that measure the enforceability of a
summons also measure the reasonableness for § 7491(a) purposes of an IRS
request for information? If so, should those requirements be applied with
the same degree of liberality for § 7491(a) reasonableness purposes as they
are for summons enforcement purposes? Plainly, there is enormous room
for divergence as to these questions. One could imagine courts importing
all, some, or none of the summons enforcement elements into § 7491(a)
reasonableness analysis, and one could imagine courts applying them with
more or less liberality.
(3) Precisely how fully need the taxpayer comply with reasonable IRS
information requests in order to satisfy the "cooperation" condition for
shifting the burden of proof? For example, if there are twenty issues in the
case and the taxpayer fully complies with IRS requests as to nineteen of
them but only partly complies with IRS requests as to the twentieth issue,
who bears the burden of proof as to that twentieth issue? Likewise, if, on a
given issue, the IRS asks for 100 documents and the taxpayer produces 90
of them, has the taxpayer sufficiently cooperated in order to shift the bur-
den as to the issue? Similar questions easily could be multiplied.
The legislative evolution of § 7491 makes answering such questions
more difficult. In the version originally passed by the House, the taxpayer
would have been required to 'fully cooperate [ ]" with IRS requests for in-
formation.24' The Senate deleted the adverb, and the Conference Commit-
tee followed the Senate's version. The legislative history does not make
clear how much substantive significance Congress intended this deletion to
have. Taxpayers surely will argue that this change means that something
less than total cooperation can be sufficient cooperation to satisfy this con-
dition for shifting the burden.
(4) Assume that the IRS asks Theresa Taxpayer to let it examine a
particular document in her possession. Assume further that this request is
reasonable but that Theresa nonetheless refuses to show the document to
the IRS during the audit. On proper facts, may Theresa argue that the "co-
operation" condition was met because there was good cause for her refusal?
The likely answer is "yes." However, we may expect controversy as to what
can constitute good cause and whether such cause is present on the facts of
a given case.
The clearest candidate for such good cause is a claim of privilege as to
the information sought by the IRS. 24 2 The legislative history of § 7491 im-
241. See supra note 55 (providing the version of § 7491 originally passed by the House).
242. Another candidate for "good cause" is assertion that the IRS was proceeding in bad
faith in seeking the information. This is a well recognized category of argument in summons
enforcement cases. E.g., United States v. Caltex Petroleum Corp., 81 A.F.T.M2d 1798 (N.D.
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plies that, notwithstanding the requirement to cooperate, taxpayers may
still assert privilege claims.243 So in our scenario, Theresa may assert that
the document sought by the IRS is protected by, for instance, the attorney-
client privilege, and that she, therefore, had good cause excusing her re-
fusal to divulge it.
However, matters are unlikely to remain that simple. Theresa's claim
of privilege may have been: correct under the law, incorrect but reasonably
arguable, or clearly incorrect. The legislative history surely means that a
correct assertion of privilege excuses non-cooperation, and it may extend
this as well to arguable-though-erroneous assertions. It surely, however,
cannot mean to extend this to frivolous assertions.- ' Thus, in order to de-
termine whether the "cooperation" condition for a burden shift was satis-
fied, courts will not only have to separate correct from incorrect privilege
claims, they also will have to sort incorrect claims into frivolous and non-
frivolous categories.
B. DELETERIOUS EFFECTS
The preceding subpart showed that the "factual issue" and "coopera-
tion with the IRS" limitations inevitably will give rise to differing interpre-
tations. Parties adjust their behavior to the contours of the litigation land-
scape. Additional uncertainty will affect the behavior of taxpayers as liti-
gants.
There sometimes is a tendency for taxpayers to see their cases through
"rose-colored glasses." Taxpayers affected by this syndrome might tend too
readily to think they qualify for burden shift because "sure, this is a factual
issue" and "heck yes, I cooperated with the IRS, at least as far as I reasona-
bly had to." Moreover, parties-even those rigorously striving to be realis-
tic-are more likely to erroneously weigh the probabilities when the envi-
ronment is uncertain. Two problems will ensue: taxpayers will be more
likely than before to take their cases into litigation and once cases are in
Tex. 1998); see also SALTZMAN, supra note 88, 13.08 (discussing bad faith requests for tax-
payer information). However, this probably is not independent of the "was the IRS's request
reasonable?" facet of the inquiry.
243. See H.R. REP. No. 105-599,supra note 57, at 240.
244. If even frivolous assertions of privilege excuse non-compliance with reasonable IRS
information requests, the "cooperation" requirement would be a dead letter-taxpayers could
simply assert spurious privilege claims as to every document sought by the IRS. Similarly,
taxpayers are permitted to contest in Tax Court IRS determinations before having to pay the
tax in controversy, but they will be penalized if they offer frivolous arguments against those
determinations. See I.R.C. § 6673(a)(1)(B) (1998) (authorizing imposition of maximum pen-
alty of $25,000 against taxpayers whose positions in Tax Court proceedings are frivolous or
groundless).
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litigation, they will be more costly and inconvenient to resolve.
1. Increased Litigation
Even now, with the burden of proof squarely upon taxpayers, some
taxpayers litigate cases that they really should have settled or conceded
during audit or administrative appeal.24 To take an example, a substantial
number of Tax Court cases involve "tax protestor" issues, in which taxpay-
ers-undeterred by § 6673-assert such things as "the Sixteenth Amend-
ment was never properly ratified"; "wages are not taxable income"; "pay-
ment of federal income tax is purely voluntary"; "U.S. currency has been
worthless since we went off the Gold Standard"; and "I am exempt from tax
as an Ambassador from the Kingdom of God."2 46 Prone to litigating even
such obvious losers, tax protestors will only be encouraged by a section that
allows them to make, at least, a colorable argument that the burden of
proof has been shifted to the IRS.
24 7
The effect need not be confined to protestors. Any taxpayer who, be-
fore enactment of § 7491 (a), would have assessed the pros and cons of pro-
ceeding to litigation as relatively balanced, will now recalibrate that balance
in light of the possibility of a burden shift. The uncertainties as to such a
shift created by the "factual issue" and "cooperation with the IRS" require-
ments will cause some taxpayers, who would have settled or conceded un-
der the prior regime, to take their chances and litigate. Cases are most
likely to settle when the consequences of trial are readily predictable. Un-
certainties breed varying assessments of probable outcomes, a condition
that stymies settlement.
245. This is why Congress enacted I.R.C. § 6673, which imposes a penalty on the taxpayer
when his Tax Court case was instituted or maintained for delay, was based on a frivolous or
groundless position, or was filed before exhaustion of administrative remedies. The amount
of the maximum penalty has progressively risen: from $5,000 to $10,000, now to $25,000.
246. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 204-05 (1991) (describing various
standard tax protestor arguments as "incredible" and "frivolous"); Christopher S. Jackson, The
Inane Gospel of Tax Protest: Resisting Rendering Unto Caesar-Whatever His Demands, 32 GONZ. L.
REv. 291, 301-24 (1996-1997).
247. The argument would not be even colorable as to the protestor arguments themselves,
as the legislative history states. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. However, it might
be colorable as to any facially genuine issues in the case, such as whether the taxpayer had
unreported income or was eligible for deductions or credits. Cf TBOR II Hearing, supra note
16, at 27 (statement of Cynthia G. Beerbower, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), De-
partment of the Treasury) (A general burden shift would be "an obvious boon to tax protes-
tors, who would claim all sorts of deductions to zero out their income. The IRS would spend
endless hours having to disprove each item on the return. Protestors would no doubt become
extremely creative in claiming deductions that would cause maximum difficulty on the part of
the IRS to disprove.").
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2. Increased Resolutional Costs
An even more significant problem will be that resolving tax cases that
reach litigation will entail greater expense and inconvenience, for the
courts, the IRS, third-party witnesses, and taxpayers themselves. Such inef-
ficiencies will stem from more discovery, more motions practice, less stipu-
lation and concession of facts, and more evidence and briefing.
a. Discovery
As discussed in Part III, a true, general shift of the burden of proof to
the IRS would result in less voluntary disclosure of information by taxpay-
ers during an audit. Section 7491(a)-which is far from a genuine shift of
the burden-would have less of an effect in this regard, but probably still
some. There is likely uncertainty as to whether a mixed question will be
held a "factual issue" in any given case, and there inherently is room for
disagreement as to whether there was sufficient cooperation with reason-
able IRS requests for information. Given that, some taxpayers may believe
that they at least "have a shot" at the burden's being shifted to the IRS.
Such taxpayers will be disinclined to voluntarily disclose any more infor-
mation than the bare minimum they deem required to satisfy the "coop-
eration" condition.
The IRS could respond either by issuing administrative summonses
during the audit24s or by engaging in discovery after the case begins. How-
ever, judicial supervision and resolution of discovery disputes and district
court litigation as to summons enforcement are costly in both time and
money. Thus, to the extent that uncertainty about § 7491's conditions leads
to substitution of summonses and discovery demands for voluntary disclo-
sure, resolution of tax controversies will be rendered less efficient.
b. Motions
Attorneys, for both taxpayers and the IRS, will feel uncomfortable
about burden-location uncertainties. In preparing for trial, an attorney
wants to know whether her party bears the burden of proof or whether the
other party does.24' Especially in the early days of our living with § 7491(a),
248. For further discussion, see supra notes 191-206 and accompanying text.
249. I assume here a bipolar trial (taxpayer versus IRS), which is the norm. However, tax
cases exist in which there are three or more parties. These involve situations in which the
persons who engaged in the transactions characterized them inconsistently for tax purposes.
For instance, (1) when alimony-like payments pass between former spouses, the payer spouse
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this likely will lead to parties submitting pretrial motions, asking the court
to announce who will bear the burden of proof at trial.
There is support in present practice for this expectation. Sections 533
and 534 of the Code set up a complex scheme for the allocation of the bur-
dens of production and persuasion in accumulated earnings tax (AET)
cases. It has become routine in AET cases for one party or the other to
move before trial for declaration by the Tax Court of who bears what bur-
dens as to which parts of the case. Generally, counsel view this as important.
Still, making, opposing, and resolving such motions add another layer of
controversy to the case, sometimes wastefully.
250
It would be unfortunate if § 7491 and its attendant uncertainties
caused this practice to metastasize throughout tax litigation. Substantial
additional costs would be imposed were pretrial motions as to location of
the burden of proof to become routine in tax litigation. The uncertainties
associated with the "factual issue" and "cooperation" conditions may raise
this specter.
In actual practice, though, I suspect that courts would find ways to
protect themselves from the barrage of such motions. For instance, trial
judges probably would adopt a routine or semi-routine practice of not
often claims a deduction under § 215 despite the payee spouse not reporting an income inclu-
sion under § 71; (2) when multiple assets are transferred between businesses by sale, the buyer
and seller sometimes disagree as to how much of the total consideration should be allocated to
each of the transferred assets, a matter which affects cost recovery and character of gain or
loss; and (3) when property is used as compensation for rendition of services, the transferor
and recipient sometimes disagree as to the fair market value of the property, which is the key
to the transferor's deduction and the recipient's income inclusion under § 83. In such cases,
the IRS, to avoid being whipsawed, often issues deficiency notices to both the parties to the
transaction. The ensuing cases sometimes are consolidated, creating a triangular alignment of
parties in which the real clash is between the sets of taxpayers, the IRS being largely a
stakeholder.
Allocating the burden of proof under § 7491(a) in such multi-party cases will entail
an extra level of complexity. For example,.assume in a triangular case that the burden is held
to have been shifted to the IRS and no evidence is introduced as to a critical fact. Would the
IRS lose relative to both the taxpayers? For instance, would the payor spouse be allowed the
deduction but the payee spouse not be required to include anything in income? Such a result
clearly would entail erroneous determination of tax on a net basis. Taxpayers would receive
legally incompatible benefits, to the detriment of the fisc.
250. An example is the AET case, Iowa School of Men's Hairstyling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64
T.C.M. (CCH) 1114 (1992). That opinion deals only with burden of proof. The IRS moved
before trial for declaration that, under §§ 533 and 534, the taxpayer would bear the burden of
proof at trial. The IRS prevailed as to that motion. Thereafter, however, the case disappears
from the reporters. Before trial, the IRS realized that, on the facts, the taxpayer would be able
to carry its burden of proof, so the IRS conceded the case. The effort, time, and expense
involved in litigating and deciding the pretrial motion as to location of the burden of proof
were, after all, wasted.
BURDEN-OF-PROOF
holding hearings on or ruling on such motions before trial, then just add-
ing a few, mostly boilerplate paragraphs to their opinions as to burden of
proof. This would reduce waste of judicial resources, but it would not be a
complete solution. Such motions probably still would be filed and answered
in at least some cases, involving costs to litigants. Moreover, counsel would
be distressed on account of not knowing until after the trial who bore the
burden of proof at trial.
c. Stipulations and Concessions
Stipulations are central to Tax Court practice.25' The court directs:
The parties are required to stipulate, to the fullest extent to which
complete or qualified agreement can or fairly should be reached,
all matters not privileged which are relevant to the pending case,
regardless of whether such matters involve fact or opinion or the
application of law to fact. Included in matters required to be
stipulated are all facts, all documents and papers or contents or
aspects thereof, and all evidence which fairly should not be in
dispute .... The requirement of stipulation applies under this
Rule without regard to where the burden of proof may lie with re-
spect to the matters involved.252
Tax trial fora other than the Tax Court also use stipulations although
they emphasize them less. All courts, of course, encourage parties to agree
to or to concede matters not genuinely in dispute. However, the "factual
issue" condition under § 7491 (a) may create a problem in this regard. As
noted in subpart II.A.3, the key question is how courts apply this condition
when dealing with mixed questions of law and fact, and, in that context,
courts may borrow a "predominant purpose" test from standard-of-review
law. However, it is widely held, under such law, that what would otherwise
have been a factual issue becomes instead a legal issue if the relevant facts
have been stipulated255 or otherwise are not in dispute.2- 4
251. See, e.g., Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Tax Court Trials: An Updated View from the Bench,
47 TAx Luv. 587, 591 (1994) (delineating the multiple benefits from stipulation).
252. TAX CT. R. 91(a)(1).
253. See, e.g., ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 142 F.3d 1200, 1203
(10th Cir. 1998) (noting that once the facts have been stipulated there remains only a legal
issue of how to apply the relevant Code section); Meek v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 50, 179, at 83,259 (9th Cir. 1998) (designated not for publication) (ruling similarly);
Sennett v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1985) (ruling similarly).
254. See, e.g., Marrin v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying de novo
standard of review because the facts were not disputed); United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d
905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969) (classifying the issue as a matter of law because the facts were not
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If stipulating, or not contesting, the facts as to an issue converts that is-
sue into one of law, there can be no possibility of burden shifting as to it
under § 7491(a)'s "factual issue" condition. One can predict the effect on
the behavior of taxpayers. The "factual issue" condition may lead to fewer
or less comprehensive stipulations or to taxpayers at least half-heartedly
controverting at trial, matters they otherwise would not have disputed, in
order to prevent loss of the possibility of burden shifting. Such a result
would be unfortunate for the efficiency of the system.
d. Evidence and Briefing
Lawyers are trained to try to secure every reasonably available advan-
tage for their clients. In all but the clearest cases of non-applicability,
therefore, we may expect taxpayers and their counsel to argue that
§ 7491(a) applies to the case, such that the burden of proof is on the IRS.
To make such arguments, taxpayers and their counsel will have to deal
with the conditions and exceptions within § 7491 and establish the predi-
cate elements for a burden shift. Unless the IRS stipulates the points, tax-
payers will have to establish, for example, that they reasonably cooperated
with IRS investigatory requests and that they are under the net worth
threshold if they are corporations. This requires presentation of evidence,
whether testimonial or documentary, and the IRS, in opposing attempted
burden shifting, may introduce its own evidence on such matters. Other
predicate elements, such as whether the issue in controversy is a factual
issue, will require argument, though not evidence. Thus, additional catego-
ries of evidence henceforth will be offered in many, if not most, tax trials,
and additional points will have to be briefed. The time required to con-
clude tax trials and the number of pages in tax briefs both will grow as a
result of § 7491(a), to the detriment of the efficiency of our dispute resolu-
tion system.
As lawyers and judges work with § 7491 in actual practice, particular
categories of such inefficiency will come to light. At least one interesting set
of questions can be anticipated now. IRS summonses are not self-enforcing.
If the taxpayer (or other target) does not comply, the IRS must bring an
action in district court to obtain a decree directing compliance. -55 Cur-
rently, the IRS sometimes chooses not to bring such a summons enforce-
ment action even in the face of noncompliance. For example, the IRS may
conclude that, in the total configuration of the case, obtaining the informa-
disputed); Thomas v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1958) (ruling similarly).
255. See I.RC. §§ 7402 (a) & (b), 7604 (1998) (granting such power to the appropriate U.S.
district court).
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tion involved would not be worth the resources that a summons enforce-
ment proceeding requires. How would future situations of this type play out
under § 7491(a)? Surely, whenever the taxpayer failed to comply with a
summons, the IRS would argue that the taxpayer had not cooperated with
the IRS, therefore that the burden of proof could not shift in the case. The
taxpayer presumably would rejoin that the summons was defective or im-
proper (so it did not constitute a "reasonable" request for information by
the IRS) and that the failure of the IRS to seek judicial enforcement of the
summons shows the IRS knew the summons was defective or improper.
In such a scenario, one can foresee two undesirable effects. First, to
foreclose such an argument by the taxpayer, the IRS might bring an en-
forcement action that, absent § 7491(a), it would have chosen to forgo. If
that occurs, there will be more summons enforcement cases than are opti-
mum from an efficiency standpoint, the excess occurring simply because
the IRS is factoring in the § 7491 effects of not seeking such enforcement.
Second, if the propriety of the summons is not determined in a district
court action, how is the court trying the ultimate tax liability case to know
whether the taxpayer reasonably cooperated with a reasonable IRS request,
in order to ascertain who bears the burden of proof? One could imagine a
collateral hearing within the liability case on this issue, that is, a quasi-
summons enforcement hearing within the liability trial in order to allocate
the burden of proof in that trial. Surely, such an approach would delay and
raise the costs of resolving tax disputes.
C. SUMMARY
Two of the conditions for burden shifting under § 7491(a)-the "fac-
tual issue" and "operation with the IRS" conditions-are ambiguous. Their
application in particular tax trials is likely to be uncertain. Such uncertain-
ties will affect the behavior of tax litigants. Section 7491 (a) will increase the
percentage of tax disputes that go to litigation; it will increase ultimately
meaningless and wasteful sparring at and before trial; and it will increase
litigation expense and inconvenience for all parties including taxpayers,
the IRS, third-party witnesses, and the courts. -56
256. For support for these concerns, see Tannenwald, supra note 251, at 12-15, and Bur-
den-of-Proof Provision Could Spur Disputes, Tax Court ChiefJudge Says, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 12-
58 (Jan. 20, 1998) (letter from ChiefJudge Mary Ann Cohen to Senators William V. Roth, Jr.,
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
Judge Tannenwald also raises an additional concern that § 7491 is likely to compli-
cate resolution of small tax cases (so called "S" cases), causing delay and complications for
small-case taxpayers. Supra note 251, at 14.
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V. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE HARMS
Part II showed that there is no reassuring answer to questions about
§ 7491's substance. This Part will demonstrate that, despite the section's
emptiness, it has been touted by politicians and described by the media as
being an important reform. In short, § 7491 has been vastly oversold.
Left there, my point would be saddening but unremarkable. Hyper-
bole and unkept promises are immemorial attributes of politics, and those
with na'ive expectations or delicate sensibilities may do well to avoid looking
too deeply into political events and processes.
But my concern goes deeper. The legislative exercise that § 7491 rep-
resents is not just unappealing as a matter of governmental aesthetics-it
will, I believe, produce real and substantial problems for this country in the
long run. Those responsible for § 7491's enactment promised more than
the section will deliver. Many citizens and taxpayers will start out believing
the promises, then discover that they are empty only when they are actually
embroiled in a controversy with the IRS. That discovery will further embit-
ter taxpayers and increase their dissatisfaction. This is important because
the success of our tax system rests on a foundation of popular support. The
erosion of that foundation cannot be beneficial to the country in the long
term.
A. DESCRIPTION OF § 7491 BY POLITICIANS
The promises surrounding § 7491 were not modest. While it has not
always been easy to assign clear and definite meanings to the slogans used,
they were clearly designed to heighten public expectations about the sig-
nificance of the measure.
Burden-of-proof shift was part of candidate Bob Dole's tax proposals
in his 1996 presidential campaign. He promised to "end the IRS as we
know it." '257 Specifically, shifting the burden of proof would, the electorate
was told, "tame the taxman."'2 5 Indeed, fundamental values were at stake:
"Americans who are audited are currently presumed guilty until they prove
themselves innocent. This should be reversed."'2 59
This spirit carried over to the Restructuring Act, the legislation of
which § 7491 was a part. In a description of the legislation, the Chair of the
House Ways and Means Committee explained: "It's about putting the tax-
payer first and the IRS second. It's been the other way around for entirely
257. Sheryl Stratton, Shifting the Burden of Proof to the IRS, 72 TAx NoTES 1328, 1328
(1996) (quoting Dole campaign literature).
258. Id.
259. Id.
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too long. 2 60 The longer one thinks about this statement, the harder it is to
grasp exactly what the statement could mean in the context of an opera-
tional revenue system. Nonetheless, it clearly has a "sound bite" quality and
communicated to taxpayers that genuine and important change had been
wrought.
The section's proponents spread the idea that § 7491 is a meaningful
part of such genuine and important change. This view was emphatically
advanced by Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott. In delivering on national
television the Republican response to the 1998 State of the Union address,
Senator Lott discussed IRS reform and the role of burden-of-proof shift in
it:
That's why one of the first things we will tackle is REAL reform of
the I.R.S....
We are going to stop the abuses the I.R.S. is inflicting on Ameri-
can taxpayers. You've got our word on it.
[Tlhe only way to limit Government and expand individual free-
dom is to eliminate the I.R.S. as we know it today.
It is morally wrong for a free people to live in fear of any Gov-
ernment agency.
It is morally wrong for citizens in a democracy to be presumed
guilty until proven innocent. 6'
These are strong words. Reversing the pre-§ 7491 burden-of-proof rule
was touted as more than just good policy: it was demanded by democracy,
indeed by morality.6 2 With further reflection, of course, this democratic
260. N.Y. TMES, June 26, 1998, at A21, col. 1 (quoting Rep. William Archer).
261. Text of address as provided by office of Senator Lott, reprinted in NEW YORK TIMES,
Jan. 28, 1998, at A21 (emphasis in original).
262. The rhetoric was not confined to Republicans. President Clinton was a belated con-
vert to IRS restructuring, but then tried to lead the charge. See President's State of the Union
Address, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1998, at A20 ("Like every taxpayer, I'm outraged by
the reports of abuses by the I.R.S. We need some changes there. . . . Last year, by an over-
whelming bipartisan margin, the House of Representatives passed sweeping I.RS. reforms.
This bill must not now languish in the Senate. Tonight, I ask the Senate, follow the House,
pass the bipartisan package as your first order of business."); Treasury Secretary Robert E.
Rubin, quoted in WASH. PosT, July 23, 1998, at Al ("We would not be here today [signing the
Restructuring Act] were it not for the president's leadership.").
In signing the Restructuring Act, President Clinton offered this intriguing observa-
tion: "The bill will give the American people an IRS they deserve." LA. TIMES, July 23, 1998,
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and moral imperative starts to unravel. As seen in Part I, the former rule
was settled and largely unchallenged for over a century; it contained many
exceptions to accommodate special situations; it was consistent with well
established principles of burden-of-proof theory generally; and it was de-
fended by nearly all tax professionals, including taxpayers' representatives.
All that being true, was the pre-§ 7491 rule really so anti-democratic and
immoral?
In fact, the "taxpayers are guilty until proven innocent" charge mixes
apples and oranges. The concepts of "guilt" and "innocence" are drawn
from criminal law, but § 7491 amends the law applicable to civil cases.263
Instead, we should compare apples to apples and oranges to oranges. In
criminal tax cases, the Government bears the burden of proof (just like in
criminal non-tax cases) and, to meet it, must establish its case "beyond a
reasonable doubt" (just like in criminal non-tax cases)."' Similarly, the allo-
cation of the burden in civil tax cases under the pre-§ 7491 rule was con-
sistent with burden-of-proof law and theory in civil non-tax cases. Where
was the democratic or moral defect when tax burdens of proof were consis-
tent with non-tax burdens of proof in both their criminal and civil
aspects?265
However, a different defect of the "guilty until proven innocent" slo-
gan is more germane for present purposes. As seen in Part II, § 7491(a)-
by virtue of its conditions and exceptions-will leave the burden on the tax-
payer in the great bulk of tax cases. That being true, either Congress, in
enacting § 7491(a), has honored democracy and morality in the breach not
the observance, or the democracy and morality rhetoric was hollow to begin
with. Either way, legislators clearly oversold the significance of § 74 91(a)
and the extent to which taxpayers will benefit from it.
Hyperbole did not end with pre-enactment pronouncements. After
passage of § 7491 by their respective chambers, Representatives and Sena-
tors continued to paint the measure as far more than it really was-both in
legislative statements and in communication with their constituents.
Chairman Archer of the Ways and Means Committee declared: "Our plan
at A16. It is not completely clear whether this means that a good people will now have a good
IRS or that a wicked people will now receive their comeuppance.
263. Section 7491(a) deals with court proceeding for "ascertaining the liability of a tax-
payer for tax." Tax liability is determined in civil proceedings, not criminal proceedings.
264. See, e.g., Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 126 (1954) (stating that "the prose-
cution must always prove the criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt").
265. According to one press report, at least some members of Congress were aware of the
civil-criminal distinction but chose to disregard it. See WASH. POST, July 23, 1998, at A6 ("The
burden of proof is on the government in criminal cases--and in criminal tax cases, for that
matter-and members said they felt taxpayers ought to be treated the same way, even through
most tax disputes are civil.").
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shifts the burden of proof off the taxpayer and onto the IRS."'2 66 Senator
Murkowski, a member of the Senate Finance Committee, said in his news-
letter to constituents: "Most importantly, whenever a dispute with the IRS
winds up in Tax Court, the legislation shifts the burden of proof from the
taxpayer to the IRS. Taxpayers will no longer be presumed guilty until
proven innocent-the IRS will have to prove its case.
267
Such statements completely omit reference to the conditions and ex-
ceptions that eviscerate § 7491(a). Plainly, the authors of such pronounce-
ments knew or should have known better. Perhaps, given political practice,
this is unsurprising; in any event, it is disinformation.
B. DESCRIPTIONS OF § 7491 IN THE MEDIA
Have the media done a better job than the politicians in informing
citizens and taxpayers of the true nature of the new burden-of-proof rules?
Unfortunately, not by much. Most reports on television, on radio, or in the
popular press did not inform their viewers, listeners, or readers that
§ 7491(a) typically will leave the burden where it always has been-that is,
on the taxpayer in most cases. 68 Surely, given time, space, and audience
266. Archer Hails IRS Conference Agreement, 80 TAX NOTES 70 (1998).
267. News from the Office of Frank Murkowski, Summer 1998, at 3. To similar effect, see
Upton: Vote Cast Against Subsidiesfor Timber Roads, SOUTH BEND (INDIANA) TRIB., July 19, 1998,
at B8 (quoting Rep. Fred Upton stating that "no longer is a person guilty until proven inno-
cent").
268. Worthwhile accounts include Albert R. Hunt & Alan Murray, Have a Nice Audit: What
the Coming IRS Reforms Will Mean for Your Wallet, SMART MONEY, Aug. 1, 1998, at 71 (stating
that the burden-shift provision is "less broad than it sounds" and "the change is likely to be
one of nuance"). Tom Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Develop-
ments, WALL ST. J., July 15, 1998, at Al ("Many legislators have been trumpeting [the burden]
change as a major taxpayer victory. But after studying the fine print, some tax lawyers dis-
agree."); Paul M. Soyk, Special Letter, Taxpayers Gain Nothing from IRS Reform, DET. NEWS,
July 28, 1998, at A6 ("The widely hailed provision to shift the burden of proof to the IRS is a
bit of a sham.").
Also, some media reports mentioned some of § 7491's conditions, usually the "re-
cordkeeping" and "cooperation" conditions. See, e.g., Armond Budish, IRS Reforms Give Citi-
zens Needed Protection, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 19, 1998, at 6J (discussing record-keeping and
cooperation); James S. Horvitz, Viewpoints, The IRS Actually Blinked, HOUs. CHRON., July 25,
1998, at 35 (discussing record-keeping and cooperation); Charles A. Jaffe, Reforming Tax Re-
lief, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 1998, at B4 (discussing record-keeping and cooperation); Gary
Klott, Chalk up Win for Taxpayers in the Battle Against the IRS, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL,
July 4, 1998, at 15C (discussing record-keeping and cooperation); Kathy Kristof, IRS Reforms
May Help Those Who Have Had Problems, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 19, 1998, at H2
(discussing record-keeping and cooperation); Editorials, Overhauling the IRS, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 14, 1998, at 12 (discussing record-keeping and cooperation); IRS Bills
Strengthen Taxpayer Protections, USA TODAY, May 8-10, 1998, at 6A (discussing record-keeping
and cooperation).
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attention-span limits, no organ of the media could have been expected to
dissect § 749 1(a) in full detail.
Still, as far as § 7491(a) is concerned, there is no tension between
economy and accuracy. A serviceably correct summary would be: "One sec-
tion of the new Act is supposed to shift the burden of proof to the IRS. But
it contains so many exceptions and conditions, that taxpayers almost never
will benefit." This capsulization would have been brief enough for newspa-
pers and news radio, maybe even for television. Instead, however, probably
because time pressures prevented journalists from understanding what they
were reporting, the media largely took legislators at their word. They ac-
cepted that § 7491 did meaningfully shift the burden of proof, and they
reported that to the public.
In ascending order of inaccuracy, most media accounts of § 7491 fall
into three categories. First are stories that include some qualifying language
that the burden shift is not universal. They still, however, give the impres-
sion that a shift often will occur. 9 Moreover, consumers of the story are
more likely to remember the main idea "burden shifted to the IRS" than
some vague and ill-defined qualification. In the second category are ac-
counts that state "the burden has been shifted to the IRS" without adding
any qualifying language. Such accounts-and there are many of them27°-
suggest to the public that the burden now is on the IRS in all tax cases.
269. See, e.g., Daniel Eisenberg, Your Money: Fight Back Against the IRS, TIME, July 20, 1998,
at G8 ("[A] few million taxpayers locked in battle with the dreaded agency may soon have a
fair fight. Under the law, the burden of proof in many cases would fall to the government
instead of the accused."); Alan Fram, Congress Poised to Reign in IRS, 'The Agency We Love to
Hate', NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, July 9, 1998, at 5 ("The bill would shift the burden of proof from
the taxpayer to the IRS in many tax court cases .... "); Editorial, Bipartisan Reform, Partisan
Junk, DAYTON DAILY NEWs, June 27, 1998, at 12A (stating that "the burden of proof will often
be on the IRS"); Clinton Signs Measure Overhauling the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at A3.
("Among the changes the new law requires is shifting the burden of proof in many tax court
cases to the I.R.S. from the taxpayer."); Ho' Laumakers Voted, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June
29, 1998, at B2 (stating that the Act "shifts the burden of proof in most civil tax disputes to the
government"); IRS Bill Expected to Pass in Senate: Approval of Reforms 'Virtually Unanimous' Top
Democrats Predict, ClHI. TRIB., May 7, 1998, at 1 (stating that the new measure "shift[s] the
burden of proof to the IRS in certain court cases"); WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAzETrE, July 15,
1998, at A8 ("One provision intended to make the system fairer shifts the burden of proof in
many tax court cases to the IRS.") (all emphases added).
270. See e.g., Tamara Lytle, IRS Reforms: Will Taxpayers Really Benefit?, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
July 5, 1998, at A4 (stating that the burden of proof is now on the IRS); Ralph Vartabedian &
Jonathan Peterson, Clinton Signs Bill That Aims to Reform IRS, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1998, atAl6
(stating that the burden of proof is now on the IRS); All Things Considered, (National Public
Radio, Peter Kenyon reporting, July 8, 1998) available in 1998 WL 3645597 (stating that the
burden of proof is now on the IRS); Good Start in Tax Reform, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1998, at B8
(stating that the burden of proof is now on the IRS); On Taxes: Reining in the IRS-But Not the
Congress, Hous. CHRON., June 28, 1998, at 2 (stating that the burden of proof is now on the
IRS); Editorial, Who's in Charge? IRS Reform Blurs Accountability for Troubled Agency,
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uggest to the public that the burden now is on the IRS in all tax cases.
Third, and worst, are accounts which not only imply a general shift of the
burden but add language expressly underscoring its importance.
As examples of the third category, the New York Daily News said: "The
legislation promises new power to taxpayers by shifting the burden of proof
to the Internal Revenue Service in court battles."27 The Los Angeles Times
offered that the Restructuring Act "would catch up with centuries-old com-
mon law by shifting the burden of proof in tax disputes to the accuser, the
IRS."1, 72 My hometown newspaper, the Bloomington Herald-Times, described
the burden shift as "the essential mark of any genuine IRS reform., 273 Oth-
ers labeled it "an important step toward communicating that citizens can
fight city hall " 274 and one of the "substantial and significant changes" ef-
fected by the Restructuring Act.275 In short, the mass media-far from re-
futing them-echoed the claims of politicians that § 7491 effects a genuine
and general shift of the burden of proof from taxpayers to the IRS.
C. EROSION OF TAx SYSTEM
As the above suggests, proposals that became § 7491 were wrongly ex-
plained to the public as representing fundamental and significant change.
Section 7491 was "oversold" and "overpromised" by its proponents. This
fact may well have long-term, adverse consequences for our tax system.
Unlike revenue systems used by some other countries, the American
system relies on the taxpayer to make the first calculation of her own tax
liability (on her tax return) and to pay that calculated amount. Moreover,
given the low and generally declining percentage of returns the IRS
audits, 276 that first calculation and payment usually are the last as well. This
being the case, our system depends heavily on the honesty and accuracy of
taxpayers' returns. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "our tax struc-
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 20, 1998, at B6 (stating that the burden of proof is now on the IRS);
Opinion, IRS Switches to Carrot, SALT LAKE TRiB., June 30, 1998, at A8; Editorial, IRS Overhaul
Bill Reins in Excesses, TACOMA NEWS TRIB., July 27, 1998, at A6 (stating that the burden of
proof is now on the IRS); WASH. POST, July 23, 1998, at Al (stating that the burden of proof is
now on the IRS).
271. TimothyJ. Burger, Congress Takes Bite Out ofIRS, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 25, 1998, at
10.
272. IRS Abuses Demand Reform, LA. TIMES, May 3, 1998, at M4.
273. IRS Reforms Is Needed, Overdue, BLOOMINGTON HERALD-TIMES, July 14, 1998, atA6
274. Bipartisan Reform, Partisan Junk, DAYTON DAILY NEWs, June 27, 1998, at 12A.
275. Keep Chopping the IRS Tree, DESERET NEWS, July 13, 1998, at A6.
276. See, e.g., Sheldon S. Cohen, The Ervin N. Griswold Lecture, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 113,
117 (1997) ("The audit rate in 1964-68 was about 4.5 to 5 percent . . . [T]oday the audit rate
is less than one percent.").
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ture is based on a system of self-reporting. There is legal compulsion, to be
sure, but basically the Government depends upon the good faith and integ-
rity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant
to tax liability.' 277 Citizens alienated from, and distrustful of, the tax system
are less likely to file honest and accurate returns. 278 Thus, maintaining pub-
lic confidence in our revenue system is an important national goal.279
This goal ultimately will be compromised by the gap between the
rhetoric and the reality of § 7491. In the short run, the belief-predicated
on the "hype" surrounding § 7491 that Congress has saddled the IRS with
the civil burden of proof may increase some citizens' satisfaction levels;
however, that condition is not ultimately sustainable.
Many taxpayers will come to this discovery under circumstances which
virtually guarantee maximum dissatisfaction. Those who actually believe
what they have heard about § 7491 will be angry when they lose in litiga-
tion, the adverse opinion saying things like "the taxpayer should have
made and kept substantiation," "the taxpayer should have cooperated with
the IRS," "the burden of proof remains on the taxpayer," and the like.280
Moreover, even if they did not fully believe the § 7491 hype, many still will
277. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975); see United States v. Rodgers, 461
U.S. 677, 683 (1983) ("The common purpose of this formidable arsenal of collection tools is to
ensure the prompt and certain enforcement of the tax laws in a system relying primarily on
self-reporting."); Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960) ("Our system of taxation is
based upon voluntary assessment and payment.. ."); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399
(1938) ("In assessing income taxes the Government relies primarily upon the disclosure by the
taxpayer of the relevant facts."); IRS Proc. Reg. § 601.103(a) ("The Federal tax system is basi-
cally one of self-assessment.").
278. "As [public] dissatisfaction increases, the continued viability of the tax system is
threatened-and as it is threatened, so too is the basis of support for essential governmental
services and functions." PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROvIrH &
SIMPLIcrY (SUMMARY) 2 (1985).
279. The IRS has acknowledged that maintaining "the highest degree of public confidence
in [the] integrity, efficiency and fairness" of tax administration is key to its mission. I.R.M.
P-1-1 (May 14, 1990). At least aspirationally, the legislative branch shares this perception.
See, e.g., Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, at 209-10 (1987) (stating that a reason for tax amendments was that "taxpayers were
losing faith in the Federal income tax system").
280. An interesting and growing area of tax scholarship uses cognitive theory to study
public reactions to tax rules. See, e.g., EdwardJ. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1861 (1994) (applying cognitive psychology or behavioral decision theory, which ar-
gues that people think and describe in ways that have systematic biases and distortions, to the
study of taxation); Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and
How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155 (1996) (same); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond
Public Choice and Public Interest, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 45-51 (1990) (same). It requires no subtle
understanding of cognition, however, to anticipate that taxpayers who are told they bear the
burden of proof, contrary to their expectations as to § 7491, will feel some dissatisfaction with
the system.
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feel themselves aggrieved. Losing litigants often feel anger and embarrass-
ment, and blaming Congress for a lie, even if only half believed from the
start, would be seductive.
In any event, once individual taxpayers, and over time a critical mass
of taxpayers, come to understand that § 7491(a) is empty, public dissatis-
faction will be engendered. The image of Congress, already low, will suffer
another blow. Predictably, legislators will try to shift blame to the IRS for
the embarrassment of Congress's own making,2 ' creating confusion and
furthering citizen alienation.
In summary, self-assessment is the bedrock of our tax system, and sat-
isfactory self-assessment depends on high public confidence in the system.
The empty symbolism of § 7491(a), and the inevitable public discovery of
that emptiness, will undermine such confidence to the long-term detriment
of the revenue system, on which the national government depends.
VI. PROPOSAL(S)
Section 7491 is unsatisfactory. In this Part, I discuss what should be
done to rectify the situation.
A. BESTAPPROACH
Conceptually, there are four possible burden-of-proof regimes for fed-
eral tax issues: (1) burden always on the IRS, (2) burden usually on the IRS
but with exceptions, (3) burden always on the taxpayer, and (4) burden
usually on the taxpayer but with exceptions. The first was considered in
Part III. It would be by far the worst approach-indeed, as long as any ra-
tionality remains in the corridors of Congress, it is inconceivable as a seri-
ous possibility. The second involves an intractable dilemma, a choice be-
tween revenue and loss of fairness on the one hand (if the exceptions are
few and weak), or ineffectiveness on the other (if the exceptions are numer-
ous and substantial). The drawbacks of § 7491 suffice to reveal the inade-
quacy of this approach. The third approach would be too inflexible, failing
to account for atypical circumstances.
We are left with the fourth approach, the one in place for generations
before § 7491 was enacted. However, differences in detail are possible, in-
deed desirable. As shown in Appendix A, situational exceptions were com-
mon under the pre-§ 7491 regime. As appropriate, even more exceptions
281. The process is well known. For instance, Senators and Representatives vote to add
new incentives, subsidies, anti-abuse rules, exemptions, transitional rules, and obscurities to
the law-then thunder against the complexity of the "IRS Code," as if the IRS, not Congress,
enacted those complexities.
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could be crafted, by statute, judicial rule, or case law.2 2
For instance, the two special rules of § 7491 could be retained. Of
these, § 7491(b)-placing the burden of proof on the IRS when it has re-
constructed income "solely through the use of statistical information on
unrelated taxpayers"-is insignificant but innocuous. 23 More important
(and more beneficial) is § 7491(c), placing the burden of production on the
IRS as to penalty issues. Even before § 7491, the burden of persuasion was
on the IRS as to a number of tax penalties."8 As to most penalties, however,
both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion were on the
taxpayer prior to enactment of § 7491.
Congress multiplied the number of tax penalties in the 1970's and
1980's and encouraged their use, in part as a backdoor way to reduce the
federal budget deficit. But cavalier assertion of penalties can be dangerous,
alienating taxpayers rather than buttressing their voluntary compliance.285
Thus, the IRS must always contemplate with gravity the possible assertion
of penalties. Putting the burden of production as to penalties on the IRS is
a way to cultivate this atmosphere.
The "action" in penalty cases often involves not the prima facie ele-
ments of the penalty but affirmative defenses to it.2 6 Congress shifted only
the production burden, not the persuasion burden, under § 7491(c) to em-
phasize that the taxpayer still bears the burden as to such affirmative de-
fenses.87 Outside of tax law too, it long has been understood that, once a
prima facie case has been made out, the burden usually is on the party re-
282. For one suggested additional exception, see Michael Quigley, A Commentary on How
the Proposed Regulations Affect the General Principles of Section 482 as Described in the Existing
Regulations and in Case Law, FED. BAR ASS'N SEC. TAX'N REP. 7, 10 (Spring 1992) (suggesting
that the burden should be on the IRS in § 482 cases based on third-party pricing data).
283. The IRS often uses average living costs, usually determined through Bureau of Labor
Statistics figures, in indirect-method unreported-income cases. However, they typically are
used as a supplementary basis of the IRS's determination, not the "sole" basis.
284. See I.R.C. §§ 6703(a) (1994) (providing that the IRS has the burden of proving penal-
ties for organizing or promoting abusive tax shelters, penalties for aiding and abetting under-
statement of tax liability, and penalties for filing frivolous income tax returns); 7422(e) (pro-
viding that the IRS has the burden of proving fraud penalties in refund suits); 7454(a) (pro-
viding that the IRS has the burden of proving fraud penalties generally).
285. See, e.g., IRS Penalty Reform: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Private Plans and Over-
sight of the Internal Revenue Service of the Senate Committee on Finance, 100th Cong. 151 (1988).
See generally Thomas R Hoffman, Studies of the Code's Tax Penalty Structure: A Fifid Step Toward
Reform, 43 TAx LAW. 201, 203 (1989) (describing Senate committee hearings on disgruntled
taxpayers).
286. E.g., §§ 6651(a)(1), (2) & (3) (providing reasonable cause defense to delinquency
penalties); 6662(d)(2)(B) (providing disclosure and substantial authority defenses to substantial
understatement penalty); 6664(c)(1) (providing reasonable cause defense to accuracy related
and fraud penalties).
287. See H.R. REP. No. 599, supra note 57, at 241.
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sisting a claim to establish any affirmative defense.2"8 Requiring the IRS to
establish its prima facie case but requiring the taxpayer to establish any
affirmative defenses, is a sensible approach to penalty issues.
Thus, we should go "back to the future." We should return to the rule
that the taxpayer usually bears the burden of proof but should retain, and,
as appropriate, expand, exceptions which place part or all of the burden on
the IRS. The simplest way to do so would be to repeal § 7491(a) but retain
§ 7491(b) and (c).
B. ALTERNATIVEAPPROACH
Now, a nod towards political reality. Having just enacted § 7491(a)
with great fanfare, it would be embarrassing for Congress to do the best
thing: simply repeal § 7491(a) outright. Thus, to allow legislators to save
political face, I offer an alternative approach.
That approach entails not outright repeal of § 7491(a) but replace-
ment of present § 7491(a) with a new § 7491(a) modeled on a statutory
precedent: Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Below, I describe that alternative
and show that it would result in restoration of the pre-§ 7491 allocation of
the burden of proof.
The draft federal rules of evidence presented to Congress in 1973
dealt extensively with privileges. The proposals proved highly controver-
sial, and a variety of alternatives were offered by commentators. 2 9 Ulti-
mately unable to decide just what privileges should apply in federal litiga-
tion, Congress enacted Rule 501, codifying an evolving common law of
privilege.2"
This approach could be adapted to another controversial area: alloca-
tion of the burden of proof in civil tax litigation. Specifically, Congress
could revise § 749 1(a) to read something like the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in another section of
288. E.g., Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (stating that, in EPA cases, once
a prima facie case is made out, burden is on employer to prove affirmative defense); Fallon v.
Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); Powers v. Russell, 30 Mass. 69, 77 (1833).
289. For detailed discussion of this history, see 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, §
5421.
290. In relevant part, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in -rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.
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this title,29" ' or in rules prescribed by the courts 92 pursuant to
statutory authority,23 the burden of proof in civil tax litigation
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted in the courts of the United States in light of
reason and experience.
This alternative would give members of Congress more rhetorical
"wiggle room" than outright repeal of present § 7491(a). Congress's pro-
claimed goal in enacting § 7491 was to "level the playing field" between
taxpayers and the IRS.2 9 Under the above alternative, legislators could
assert: "New § 7491(a) (the above alternative) does its job and accomplishes
our goal. The IRS will have to abide by the same burden of proof rules as
every other litigant; all will be governed by the same common law princi-
ples. The IRS will have no special advantage, no unfair advantage, as to the
burden of proof."
Of course, there would be no substance behind this. The pre-§ 7491
regime was consistent with common-law burden-of-proof principles, so the
IRS never had any special advantage as to the burden. But, of course, that
is not the point. As we have seen, the rhetoric on which present § 7491(a)
was justified had no contact with reality either. One may not feel clean us-
ing misleading rhetoric to extricate the nation from the effects of previous
misleading rhetoric, but, unfortunately, that may be the way the game of
legislation is played. If Congress needs a rhetorical device to smooth the
way for undoing its past indiscretion, the above alternative provides it.
Whatever its rhetorical utility, let there be no doubt that the above al-
ternative would accomplish the same substantive result as outright repeal of
present § 7491(a): it would restore the prior rule that the taxpayer gener-
ally bears the burden of proof. As shown in Appendix B, the prior regime
was consistent with common law principles, so would be restored by a rule
that made those principles dispositive. Thus, the above alternative
§ 7491(a) would return us to the pre-1998 burden rule. Hasten the day,
either by outright repeal of current § 7491(a) or by its replacement by the
above alternative.
291. "Title" means Title 26 of the United States Code, i.e., the Internal Revenue Code.
For examples of such other sections, see supra text accompanying notes 120-36.
292. The legislative history of such a provision should make clear that, for this purpose,
the term "courts" includes not only Article III courts (like the district courts) and units of or
adjuncts to them (the bankruptcy courts) but also Article I courts (the Tax Court and the Court
of Federal Claims).
293. For examples of burden allocations under court rules, see infra text accompanying
notes 318-30.
294. See H.R. REP. No. 364, supra note 78, at 56.
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CONCLUSION
The previous regime placed the burden of proof on taxpayers gener-
ally, with rifle-shot exceptions to cover special situations. In contrast, §
7491 is like a shot-gun with a clogged barrel. Were it to fire, its effect would
be felt widely. But, because of § 749 1's clogging conditions and limitations,
its shot is likely to go nowhere, or to ricochet back on itself with deleterious
effect. The prior regime was better. Any perceived deficiencies in it would
have been better addressed by new targeted exceptions than by a purport-
edly general but largely self-canceling reversal of the burden of proof.
Section 7491 will fail in its promise to help taxpayers; it will create or
exacerbate problems in tax administration and adjudication; and it will
undercut the citizen support essential to our revenue system. These short-
comings were predictable when the Restructuring Act was under considera-
tion by Congress. They were given insufficient attention because the con-
trolling momentum was the drive to create a political symbol. That symbol
is not worth the harm it will produce. Hopefully, in the fullness of time-
when the heat of the political moment has abated-a more deliberative Con-
gress will return us to the civil tax burden-of-proof allocation that prevailed
before enactment of § 7491.
A larger question emerges from the § 7491 affair. That provision and
other unfortunate provisions of the Restructuring Act are not isolated mis-
steps. Many have decried the deteriorating quality of tax legislation over
the last decade.295 The tax laws have been changed too often, with too little
deliberation, and with too little regard to relationship with other Code sec-
tions and to the overall complexity of the Code.
Through the various Taxpayer Bills of Rights, the Restructuring Act,
and other measures, 2 196 Congress has trained a spotlight on IRS abuses. But,
if the way the IRS administers the Code is compared to the way Congress
writes the Code, the latter is far the bigger problem for the tax system and
the nation. Thus, a key question in the current climate is "can arrange-
ments be forged-in the legislative process, through judicial review, or oth-
erwise-to ameliorate the fact or the effects of congressional irresponsibility
in tax writing?" I intend to explore this question in future articles.
295. E.g., IRS Restructuring, supra note 34, at 264 (statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, former
Commissioner, IRS); Glenn E. Coven, Interpreting Tax Legislation in the 90s, ABA SECTION OF
TAX. NEWSLETTER 11, 11 (Spring 1998); Steve R. Johnson, Further Thoughts on Interpreting Tax
Statutes, ABA SECTION OF TAX. NEWSLETTER 11, 13 (Summer 1998).
296. E.g., Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-35, 111 Stat. 1104
(1997).
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APPENDIX A
FLEXIBILITY OF THE PRE-§ 7491
BURDEN-OF-PROOF REGIME
Although the taxpayer usually bore the burden of proof under the rule
which preceded § 7491, this was not invariable. Special approaches altering
allocation of either the burden of production or the burden of persuasion
in tax cases emanated from statutes, judicial rules, and judicial decisions.
Such special approaches were crafted to respond to the peculiar nature of a
given issue or the context in which the issue arose.
A. STATUTES
Before enactment of § 7491, sections of the Internal Revenue Code (or
of non-Code statutes) placed some or all of the proof burden on the IRS in
over a score of situations. They included:
(1) the fair market value of property transferred in connection with
performance of services, when the property is subject to a non-lapse re-
striction which allows transfer only at a price determined under a
formula; 2
9 7
(2) the illegality of bribes and kickbacks to government officials, for
purposes of determining the deductibility of such payments; - 8
(3) the illegality of other payments (made to other than government
officials); 299
(4) whether an agreement violates generally enforced securities laws or
regulations, for purposes of disallowance of deductions for excess payments
under golden parachute agreements;m
(5) whether earnings and profits were accumulated beyond the reason-
able needs of the business, for purposes of the accumulated earnings tax;3"'
297. I.R.C. § 83(d)(1).
298. I.R.C. § 162(c)(I). Moreover, the IRS had to have "clear and convincing" proof in
order to meet this burden. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(5). Section 162(c) was enacted in
1969. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 487 (1969). Before
such enactment, a similar result had been reached by case law. E.g., Aetna-Standard Engage
Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 284, 292 (1950).
299. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2). Again, "clear and convincing" proof was required. Id.
300. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(B).
301. I.R.C. § 534(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.534-2(a) (1999). There are conditions under which
the burden of persuasion is on, or the burden of production shifts to, the taxpayer, depending
on the existence and specificity of various notices and statements passing between the IRS and
the taxpayer. See I.R.C. §§ 533(a) & 534(a)-(c) (establishing the burden-of-proof rules for
accumulated earnings tax cases).
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(6) whether it is reasonable to believe that an individual's loss of
United States citizenship would substantially reduce his or her United
States tax liabilities;. 2
(7) whether additional disclosure of written determinations and back-
ground information is appropriate;03
(8) the production of reasonable and probative information (beyond
mere introduction of an information return) when the taxpayer reasonably
denies receipt of additional income and has fully cooperated with the
IRS; 30 4
(9) the applicability of penalties for organizing or promoting an abu-
sive tax shelter;05
(10) the applicability of penalties for aiding and abetting the under-
statement of tax liability;306
(11) by extension, the appropriateness of an injunction against organi-
zation or promotion of an abusive tax shelter or against aiding and abetting
understatement of tax liability;307
(12) the applicability of penalties for filing a frivolous income tax re-
turn;
3 0 8
(13) in a Tax Court case, whether a petitioner is liable as a transferee
of property of a taxpayer owing tax;309
(14) whether an income tax return preparer willfully attempted to un-
derstate tax liability, for purposes of the § 6694(b) preparer penalty;10
(15) whether the making of a termination assessment of income tax
was reasonable;31'
(16) whether the making of a termination assessment against a §
501(c)(3) organization on account of flagrant political expenditures was
reasonable;312
(17) whether the making of a jeopardy assessment of tax was reason-
302. I.R.C. §§ 877(0, 2107(d) & 2501(a)(4).
303. LR.C. § 6110(0(4)(A).
304. I.R.C. § 6201(d).
305. I.R.C. § 6703(a); see I.PC. § 6700 (establishing the penalty).
306. I.R.C. § 6703(a); see I.RC. § 6701 (establishing the penalty).
307. Conduct violative of § 6700 or § 6701 is the predicate for such an injunction. I.R.C.
§ 7408(a); see United States v. United Energy Corp., 87-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9216, at
87,365 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that the "United States must prove that defendants are subject
to penalty under Section 6700 by a preponderance of the evidence").
308. I.R.C. § 6703(a).
309. I.RC. § 6902(a). The petitioner does have the burden as to whether the transferor
owed tax. Id. However, special discovery provisions are available to help the petitioner meet
that burden. LR.C. § 7 429(g)(2).
310. I.RC. § 7427; see Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b)(5).
311. I.R.C. § 742 9(g)(1); see I.RC. § 6851.
312. I.R.C. § 7429 (g)(1); see I.R.C. § 6852.
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able;'13
(18) whether the position taken by the IRS in the dispute was reason-
able, for purposes of the cost-shifting provisions when the taxpayer prevails
in the proceeding;"
(19) whether civil fraud penalties should be imposed;1 5
(20) whether a foundation manager knowingly participated in any
prohibited transaction;31
6
(21) whether a worker is an "employee" for purposes of the so-called
"safe harbor" provisions with respect to employment taxes. 7
B.JUDICIAL RULES OFPROCEDURE
The great bulk of trials for the determination of federal tax liability
are conducted before the United States Tax Court.31 8 The Tax Court's
Rules of Practice and Procedure repeated a number of the statutory burden
reversals described above, including placing on the IRS the burden of proof
as to matters involving the civil fraud penalty;" 9 knowing participation in
prohibited conduct by foundation managers, trustees, and organization
managers;"' liability as a transferee;32' accumulated earnings tax; 22 addi-
313. I.R.C. § 7429(g)(1); see I.R.C. §§ 6861 & 6862. As to all of §§ 6851, 6852, 6861 &
6862, however, the taxpayer does have the burden as to the reasonableness of the amount of
the assessment. I.R.C. § 7429(g)(2).
314. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(i).
315. See I.R.C. §§ 7454(a) (regarding the burden of proof in fraud cases generally); 7422(e)
(regarding refund suits). The IRS has to have "clear and convincing" proof to meet this bur-
den. E.g., Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213, 220 (1971); Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.
85, 92 (1970). See also I.RtC. § 6663(b) (establishing presumption that, if the IRS proves that
any part of a tax deficiency is attributable to fraud, the whole deficiency will be treated as
attributable to fraud but providing that taxpayer could rebut this presumption through a
preponderance of the evidence).
316. I.R.C. § 7454(b); see I.R.C. §§ 4912 (regarding tax on disqualifying lobbying expen-
ditures of certain organizations); 4941 (regarding taxes on self-dealing); 4944 (regarding taxes
on investments which jeopardize charitable purpose); 4945 (regarding taxes on taxable ex-
penditures); § 4951 (regarding taxes on self-dealing); § 4952 (regarding taxes on taxable
expenditures); § 4955 (regarding taxes on political expenditures of§ 501(c)(3) organizations);
4958(c) (regarding taxes on excess benefit transactions).
317. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-86 (1978).
318. See, e.g., Arthur L. Nims, III, The Role of the Tax Court, Address to 10th Annual Mary-
land Advanced Tax Institute (Nov. 12, 1990) (on file with author) ("Ninety-five percent of all
substantive civil tax litigation is conducted by the Tax Court.").
319. TAXGr. R. 142(b).
320. TAX GT. R. 142(c).
321. TAXGT.R.142(d).
322. TAX Gr. R. 142(e).
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tional disclosure actions; 32 3 and cost-shifting actions."24
In addition, the Tax Court's rules place the proof burden on the IRS
in three situations not covered by statute:
(1) Cases typically reach the Tax Court because the taxpayer has filed
a petition contesting the IRS determinations contained in a statutory notice
of deficiency issued after audit.3 25 After the petition is filed, the IRS some-
times concludes that even more tax is owed than it determined in its statu-
tory notice. It will assert such additional tax via pleadings or amended
pleadings in the Tax Court case. By rule, the IRS bears the burden of proof
as to such increases in the asserted deficiency.326
(2) The IRS also may seek to assert new matters not in the statutory
notice, without claiming an increased deficiency. These may be new ad-
justments or may be new theories requiring different factual development
in support of adjustments already in the notice.3 27 By rule, the IRS bears
the burden of proof as to such new matters. 28
(3) The IRS may rely on any of a number of affirmative defenses in its
answer to the taxpayer's petition. These include res judicata, collateral es-
toppel, other varieties of estoppel, and statute-of-limitations bar. 29 By rule,
the IRS bears the burden of proof as to such affirmative defenses in its an-
swer.
330
C. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Under the former regime, the courts did not confine reallocations of
civil tax burdens to judicial rule. On occasion, they also reversed the bur-
den (either as to production or persuasion) through decisions in particular
cases. For instance,
(1) A major case-law alteration of the prior general burden allocation
involved unreported income cases. When the IRS asserted that the taxpayer
had underreported her income, a number of courts held that the IRS bore
some initial burden to support the allegation. Some courts required "some
substantial evidence . . . demonstrating that the taxpayer received unre-
323. TAx CT. R. 229.
324. TAx GT. R. 232(e) & 270(d).
325. See I.R.C. §§ 6212-6215 (requiring such notices for certain types of taxes and author-
izing Tax Court review).
326. TAX G. R 142(a).
327. As to what constitutes a new matter for this purpose, see e.g., Achiro v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 881, 889-91 (1981); Richard C. Forman, The Burden of Proof, 39 TAXES 737, 740-47
(1961).
328. TAX GT. I 142(a); see TAX CT. R. 217(c) (stating similar rule as to declaratory judg-
ment actions).
329. TAx C. R. 39.
330. TAX GT. t 142(a).
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ported income." '' Others required at least an IRS showing linking the tax-
payer with the activity which allegedly generated the additional income.32
Should the IRS fail to make such a showing, it would lose before such
courts, even when the taxpayer introduced no evidence.3 A few courts
went even further 34 Not content with imposing an initial burden of pro-
duction on the IRS, these courts shifted the burden of persuasion to the
IRS in unreported income cases.3 5
Thus, in unreported income cases, many courts placed an initial bur-
den of production on the IRS and some even placed the burden of persua-
sion on it. The pattern among the courts was confusing and, since courts
sometimes switched camps, shifting. That being so, every prudent attorney
for the Government prepared and presented his case in an unreported
income trial as if his client bore the full burden of proof.. 6 Consequently,
as a practical matter, the burden of proof in unreported income cases came
close to being reversed even under the former regime.
(2) When the IRS uses the "net worth method" to establish unreported
income, an essential element is "opening net worth," defined as the tax-
payer's net worth at the start of the first tax year at issue.337 The IRS bore
the burden of proving opening net worth with reasonable certainty.3 '
(3) Since 1988, the Tax Court has had the authority to enjoin IRS col-
331. Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1986); Delaney v. Commis-
sioner, 743 F.2d 670, 671 (9th Cir. 1984); see Spatafore v. United States, 752 F.2d 415, 418
(9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the district court's finding cannot be overturned unless such a
finding was clearly erroneous).
332. Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d Cir. 1985); DiMauro v. Commis-
sioner, 706 F.2d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1983).
333. Walkerv. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 36,38 (3d Cir. 1985).
334. Most courts, however, did not shift the burden of persuasion in unreported income
cases. Bennet v. Commissioner, 98-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 50,238 (1st Cir. 1998) (per curiam)
(designated not for publication); Delaney v. Commissioner, 99 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1996).
335. Cebollero v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 986, 990-91 (4th Cir. 1992); Portillo v. Com-
missioner, 932 F.2d 1128, 1134 (5th Cir. 1991); Keogh v. Commissioner, 713 F.2d 496, 501
(9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Stonehill, 702 F.2d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 1983).
336. Of course, not every attorney was prudent, especially initially. For example, when the
IRS received a Form W-2 from an employer or a Form 1099 from another payor suggesting
additional income the taxpayer did not report, the IRS sometimes relied on that Form alone,
without conducting deeper investigation. This practice, however, was condemned in Portillo v.
Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128, 1134 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'g on this issue, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1386
(1990), and was proscribed by Congress in I.1RC. § 6201(d). Such reminders reinforced the
circumspection with which Government attorneys usually prepared and presented unreported
income cases.
337. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 132 (1954).
338. Yoon v. Commissioner, 135 F.3d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1998); Campfield v. Commis-
sioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 425,429 (1996), afid, 133 F.3d 906 (2d Cir. 1997).
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lection efforts under certain circumstances."3 9 The court has crafted shifting
burdens for such injunction cases. For example, the Tax Court may enjoin
the IRS from selling any property seized pursuant to a termination orjeop-
ardy assessment and levy against a taxpayer who has filed a Tax Court pe-
tition. " The court has held that, with respect to a motion to stay such a
sale, the taxpayer bears the initial burden of asserting plausible and believ-
able grounds in support of the motion. If she does, the burden then shifts
to the IRS to prove that the sale is necessary and appropriate? "
Similarly, the Tax Court may enjoin the assessment and collection of
tax before completion of Tax Court review of an alleged deficiency. 42 The
Tax Court has held that, with respect to a motion to stay such assessment
and collection, the taxpayer bears the initial burden of asserting plausible
and believable grounds that the assessment or collection is premature. If
she does, the burden then shifts to the IRS to prove that its actions were
proper.3"
(4) Generally, the IRS must assess a tax liability, including any defi-
ciency, within three years of the filing of the tax return,3 4 although a vari-
ety of exceptions can extend this period.345 The courts have held that, if the
IRS issues its statutory notice more than three years after the return is filed,
the IRS bears the burden of establishing that an exception applies" 6 This
meant that "as a matter of general practice the Commissioner ha[d] the
ultimate burden of proof with respect to the statute of limitations.""
(5) In an action to enforce an IRS summons for information, the IRS
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case. If it does so, the burden
shifts to the party opposing the summons to show that there is some other
reason the summons should not be enforced.3"
339. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, §§ 6243
& 6245(a), 102 Stat. 3749-51 (1988) (allowing the Tax Court to review certain sales of seized
property).
340. I.R.C. § 6863(b) (1998).
341. Williams v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 920, 935 (1989).
342. I.RC. § 6213(a) (1998).
343. Kamholz v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 11, 16-17 (1990).
344. I.R.C. § 6501(a).
345. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6501 (c), (e) (listing exceptions, such as filing a false return, failure to
file a return, and omitting a significant part of gross income).
346. E.g., Murray v. United States, 292 F.2d 602, 603-04 (1st Cir. 1961); Reis v. Commis-
sioner, 1 T.C. 9, 12 (1942); Concrete Engineering Co. v. Commissioner, 19 B.TA 212, 221-22
(1930), ajfd, 58 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1932).
347. Forman, supra note 327, at 739.
348. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). To establish that prima facie case,
the IRS must show that it has a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to that
purpose, that the IRS does not already possess the information sought, and that required
administrative steps have been followed. Id.
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(6) The IRS bears the burden of proving that it sent a statutory notice
of deficiency to the taxpayer.
3 4 9
(7) If the taxpayer initially demonstrates that the statutory notice was
arbitrary or without foundation, courts often shift the burden of proof in
the case to the IRS. 50
(8) The IRS may make only one inspection of a taxpayer's books and
records for each tax year unless it notifies the taxpayer of the necessity of
an additional inspection.35' In the event of litigation, the IRS bears the
burden of persuasion as to the applicability of this exception. 52
(9) If the IRS made a refund that it later considers to have been erro-
neous, it may sue to recover it. 53 The Government bears the burden of
proving that some amount was refunded erroneously and what that amount
was.
3 54
(10) When the Government sued to collect taxes despite not having
made an assessment, the burden was on the Government. 55
(11) In addition to the above more-or-less formalized situations, courts
sometimes have shifted some or all of the burden of proof to the IRS as an
ad hoc remedy under the circumstances of the case at hand. 56
In summary of the foregoing statutory, rule, and case law exceptions,
one is struck by the flexibility of the pre-§ 7491 regime. Although taxpayers
bore the burden of proof on most issues under the former rule, there were
numerous exceptions. The regime was capable of evolving, and did evolve,
over time as new conditions or problems were perceived by the legislature
or the courts.5
349. Traxler v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 97, 100 (1973), modified, 63 T.C. 534 (1975).
350. Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (Hall, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting reversal of the burden as alternative to holding for the taxpayer outright); Cohen v.
Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11 (9th Cir. 1959).
351. I,R.C. § 7605(b).
352. E.g., Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1956); U.S. Aluminum Siding
Corp. v. Eshleman, 170 F. Supp. 12, 14-15 (N.D. 111. 1958); In re Foster, 159 F. Supp. 444, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
353. I.R.C. § 7405(b).
354. E.g., Soltermann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387, 387 (9th Cir. 1959).
355. E.g., United States v. Tyson, 40-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9430, at 463 (N.D. 111. 1939).
356. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Commissioner, 973 F.2d 1403, 1408 (8th Cir. 1992) (partly shift-
ing the burden of proof as to a valuation issue when the taxpayer had relied on valuation
tables promulgated by the IRS); Borchers v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 82, 89-91 (1990) (shifting
to the IRS the burden of going forward as to investment tax credit issue); Smith Leasing Co.
v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 37, 41-42 (1964) (shifting to the IRS the burden of going forward as
to whether claimed expenses had previously been deducted by the taxpayer or its predeces-
sor). See generally John T. Piper &James M. Jerge, Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Court, 31
TAx LtW. 303 (1978).
357. Some exceptions to the former general rule, such as the IRS's burden as to civil fraud,
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APPENDIX B
CONSISTENCY OF THE PRE-§ 7491
REGIME WITH
BURDEN-OF-PROOF THEORY GENERALLY
Many courts and commentators have discussed the factors relevant to
allocating the burden of proof, and their formulations have been various.
Writing about burden-of-proof rules generally, Professors Wright and Gra-
ham described the "Three P's" customarily used by the courts in allocating
the burden: Policy, Probability, and Possession of Proof.58 In a leading
article, Dean Martinez discussed five general factors that inform the rules
for allocating the burden in tax cases (in addition to statutory command):
(1) which party has the affirmative of the issue, (2) which party is the plain-
tiff, (3) whether the particular contention is one disfavored by the courts,
(4) which party's scenario as to the contention is the less likely, and (5)
which party has easier access to evidence as to the matter at issue.35
These five factors are a mixture of two styles of legal reasoning: con-
ceptualism and functionalism.36 ° For instance, the question "which party is
the plaintiff?" is a conceptual inquiry. In contrast, the question "which party
has superior access to the facts?" is grounded in concerns such as ease, effi-
ciency, and decisional accuracy, and therefore is a functional inquiry.
Everyone, of course, uses conceptualism sometimes and functionalism
sometimes, but shades of preference exist. I am a confirmed functionalist.
Thus, I would place principal emphasis on the practical consequences
choices produce. In particular, I believe that the "possession of proof" con-
sideration usually should be the controlling factor in allocating the civil tax
have existed for generations. See Revenue Act of 1928, § 601, ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791 (codified at
I.R.C. § 7454(a)). Others, such as that in the § 7430 cost-shifting provisions, arose only re-
cently. See Taxpayers Bill of Rights 2, § 701, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452, 1463 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 7430 (1996)).
358. WRIGHT & GAHAMi, supra note 8, at 556-57. "Probability" involves the perceived
likelihood that a given allegation will be found to be correct. The more surprising or improb-
able the allegation, the more likely the courts are to say to the proponent of that claim:
"You'll have to prove that." Id.
359. Martinez, supra note 39, at 249-55, 268-73. For a discussion of factors unique to the
tax field, see id. at 274-77.
360. Conceptualism chooses between competing answers to legal questions by asking:
"Which answer follows more logically from existing precedents or rules? Which answer more
closely approximates answers already given to similar questions?" Functionalism, on the other
hand, asks: "Which answer is more likely to improve society? What concrete results could be
expected from the different answers, and which set of results is preferable?" See Ernest J.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (discuss-
ing these alternative styles of legal reasoning).
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burden of proof. However, the former civil tax burden-of-proof regime was
capable of being embraced by both conceptualists and functionalists. By
usually placing the burden on the taxpayer but reallocating it to the IRS in
unusual situations, that regime comported well with both the conceptual and
the functional factors stressed by burden-of-proof theory.
A. THEAFFIRMATIVE OF THE ISSUE
In general, the affirmative of an issue-that is, the contention that
something did happen-is thought to be easier to establish than the nega-
tive of the issue-the contention that something did not happen. This has
been thought to support imposing the burden on the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue."' The usefulness of this factor has been criticized,
especially since it is not always clear that a matter in controversy has a natu-
ral affirmative or negative form. 62 Moreover, in my opinion, this factor
tends to bleed into the more important factor as to which party has better
access to evidence.
Whatever the usefulness of this factor, however, the former tax bur-
den-of-proof regime operated consonantly with it. The income tax is by far
the most frequently litigated federal tax. Of litigated income tax issues,
probably the majority involve the taxpayer's eligibility for a deduction (or
credit). The taxpayer has the affirmative of such issues. It would be easier
for the taxpayer to show that she made the expenditure in question and
that the expenditure was of the nature contemplated by a particular deduc-
tion (or credit) section than it would be for the IRS to prove that she made
no expenditure or that all deduction (or credit) sections in the Code are
inapplicable. 3 '
Moreover, when the issue involves not deductibility (or creditability) of
an expense but whether the taxpayer had additional taxable income, the
taxpayer again often is asserting the affirmative of the issue. Such disputes
frequently turn on whether a particular item of receipt falls within one of
the exemption or exclusion provisions of the Code." Again, it is more
361. See, e.g., J,%MES ET AL., supra note 8, at 322 (discussing the generally accepted norms
as to burden of proof).
362. See, e.g., Charles V. Laughlin, The Location of the Burden of Persuasion, 18 Prrr. L. REv.
3, 5-6 (1956).
363. As an example, in one case, the issue involved the source that had generated a par-
ticular gain. Because the IRS raised an adjustment that was not in the statutory notice, the
burden of proof was held to be on the IRS. TAX Gr. R. 142(a). The taxpayer pointed to four
or five possible origins of the gain, which the IRS had not expressly negatived. As a result, the
IRS was held not to have met its burden of proof, so lost. Weaver v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.
1067, 1086 (1956).
364. See, I.RC. §§ 71-90 (listing items specifically included in gross income); 101-139
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natural to compel the taxpayer to show that one particular exclusion sec-
tion applies than to compel the Government to show that all exclusion sec-
tions do not apply.
The principal time when the IRS would be asserting the affirmative in
an income tax case would be when the issue is whether the taxpayer had
greater receipts of an admittedly taxable type than she reported on her
return. Here, it seems more natural to require the IRS to show there was
more income than was reported, than to require the taxpayer to "prove the
negative" that there was not.365
But the pre-§ 7491 regime demonstrated its flexibility on this issue. As
seen, many courts shifted the burden of initial production, sometimes even
the burden of persuasion, to the IRS in unreported income cases.366 As il-
lustrated by income tax cases, therefore, the former burden-of-proof re-
gime fit well with the "who has the affirmative of the issue" factor. The tax-
payer usually has the affirmative of tax issues and usually had the burden of
proof, but a partial or complete shift of the burden to the IRS often oc-
curred when the IRS was the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.
B. THE PLAINTIFF
Dean Martinez also indicated that allocation of the burden should be
informed by which party is the plaintiff. Although this factor too has been
subject to criticism, 67 it continues to be widely applied by courts." Histori-
cally, and at least in part substantively, the former civil tax burden alloca-
(listing items specifically excluded from gross income).
365. For examples of cases in which the burden of proof shifted to the IRS, see Anastasato
v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986); Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062,
1065 (9th Cir. 1982); Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1981); Note,
Proving a Negative-When the Taxpayer Denies Receipt, 70 CORNELL L REV. 141 (1984).
However, some commentators have argued that the difficulty of proving a negative
can be exaggerated. See, e.g., WILLIAM BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE §
255 (1849) (stating that proving a negative is not always as difficult as often suggested); Kevin
W. Saunders, The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative, 15 SETON HALL L REV. 276 (1985)(stating that the difficulty in proving a negative is easily and often overstated). For an appli-
cation of this to unreported income cases, see Note, The Presumption of Correctness: Should the
Commissioner Be Required To Carny the Initial Burden of Production, 55 FORDIAM L REV. 1087,
1102-06 (1987).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 331-36 (discussing court decisions shifting the
burden to the IRS in unreported income cases).
367. See, e.g., Wigmore, supra note 3, at 288; Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading:
An Essay on juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L REV. 5, 11 (1959).
368. "[I]n most litigation, from time immemorial, the burden of proof-i.e., the burden of
persuasion-is on the plaintiff." Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1975);
see, e.g., Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514 (1935).
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tion was consonant with this factor.
Originally, taxpayers had no prepayment judicial recourse for con-
testing federal tax liabilities. 69 They had to pay the taxes in question then
sue for a refund, at first in common law assumpsit actions for money had
and received,"'0 later in statutory actions.37' In a refund suit, the Govern-
ment has the money in question and the taxpayer seeks to obtain it. In this
posture, the taxpayer is the plaintiff, so she would be expected to shoulder
the burden of proof according to this principle. 72
Prepayment remedies for taxpayers developed later, first within the
revenue agency itself, then through the Board of Tax Appeals (the fore-
runner of the Tax Court). 73 In substance, the IRS could be said to be the
plaintiff in a prepayment case-it is seeking to obtain money in the tax-
payer's possession.174 Formally, however, the matter sits differently. Typi-
cally, after audit, the IRS issues a statutory notice of deficiency stating its
determination as to correct tax liability. The prepayment litigation is inau-
gurated when the taxpayer files a petition with the tribunal contesting the
determination. In this sense, the taxpayer is the party initiating the suit.
Because of this formality (and as a matter of habit carried over from the
prior refund tradition), the taxpayer always has been viewed as the plaintiff,
even in prepayment suits.
The "who is the plaintiff?" factor also explains some of the exceptions
to the general rule as it existed before § 7491. When the IRS asserts new
issues or additional deficiencies not contained in the statutory notice, or
when the IRS raises by answer any affirmative defense, it becomes the pro-
ponent of those claims, in effect the plaintiff as to them. This explains
why-consistently with this factor in traditional burden-of-proof theory-
the IRS was assigned the burden as to such matters. 75
369. For detailed discussions of this early period, see HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED
STATEs TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 28-35 (1979); see also Martinez, supra note 39,
at 260-62; William T. Plumb, Jr., Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60
HARV. L. RFv. 685, 686-91 (1947).
370. See, e.g., Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263 (1839); Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 137 (1836).
371. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887).
372. E.g., Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937); David v. Phinney, 350 F.2d 371, 376
(5th Cir. 1965).
373. In 1917, administrative prepayment review of asserted tax deficiencies became avail-
able within the Internal Revenue Bureau (now the IRS). This was followed in 1924 by creation
of the Board of Tax Appeals. See Dubroff, supra note 369, at 35-79 (elaborating on the histori-
cal development of the IRS).
374. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note 167, at 1016 (outlining similarities in these types of
cases),
375. See TAX Gr. R. 142(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 325-30.
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C. DISFAVORED CONTENTIONS
This traditional factor undergirds both the usual burden allocation
under the former general rule and a number of the exceptions to it. At the
general level, two considerations came into play in this regard, at least his-
torically. First, the modem era of taxation in the United States began with
the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. For most of the time
since then, the dominant tendency of the courts, recognizing the centrality
of revenue to the modem state, has been solicitude towards revenue-
raising? 6 This has been given doctrinal expression in constructional rules
which presume that receipts are taxable," and that expenditures are non-
deductible,378 unless shown to the contrary. The existence of such rules
makes arguments for non-taxability or for deductibility disfavored conten-
tions, suggesting, under this traditional factor of burden-of-proof theory,
that the burden usually should be on the taxpayer. Second, the courts often
have invoked a presumption that actions taken by the Government are cor-
rect. In tax law, this presumption of administrative regularity has extended
to both the procedural37 9 and substantive38 aspects of actions by the IRS.318
This presumption adds additional weight to viewing an argument that the
IRS's determination was wrong as being a disfavored contention.
Both principles can be pushed too far. Courts have varied widely in
the extent to which they sought to protect the revenue or to espouse faitlh
in the regularity and correctness of Government actions. 2 Still, for many
376. E.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 604 (1990); Bull v. United States, 295 U.S.
247,259 (1935).
377. E.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) ("This Court has
frequently stated that [current I.R-C. § 61] was used by Congress to exert in this field 'the full
measure of its taxing power.'") (citations omitted).
378. E.g., Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943) ("[A]n in-
come tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and . . . the burden of clearly showing the
right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer."). But see Erwin N. Griswold, An Argument
Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56
HARV. L. REv. 1142 (1943) (arguing that it is a function of the court to interpret the statute
and resolve doubt).
379. R.H. Steams Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934).
380. E.g., Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357, 361 (1930); Thomas v.
Commissioner, 223 F.2d 83, 88 (6th Cir. 1955).
381. The same forces that led the courts to this view also caused them to accord similar
indulgence to the actions of federal regulatory agencies, for much of the modem period. See
Steve R. Johnson, Note, Reasonable Relation Reassessed: The Examination of Private Documents by
Federal Regulatory Agencies, 56 N.Y.U. L REv. 742, 749-53 (1981) (discussing relaxed restric-
tions on agency access).
382. Karl Llewellyn's classic pairing of antithetical canons of statutory interpretation, Karl
N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About Hou, Stat-
utesAre to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950), has parallels in tax. Opposed to the above
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courts, throughout much of our modem chapter of taxation, a desire not to
impede revenue collection and tax administration has buttressed other
reasons to place the proof burden on taxpayers.
In addition, "disfavored contention" analysis is dynamic, not static. If,
as I believe, revenue-protection and presumed-administrative-regularity
have often been a "thumb on the scale" in the past, that need not always
obtain. Especially since the Reagan Administration and given the recent
Republican ascendancy in Congress, many have felt that we need to be
protectedfrom the government, not by it. Lively controversy now exists as to
whether, at this stage in our political evolution, the country is better served
by the marginal dollar entering the federal fisc or by its remaining in pri-
vate hands. Depending on the outcome of this national debate, there may
be an inversion in which contentions are disfavored. 83 Indeed, § 7491 may
be seen as representing just that inversion, effected legislatively rather than
judicially."t
The "disfavored contention" factor of traditional burden-of-proof the-
ory also explains a number of exceptions to the former general rule. It is
"un-genteel" to assert that a taxpayer committed fraud,8 5 or violated appli-
cable non-tax law,"St and it is irregular to assert that normal procedural
steps and safeguards must be omitted because of collection exigencies.8 7
Accordingly, the pre-§ 7491 regime placed the burden of proof on the IRS
when its case involved such assertions.
pro-Government precepts are several favoring taxpayers. See, e.g., Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S.
151, 153 (1917) (stating that, if the statute's application to a situation is unclear, doubt should
be resolved against taxability); Northville Dock Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 68, 73 (1969),
affd, 427 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that deductions and credits should be liberally con-
strued to accomplish their subsidy purposes). However, the pro-revenue maxims have loomed
larger in tax jurisprudence than have the anti-revenue maxims.
383. The retrenchment of the formerly nigh universal reach of federal authority under the
Commerce Clause, illustrates that judicial doctrine is not immune from this national ideologi-
cal debate. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that a statute ex-
ceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause).
384. More accurately, § 7491 could have been so seen if it really had altered allocation of
the burden in actual cases.
385. For burden reversals as to fraud issues, see I.RC. §§ 7422(e), 7427 & 7454(a)-(b).
Also, I.R.C. § 6902(a) is germane since transferee liability is the tax equivalent of fraudulent
conveyance. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 42-46 (1958).
386. For burden reversals as to such issues, see I.R.C. §§ 162(c)(l)-(2) § 280G(b)(2)(B).
387. For burden reversals as to such issues, see I.R.C. § 7429(g)(1) (discussing jeopardy
and termination assessments). See supra notes 344-47 and accompanying text (discussing
statute of limitations exceptions).
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D. PROBABILITY
Another traditional factor in allocating the burden of proof is prob-
ability-the party asserting the more unlikely or improbable scenario is
more likely to have the burden imposed upon her.-88 Viewed categorically
(without reference to the particulars of any given controversy), whose con-
tention is less likely to be correct: the IRS's contention that the taxpayer has
greater tax liability than reported or the taxpayer's contention that she
does not?
We want to believe that taxpayers usually are honest and that the posi-
tions they take on their tax returns usually are correct. This desire com-
ports with fact. As far as can be ascertained, the voluntary compliance rate
for American taxpayers is high (though dropping). 89 From the numbers,
one might conclude that the probability factor cuts in taxpayers' favor. But
go deeper. Litigated tax controversies do not involve items selected ran-
domly from the universe of tax returns. They involve only items the IRS
believes erroneous, and a formidable array of checks are built into the sys-
tem to cull spurious IRS adjustments before trial. Specifically, most returns
are selected for audit by the IRS based on their reporting items significantly
divergent from the statistical norm for items of that kind claimed by com-
parable taxpayers." ° If the taxpayer disagrees with the conclusions of the
revenue agent, she may take the matter to the agent's supervisor. 9 ' The
taxpayer then has the opportunity for administrative review through the
IRS Appeals Office, whose very purpose is to resolve cases short of trial.392
If no settlement occurs, a statutory notice of deficiency will be issued, but,
in many cases, only after further review by the attorneys in the IRS District
Counsel Office. 93 If the taxpayer files a Tax Court petition, the case often
is referred back to the Appeals Office for another attempt at settlement. 9'
If Appeals fails, IRS Counsel often succeeds in settling the case short of
388. E.g., JAEs ET AL, supra note 8, at 324.
389. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 276, at 117 (stating the voluntary compliance rate was over
90% in 1964-1968 and is about 80% today).
390. See, e.g., Saltzman, supra note 88, at 8-9 to 8-10 (discussing the procedures by which
the IRS selects returns for audit).
391. Id. at8-51,8-96.
392. Typically, 85% or more of the cases handled by the Appeals Office are disposed of by
agreement with the taxpayer. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HIGHLIGHTS 1990, at 41
(reporting that 47,446 and 39,845 nondocketed cases were settled by Appeals by agreement in
1989 and 1990, respectively, versus 3,313 and 3,680 unagreed cases).
393. See I.R.M. 4469(3)-(9).
394. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HIGHLIGHTS 1990, at 41 (30,604 and 27,017
docketed cases settled by Appeals by agreement in 1989 and 1990, respectively, versus 5432
and 4586 unagreed cases).
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trial." 5
One may suspect that, if the IRS still thinks there is triable return inac-
curacy after all these levels of review, it probably is right more often than
not. The fact that the IRS wins many more litigated cases than it loses.96
does nothing to diminish this suspicion. Thus, the pre-§ 7491 general allo-
cation of the burden of proof accorded with the probability factor of bur-
den-of-proof theory.
This factor also explains some of the exceptions to the former rule.
For instance, I.R.C. § 83 governs taxation of property transferred in con-
nection with the performance of services. The taxpayer's inclusion into in-
come usually is measured by reference to the fair market value of the prop-
erty.3 9 7 However, in the case of property subject to a non-lapse restriction
permitting sale of the property only at a price determined under a formula,
the statute puts the burden of proof on the IRS to prove that fair market
value is different from the formula price.398 This exception reflected a
probability judgment, Congress's determination that such a formula price is
likely to describe accurately the property's fair market value. 99
E. POSSESSION OF PROOF
Traditionally, the extent to which the opposing parties have access to
information and evidence as to the transactions at issue in the case, has
been an important factor in allocating the burden of proof."n This makes
sense in terms of efficiency: it is cheaper for the party already in possession
395. See, e.g., MARSHALL W. TAYLOR ET AL, TAX COURT PRACTICE 116-20 (7th ed. 1990)
(discussing settling with IRS counsel).
396. Although statistics are not consistently reported, the available information is strongly
to this effect. For instance, in the years between 1965 and 1986, the IRS won (partly or com-
pletely) between 63% and 78% of district court tax cases and between 83% and 96% of Tax
Court cases. Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the ProposalAdvanced by the Federal
Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied Constitutional Theoy, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 998
(1991) (summarizing information from various Annual Reports of the Commissioner of the
IRS). More recent information reflects generally similar results. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE DATA BOOK 1996, at 31; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 1993-94 DATA BOOK, at 67;
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HIGHLIGHTS 1990, at 43.
Of course, these figures do not control for the burden of proof. It is impossible to
know how much these figures would be depressed under a different allocation of the burden.
I suspect the IRS's win rate would remain well over 50%.
397. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1) (1998).
398. I.R.C. § 83(d)(1) (1998).
399. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1645, 1735-36 (1969).
400. See, e.g., Wigmore, supra note 3, at 290 (giving examples of statutes and cases apply-
ing this principle and putting the burden of proof on the party with peculiar means of knowl-
edge).
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of the evidence to produce it than to compel the other party to get it from
him or to replicate it from other sources."' Decisional accuracy cuts in the
same direction. A decision is only as good as the information on which it
rests. 4 2 Thus, the burden of proof should be allocated so as to encourage
the party in possession of, or with better access to, the relevant information
to bring it to the attention of the tribunal.
Typically, the taxpayer, but not the IRS, was a party to the transactions
at issue in the case. The taxpayer, but not the IRS, can testify from first-
hand knowledge and has kept (or had the chance to keep) documentary or
physical evidence of those transactions. This superior knowledge and this
superior access to evidence strongly support allocating the burden of proof
in civil tax cases to the taxpayer, 403 as the former rule generally did.
However, in rare cases, the informational advantage is with the IRS.
For example, the Tax Court has the authority to enjoin IRS collection ac-
tivities in certain circumstances.Y The Tax Court has put the main burden
of persuasion on the IRS in such cases, reflecting its perception that the IRS
is in the better position to explain the nature of, and justification for, its
collection activities.405 Thus, this traditional factor explains some exceptions
to the former rule as well as the former general rule.
In summary of the foregoing, the pre-§ 7491 rule comported well with
the factors traditionally governing allocation of the burden of proof.
401. So, as Bentham observed, the burden of proof should be imposed "on whom it will sit
the lightest." THE WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 139 (John Bowring ed. 1962).
402. As Francis Bacon told us four centuries ago: "knowledge itself is power." Religious
Meditations, in 7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 253 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath eds., 1st
ed. London 1870) (1597).
403. For greater detail of this idea, see supra Part III.B. 1.
404. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6213(a), 6863(b) (1998) (describing procedures for filing petitions
with Tax Court and listing conditions in case of income, estate, or gift taxes for the stay of
collection ofjeopardy assessments).
405. See supra text accompanying notes 339-43 (describing circumstances in which the IRS
has the burden of proving its collection activities were appropriate).
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